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Resumen en Castellano
El trabajo de investigacio´n realizado para la obtencio´n del grado de Doctor en Economı´a se com-
pone de tres trabajos en el a´rea de Organizacio´n Industrial y Disen˜o Organizacional de las Empresas.
El primer capı´tulo analiza la delegacio´n o´ptima de la toma de decisiones dentro de una empresa
monopo´lica que vende varios productos en varios mercados con el objetivo de balancear los in-
centivos a adquirir y transmitir la informacio´n de mercado dentro de la organizacio´n. El segundo
capı´tulo responde a la pregunta si la introduccio´n de mecanismos que ayuden a los consumidores
a realizar reclamaciones cuando reciben productos defectuosos puede motivar a las empresas a
proveer productos de calidad inferior. El tercer capı´tulo es un trabajo conjunto con Daniel Garcı´a
Gonza´lez. En este capı´tulo estudiamos los efectos de la provisio´n de informacio´n pu´blica y privada
en los incentivos a competir en un duopolio con productos diferenciados y costes heteroge´neos,
cuando hay informacio´n imperfecta sobre las preferencias en la demanda.
Capı´tulo 1: Organizational Design of Multi-Product Multi-Market Firms.
Este capı´tulo busca entender los determinantes del disen˜o organizacional y del esquema de compen-
sacio´n en una empresa multi-mercado y multi-producto cuando la rentabilidad esta´ condicionada
por los incentivos a transmitir la informacio´n del mercado dentro de la firma. Modificando la es-
tructura organizacional- centralizando o decentralizando la toma de decisiones- y cambiando los
incentivos a trave´s de las compensaciones de los managers, la empresa puede afectar los flujos y la
veracidad de la informacio´n, y, por ende, la rentabilidad de la empresa. Por medio de un modelo
matema´tico formal, en este trabajo encontramos que, al ser multi-producto (lo que implica tener
que compartir un recurso escaso en diferentes mercados), la oficina central de una empresa vincula
la toma de decisiones de diferentes productos. La empresa decentraliza la toma de decisiones sobre
productos con mayor retorno a la diferenciacio´n, mientras que centraliza la toma de decisiones de
productos con menor retorno a la diferenciacio´n. Como la centralizacio´n es complementaria con
la estandarizacio´n del producto y la decentralizacio´n es complementaria con la diferenciacio´n de
productos, el disen˜o organizacional condiciona la estrategia que la empresa sigue en el mercado.
La relacio´n entre los derechos en la toma de decisiones para diferentes productos se mantiene au´n
cuando la oficina central de la empresa no puede controlar la asignacio´n de recursos dentro de cada
divisio´n subsidiaria. La contribucio´n de este trabajo es extender la literatura econo´mica de disen˜o
interno de la firma para el caso de empresas multi-producto, lo que implica introducir un problema
de multi-tarea en el problema del disen˜o organizacional.
Capı´tulo 2: Product Reliability, Consumers’ Complaints and Market Performance: The case
of Consumers’ Associations.
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Este trabajo analiza la relacio´n entre la calidad de un producto, medida como la probabilidad de que
el producto sea defectuoso, ofrecida por un monopolista y la disposicio´n a reclamar de los consum-
idores que reciben productos defectuosos. Existe amplia evidencia que algunos consumidores no
realizan reclamos para cambiar, reparar o pedir alguna compensacio´n cuando reciben un producto
defectuoso. Esta evidencia sugiere que existe heterogeneidad en el coste de realizar reclamos entre
los consumidores. Por otro lado, la empresa determina la probabilidad con la que un consumidor
recibe un producto defectuoso. Obviamente que la empresa anticipa el comportamiento de los con-
sumidores en el momento de elegir la probabilidad con la que un producto falla. A partir de esta
relacio´n, se estudia el efecto de una reduccio´n en el coste de realizar reclamos de los consumidores
sobre la eleccio´n que la empresa realiza sobre la probabilidad de que el producto sea defectuoso.
La reduccio´n en el coste de reclamar puede estar generada, por ejemplo, por la introduccio´n de
asociaciones de consumidores.
El resultado principal del trabajo consiste en demostrar que la empresa puede elegir subir la prob-
abilidad con la que el producto resulta defectuoso cuando se reduce el coste de reclamar de los
consumidores. A trave´s de un modelo matema´tico identifiamos dos efectos. Por un lado, incremen-
tar dicha probabilidad reduce el coste de produccio´n de la empresa aunque incrementa el coste de
gestionar los reclamos de los consumidores (produccio´n y gestio´n de los reclamos). Por otro lado,
aumentar la probabilidad de que el producto sea defectuoso reduce el valor que los consumidores
asignan al producto. El efecto neto dependera´ de la circunstancias del mercado. Si los consum-
idores tienen un menor coste de reclamar realizan ma´s reclamos lo cual motiva una reduccio´n en
la probabilidad de que el producto sea defectuoso. Sin embargo, la disponibilidad a pagar de los
consumidores se vuelve menos sensible a la probabilidad de recibir un producto defectuoso cuando
los consumidores tienen un menor coste de hacer reclamos: una vez que los consumidores tienen
un mecanismo barato que les garantiza un producto defectuoso, ya sea porque el producto no falla
o porque lo cambian a bajo coste, el valor que se le asigna a la fiabilidad del producto cae.
La principal implicacio´n empı´rica de este trabajo es que las asociaciones de consumidores pueden
tener objectivos en conflicto. Sus objetivos de reducir el coste de hacer reclamos de los consumi-
dores y garantizar la provisio´n de productos de alta fiabilidad pueden no estar alineados.
Capı´tulo 3: Hotelling Competition for a Consumer with Unknown Taste.
En este capı´tulo (un trabajo en conjunto con Daniel Garcı´a-Gonza´lez) analizamos un mercado
donde ni el consumidor ni el productor tienen informacio´n precisa sobre cua´les son las preferencias
del consumidor. Las empresas deben primero disen˜ar los productos y luego competir en precios por
la demanda. Sin embargo, el consumidor puede proveer informacio´n adicional a las empresas sobre
sus propias preferencias que ayudarı´an a las empresas en el disen˜o de sus productos. Formalmente,
utilizamos un modelo de Hotelling de diferenciacio´n horizontal donde hay dos empresas que eligen
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localizacio´n-luego-competencia-en-precios con costes de transporte cuadra´ticos y heterogeneidad
en los costes de produccio´n. En este trabajo mostramos que la existencia de heterogeneidad en
costes y la provisio´n de sen˜ales informativas puede fomentar la competencia entre empresas, in-
crementando el excedente del consumidor a pesar de reducir beneficios y el bienestar. Finalmente,
probamos que la existencia de sen˜ales privadas puede fomentar la competencia, mientras que la
existencia de sen˜ales pu´blicas puede desincentivar la competencia, generando importantes implica-
ciones de polı´tica para el disen˜o de mercados y de subastas para adquirir productos.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis dissertation consists on three independent research papers in Industrial and Organiza-
tional Economics. The first chapter, in Organizational Economics, studies the organizational design
of a multi-product multi-market firm. The second chapter, in Industrial Economics, analyzes the in-
teraction of consumers complaining behavior and the firm’s choice of product reliability. The third
chapter (with Daniel Garcı´a-Gonza´lez), in Industrial Economics, seeks to understand the incentives
of a consumer to provide information about her own preferences to the suppliers before firms design
their products.
In the first chapter we seek to understand how a multi-product multi-market firm (for example, a
multinational firm) designs its organizational structure and compensation scheme when its prof-
itability is conditioned by how market information flows within the company. By modifying its
organizational structure–centralizing or decentralizing decision making–and changing the weights
of its compensation scheme, the firm can shape how information flows and is represented, chang-
ing the firm’s profitability. We find that, when being multi-product (having to allocate a scarce
resource between markets), the headquarters links the organizational design of decision rights be-
tween different product markets. The headquarters decentralizes decision rights in products with
higher returns to product differentiation while it centralizes decision rights in products with lower
returns to product differentiation. As centralization is complementary with product standardization
and decentralization is complementary with product differentiation, the organizational design con-
ditions the firm’s market policy. The relation among product’s decision rights remains even when
the headquarters cannot control how local managers allocate resources in their own local divisions.
Our results are robust to different generalizations. Our paper therefore, contributes to the literature
on organizational design by analyzing the case of multi-product multi-market firms.
In the second chapter we analyze the relation between consumers’ claiming behavior and product’s
reliability. In their dealings with retailers and suppliers, regulations and warranties ensure that
consumers can seek a repair, a replacement or a refund if the good they have purchased is faulty. The
evidence, however, indicates that few consumers pursue any form of compensation, suggesting that
1
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consumers have heterogeneous claiming costs. Moreover, product’s reliability, which determines
how likely it is that a consumer receives a defected product, is endogenous to the problem of the
firm. The fact that some consumers have high claiming cost and that firms choose the product’s
reliability provides a rationale for the role that consumers’ associations play.
In this paper, we analyze the monopolist’s pricing and product reliability problem when consumers
are entitled to product replacement and assess the implications of a decrease in consumers’ trans-
action costs. Our results suggest that the appearance of the consumers’ associations could, instead,
lower product reliability. A reduction in consumers’ claiming cost increases the cost associated with
replacements but also reduces the sensitivity to product reliability of consumers’ willingness to pay.
Alone, the manufacturing cost of the replacement units would make the firm increase the level of
its product reliability, but the presence of the expected utility effect may yield opposite results.
The main empirical implication of the paper is to show that consumer associations may have con-
flicting goals: reducing consumers’ claiming cost and increasing product reliability may not be
aligned. The firm may decide to produce a less reliable product if more consumers request a re-
placement of a defected product. We draw empirical evidence from the pattern of recalls and com-
plaints in the U.S. car market around 1995 (the year in which the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) incorporated on-line filings) and find that it appears consistent with this
prediction.
In the third chapter, a joint work with Daniel Garcı´a-Gonza´lez, we study a market where neither
the consumer nor the suppliers have precise information about the consumer’s taste. Firms first
design their products and then compete in prices for consumer’s demand. However, the consumer
can provide some additional information about her own preferences to the suppliers that can be
used for designing their products. This information can be provided through private meetings or
public announcements. Formally, we analyze a Hotelling’s duopoly game of location-then-price-
competition choice with quadratic transportation cost and firms with heterogeneous costs, under the
assumption that firms are uncertain about consumer’s taste. We show that firms’ heterogeneity and
the existence of informative signals can foster competition, thereby increasing consumer surplus in
spite of decreasing profits and welfare. Finally, we show that private signals can foster competition
while public signals can discourage competition, having important policy implications for markets
and procurement design.
2
Chapter 2
Organizational Design of Multi-Product
Multi-Market Firms
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we seek to understand how a multi-product multi-market firm (for example, a multi-
national firm) designs its organizational structure and compensation scheme when its profitability
is conditioned by how market information flows within the company. By modifying its organi-
zational structure–centralizing or decentralizing decision making–and changing the weights of its
compensation scheme, the firm can shape how information flows and is used, changing the firm’s
profitability. Our paper contributes to the literature on organizational design by analyzing the case
of multi-product multi-market firms highlighting a relation on how decision rights are allocated
within a firm.
In the model, a monopolist manufactures two different products to sell in two (country) markets.
The products have independent demands (they are, for example, coffee and candy bars) and can be
customized to meet the country demand’s specificities. In each country, the firm has a manager who
oversees demand information and who may have product-design decision rights if decision making
has been decentralized.
The two country managers are under the umbrella of a headquarters’ office (hereafter, HQ) that has
the same objective function as the firm. Country demands are heterogeneous (for example, they
have different demand elasticities) and thus country-level profits are maximized when the prod-
uct’s characteristics are tailored to the specificities of the country’s demand. The country manager,
however, only imperfectly observes his own country’s demand heterogeneity, but can improve the
quality of his signal by devoting more time and effort to information acquisition.
Managerial time, however, is a scarce resource that must be split between the two product markets
the manager oversees. Time and effort are complementary. Effort determines the quality of the
signal, while time lowers the cost of exerting it—that is, exerting the same amount of effort over a
longer period of time is less costly to the manager. Nonetheless, the decisions in the two markets
3
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are not independent: as time is a limited resource, the additional time devoted to one market is not
devoted to the other and this results in an increase in the latter market’s cost of effort.
The firm must decide whether, and how much, to customize the products to the countries it sells
to, adding hazelnut flavoring to its coffee or mixing crunchy rice puffs in its chocolate bars. This
decision can be delegated to the country’s manager, resulting in a decentralized structure, or be
centralized in the HQ’s office. Country managers are self-interested and their pays are endogenous
to the firm. If their pay is simply a share of the firm’s aggregate profits, we say their interests are
aligned, while, instead, if they are an unequal average of the two countries’ profits, we say their
incentives are misaligned.
After observing their private signals, each manager acts upon his information. With centralized
decision-making, the managers simultaneously send reports to the HQ’s office. It is this office that,
after receiving the two reports, decides the specificities of the products to manufacture. Instead,
with decentralized decision-making, reports are exchanged between country managers, who then
unilaterally determine the characteristics of their two products.
Obviously, when sending reports, the manager may be strategic, aiming to bias the characteristics of
the products chosen by either the HQ or the other country’s manager. Managers may misreport their
observed signals to strategically bias product decisions. If the chosen products are identical across
country markets, there are economies of scale in production and thus, cost savings. If, instead,
the products are heterogeneous, the firm raises revenues as it is implementing third-degree price
discrimination. Therefore, when misreporting, the manager seeks to have the two countries sell the
same product, yet he wants this product be the ideal product in his own country. From the firm’s
point of view, having the manager misreport information is costly since it lowers the accuracy of the
information transmitted, upon which other agents (HQ or other country) make product decisions.
To align the manager’s incentives, the firm can modify the manager’s compensation, making it more
or less aligned with the firm’s profit, and/or decentralize decision-making.
To understand the workings of the model and gauge intuition for the results obtained in the de-
scribed environment, it is useful to start with the existing literature. As our model builds upon this
literature, it inherits some of its workings. Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008)1 analyze the
problem of a multi-market (two countries) single-product firm when the manager of each country
perfectly, but privately observes information about true demand characteristics. As in our paper,
there are economies of scale in homogenizing products and there are also gains from price discrim-
ination when customizing the products to the respective country markets. Different from our model,
however, are that information is exogenous and does not arise from exerting effort or allocating a
scarce resource and that the compensation scheme is exogenously given.
Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) show that, for compensation schemes that align incen-
tives, the firm prefers to decentralize decisions, while for those that misalign them, the firm prefers
1See Rantakari (2008) for the case of asymmetric organizational design in the environment of two country single-
product firm with private (perfectly observed) information.
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to centralize them. To see this, consider the case of perfect alignment (country managers and HQ
have the same objective function). Since there is perfect alignment, the maximization problems
of all agents are the same and thus, regardless of who decides, the same decisions are made. As
the misalignment increases, the weight on the manager’s own country profit does too, the man-
ager, then, starts having incentives to misrepresent information. In his report, the manager seeks
to implement product characteristics that are close to his ideal product, as this makes his country’s
division profit grow. If the misalignment is small, the policy the country manager chooses with de-
centralization is similar to the one the HQ would choose, albeit the manager makes his choice with
better information, and reduces the mismatch with the country’s true ideal product. The manager
bases his choice on his own observed information and the report that the other sends. Since the
two managers have similar objective functions (the misalignment is small), there is little incentive
to lie about the reports to each other and thus there is only a small bias in their choices. As the
misalignment of incentives increases, however, decisions’ biases increase under decentralization as
objective functions now differ. Moreover communication under decentralization becomes too poor
as they seek to effectively bias the other country’s product implementation. As a result, the HQ
prefers to centralize decisions and pursue lower production costs through product standardization.
Although the managers also misreport information in their communication with the HQ the bias
is smaller than it would be if the information were sent to the other manager. The HQ’s objective
function, being the sum of the two country profits, is closer to the country’s objective function than
the objective function of the other country and thus there are fewer incentives to lie.
Rantakari (forthcoming) can be viewed as adding a new trade-off to this single-product two-country
environment. Now the manager does not perfectly observe the country’s characteristics, instead,
like in our paper, he obtains a signal that can be made more precise by exerting costly effort. As
in Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008), if the objective functions are aligned, the manager
has no incentive to lie when reporting the market’s characteristic. However, because the cost of
effort is only incurred by the manager and thus in his aligned objective function it carries more
weight than the country’s profit, he exerts less effort than optimal for the firm. With less effort,
the manager obtains lower quality information, by choosing a product that does not coincide with
the country’s ideal which lowers profits. To give incentives to the manager to exert more effort
and obtain higher quality information, the firm must compensate him by misaligning the objective
function, but then the manager has incentives to misreport the signal, which, in turn, lowers profits.
When the misalignment needed to induce effort is too large, the communication between countries
is too imperfect, as their diverging objective functions lead them to strongly bias the reports, and
this makes the firm prefer centralized decision-making.
In our paper, we extend this environment to make the firm multi-product and multi-market. Being
multi-product may have multiple effects in the problem of the firm, here we focus on one: the
country manager allocates a scarce resource—managerial time—to acquire information in the two
markets he oversees. The product markets have independent demand yet differ in their returns to
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product differentiation, which makes the quality of information more valuable in one market than
in the other.
Being multi-product and endogenously determining the allocation of the scarce resource qualita-
tively modify the findings. If time allocation between product markets were, instead, exogenous,
the problem of the firm would be equivalent to the problem of two multi-market single-product
firms and thus the results in Rantakari (forthcoming) would apply separately to each market. But,
if the allocation of time is endogenous to the manager, as it is in our paper, the results are no longer
an immediate generalization of Rantakari (forthcoming). The asymmetry of the returns to differ-
entiation makes the firm want to shift resources (time and effort) to the market with higher returns
to differentiation. To provide incentives for such a shift, the firm misaligns incentives, decentral-
izing decision-making in the high-return market, and aligning incentives and centralizing decision
marking in the market with lower returns to differentiation. That is, to induce the correct shift of
resources, the firm jointly modifies the return to effort and time in the two markets.
Nonetheless, this negatively correlated allocation of decision rights may not be optimal as it misses
out on one effect in the market with lower return. If the difference in return between the two
markets exists but is small, the cost of shifting resources away from the market with low return and
of obtaining bad quality information in this market, is large. Low quality information means that
product decisions with centralization are “incorrect” and yield low profitability although initially
this market was almost as profitable as the other. To offset this effect, the firm modifies its decision
to also decentralize the market with lower returns to differentiation so that more resources are
devoted to it. That is, if the differences in returns to differentiation between markets are small, the
firm prefers to decentralize the two markets. If, instead, the differences are large, the market with
higher returns to differentiation is decentralized while the other is not.
It is worth noting that whether the firm prefers to decentralize the two markets depends critically
on the manager’s allocation of time not being verifiable. If the HQ was to monitor the allocation
of time, the firm would not need to decentralize the market with lower returns to provide incen-
tives. Instead, the firm could simply force the manager to devote more time to it. Then, with more
time being devoted, the manager would obtain, and transmit, better information and this would, in
turn, raise the profitability of product standardization and increase the returns from centralizing the
market with lower returns.
Lastly, there are other strains of literature that our work relates to. Athey and Roberts (2001), Friebel
and Raith (2010), and Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (forthcoming) explore other environments but
share with Rantakari (forthcoming) and our paper the trade-off between the choice of effort and the
quality of decision making. Our paper also relates to the organizational design literature that uses
a mechanism design approach, which is summarized in Mookherjee (2006). This literature ana-
lyzes the trade-offs between performance and incentives (not the allocation of decision rights) by
assuming that contracts are complete, which implies that the revelation principle applies. In our
framework, and in the one of Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (forthcom-
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ing), imposing completeness of contracts would imply that decision rights are always centralized,
making the framework unsuitable to understand the problem of organizational design: contract in-
completeness (i.e., pays that are contingent on realized profits) and decision-making allocation are
inherent to the same problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe the model and solve it in Section 4.3.
In Section 2.4 we extend the model to consider endogenous coordination needs and externalities in
information acquisition, showing that our results are robust. In Section 3.6, we conclude.
2.2 Setup of the Model
A multi-division firm produces two products, A and B, which it sells in two different regional
markets, 1 and 2. Each regional division is controlled by a local division manager who is in charge of
obtaining information about demands’ characteristics. We denote by θ ji the demand characteristic
of product j in region i, for j ∈ {A,B} and i∈ {1,2}.2 Product demands are unrelated both by region
and by product, which implies that demands’ characteristics are independently distributed. We
assume that θ ji is uniformly distributed over the interval [−θ j,θ j], where θA and θB are bounded
and, without loss of generality, θA ≥ θB.
We define a1A as the type of product A the firm offers in region 1, where a1A ∈ R. We define a
firm’s product strategy for market A as a pair of actions (a1A,a2A).3 For instance, given a strategy
for product A, (a1A,a2A), and a taste for product A in region 1, θ1A, profits derived from product A
in region 1 are,
Π1A = K− (a1A−θ1A)2−β (a1A−a2A)2.
The term K captures the maximum potential profits that the firm can obtain from product A.4 The
potential profits K and the actual profits Π1A can differ for two reasons: 1) the firm does not achieve
a good fit between product strategy and local demand characteristics in region 1, represented by
the term (a1A−θ1A)2; 2) the firm’s strategy does not accomplish a good coordination in product A
across regions, represented by (a1A−a2A)2. The more standard the product strategy, the lower the
term (a1A−a2A)2, and the better the coordination across regions. Similarly, we define the profit for
each regional division in each product as Π1B, Π2A and Π2B.
The payoff of each local manager depends on the compensation scheme designed by the headquar-
ters. For each product j, we denote by s j the share of the division 2’s profit in market of product j
2The parameter θ represents demand characteristics that can be used by the firm to increase its profits. For example,
suppose a market with horizontal product differentiation and installed capacity, where preferences are single-peaked at
θ , such that firm’s profits increase as its product is closer to the bliss point θ .
3In this paper we use the concept of strategy to represent two different ideas. ”Firm’s strategy” is intended to represent
the set of decisions that the firm as a whole takes and the objectives it pursues. ”Players’ strategies”, in the sense of the
game-theoretic literature, will refer to the mappings from histories into actions that every agent is entitled to choose.
4In an extension in Section 2.4.1, the term K is assumed to be an increasing function of the level of divisional
integration. The level of integration represents the losses for not having a good coordination between product strategies.
Some papers require that this level of divisional integration is a firm’s choice variable and some papers do not. See
Section 2.4 for a discussion.
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that is awarded to division 1 and (1− s j) the share of division 1’s profits in market of product j that
remains in division 1. The value of s j (∈ [0,0.5]) defines how much aligned the incentives of local
managers are in terms of product j. For example, in one extreme case when s j = 0, a local manager
only cares about his own profits in market of product j; in the other extreme case when s j = 0.5,
a local manager cares equally about his own profits and the other manager’s profits in market of
product j, i.e., the manager receives half of the total firm’s profits. The payoff of the local manager
of division 1 in market j is
U j1 = (1− s j)Π j1+ s jΠ j2−C(e, t), j ∈ {A,B},
where C(e, t) is the cost of acquiring information of precision e when the manager allocates the
amount t of resources, e.g., managerial time.
The headquarters chooses the organizational design of the firm, which is defined as an allocation
of the decision rights, g, and as a compensation scheme, s for each product market, to maximize
the expected sum of division payoffs. Decision rights can be centralized by the headquarters or
decentralized to the local managers, g ∈ {C;D}, where C stands for centralization and D for de-
centralization. Under centralization of decision rights, each manager sends reports about demands’
characteristics to the headquarters before it makes a decision of the product strategy. Under decen-
tralization, local managers may communicate between themselves before taking a decision about
the product to be sold in their own regions. This means that under decentralization the firm’s product
strategy results from the addition of two separate decisions.5
The problem of the headquarters choosing the optimal organization design would be simple if there
were no agency problems. But, as communication is soft and non-verifiable, local managers act
strategically to exaggerate their local information in their own interest. Following the literature
starting from Alonso et al (2008), we model informal communication as a one-round cheap talk
model (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).6
Moreover, information about demand characteristics is not perfectly observed by local managers.
Instead, local managers observe an imperfect signal of demand characteristics with the following
technology: the realization of the signal θˆ equals the true value θ with probability
√
e and equals a
random draw from the distribution of θ with probability 1−√e. The quality of this signal reflects
the effort and resources local managers apply to learning about demand characteristics, and it is
observable but non-verifiable to the organizational participants.
5Our framework is symmetric and we follow the literature to concentrate on symmetric structures for each market j
( j ∈ {A,B}) which implies centralizing or decentralizing decision making. Defining s ji the share of product j in region
i the symmetric structure implies s j1 = s j2 = s j. Similarly if g ji is the allocation of decision right of product j in region
i the symmetric structure implies g j1 = g j2 = g j. For these results in asymmetric structures see Alonso et al (2008) and
Rantakari (2008).
6Also see Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) for a reflection over information transmission within organizations: “we
assume that only the surface content of a message like “produce 100 widgets” can be grasped costlessly; the subtler
content, which depends on drawing an inference from the message using knowledge of the sender’s decision rule, can be
inferred only at a cost.”
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The cost of acquiring a signal of quality
√
e exerting a level e of effort and allocating t resources
is C(e, t) ≡ µ(t)C(e)σ2. Each local division has a budget of 1 of resources, i.e., 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and
tA+tB ≤ 1 per local division, and effort is a free choice in e∈ [0,1]. We assume C(e)> 0, C′(e)> 0,
C′′(e)> 0, µ(t)> 0, µ ′(t)< 0, µ ′′(t)< 0, and limt→0 µ(t) = +∞. We normalize the cost function
to be proportional to product demand variability, σ2, i.e., it is more difficult to find the information
when it is disperse in a bigger interval. The function C(e) provides the convexity of the cost of effort
in learning about market characteristics. The function µ(t) scales the marginal cost of that effort.
Exerting effort and allocating resources in collecting information in one market are complementary.
The effort determines the precision of the signal, while resources assigned reduce the cost of this
effort. For example, it is less costly for a manager to acquire an amount of information if this is
exerted over a longer period of time.7 We assume that C(e) =−(e+ log(1−e)) and µ(t) = µ (0.5t )b
with µ ∈R+ and b ∈ [0,1].8 We analyze two different cases concerning the allocation of resources.
In our benchmark case, the headquarters controls how resources are allocated. In the second case,
local managers are in charge of resource allocation.9
Finally, the timing of the model for the benchmark case where the headquarters controls resource
allocation is as follows (Figure 2.1): first, the headquarters chooses the firm’s structure (decision
making and compensation scheme) for each product and an allocation of resources in each division;
second, local managers simultaneously and independently choose how much effort, e, to devote to
collect local information about each product taste; third, signals θˆi j with precisions ei j about the
true values of θi j are observed; fourth, strategic communication takes place; fifth, products ai j are
chosen and, finally, payoffs are delivered. Figure 2.2.a shows a mix organizational design where
the firm decentralizes the decision right of product A and centralizes the decision rights of product
B. Manager 1 chooses a1A and manager 2 chooses a2A after they communicate with each other. The
headquarters chooses a1B and a2B after communicating with country managers. Figure 2.2.b shows
an organizational design where the firm decentralizes the decision rights of both products.
For the case where managers can decide resource allocation (Figure 2.1), the timing changes in that
resource allocation is made by local managers simultaneously with their choice of effort.
We focus on Pareto Efficient and Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. We derive the equilibria that
7Resources and effort in one activity are complementary. Then, the efforts exerted to collect information about
different products are substitutes. If managers allocate resources, our model can be interpreted as the multi-tasking
model of Holmstron and Milgrom (1991) for substitute effort in the organizational design environment.
8These expressions capture all the general properties and contribute with simplicity in solving the model.
9 We motivate the analysis of these two cases as follows: the headquarters may have calculated and allocated which
is the optimal amount of resources in each local division for operational functioning (motivating our benchmark case).
However, it could be argued that within each division, local managers administer how to distribute these resources for
learning about market characteristics (motivating our second case). See Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991): “To take
advantage of the information processing potential of a group of managers, it is necessary to have the managers attend to
different things. But these differences are themselves the major cause of failure of coordination among the several man-
agers.” In their model, “a chief executive allocates production targets, capital and other resources to division managers
who in turn reallocate the budgeted items to their subordinates, etc. until the resources and targets reach the shops where
production takes place.” Nevertheless, delegating resource allocation may be based upon positive externalities in market
learning. We adapt our model to this case in an extension.
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Figure 2.2: Organizational Structure depending on decision making.
maximize total expected profits by backward induction. Given the signals and the communication
outcome, we find the best response functions. Then, anticipating these best response functions, local
managers engage in optimal strategic communication. Anticipating the optimal strategic communi-
cation and actions, each local manager allocates resources and exerts effort to collect accurate local
information. Finally, given optimal behavior, the headquarters chooses the optimal organizational
design of the firm.
2.3 Equilibrium
To find the optimal structure we calculate the incentive scheme that maximizes total expected prof-
its of the organization for the four possible allocation of decision rights, taking as given the best
response of local managers in collecting, transmitting, and using information. Then, we compare
which structure provides higher expected profits.
First we analyze how information is transmitted and used (Section 2.3.1). Second, we study how
local managers acquire local information (Section 2.3.2). Third, we describe the resource allocation
problem (Section 2.3.3). Finally, we characterize the organization structure that maximizes total
profits (Section 2.3.4).
We focus on one product in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, omitting product subindex j until section 2.3.3.
We can omit the subindex because product A and B have unrelated demands and profit functions.
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They are related only because they share a common input, i.e., resource allocation.
With respect to the equilibrium concept, we focus on Pareto Efficient and Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. In some stages, there are multiple equilibria that can be ranked from a pareto optimality
perspective; therefore we concentrate on those equilibria that leave the agents with the maximum
expected payoffs.10 We assume that agents can coordinate over those equilibria when it is mutually
beneficial.
2.3.1 Actions and Communication: Transmitting and Using Information
We proceed by backward induction and we analyze the communication and decision making stages
for a given organizational design (allocation of decisions rights and a compensation scheme), and
the amount of information acquired by local managers. Each local manager i has private information
about market characteristic in his own region, θi. We solve how information is transmitted by
managers and used by decision makers for one product. The solution is similar for both products,
and follows from Alonso, Dessein and Matouscheck (2008).
Under centralization, the headquarters communicates with each local manager and forms beliefs
about local demand characteristics, i.e., E[θ1] and E[θ2], and chooses the firm’s product strategy
solving
max
a1,a2
E[U1+U2] = E[pi1+pi2] = E[K(β )− (a1−θ1)2− (a2−θ2)2−2β (a1−a2)2].
Under decentralization, local managers communicate between them, form beliefs about the other
manager’s action, i.e., manager 1 forms beliefs E[a2], and chooses his action solving
max
a1
E[U1] = E[(1− s)pi1+ spi2] = E[K(β )− (1− s)(a1−θ1)2− s(a2−θ2)2−β (a1−a2)2].
The following proposition characterizes the optimal actions under centralization and decentraliza-
tion.
Proposition 1. 1.a Conditioned on beliefs, the optimal actions under centralization are
aC1 (m1,m2) =
1+2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 2β1+4β E[θ2|m2], and
aC2 (m1,m2) =
2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 1+2β1+4β E[θ2|m2].
1.b Conditioned on beliefs defined by E2[θ1] ≡ E2[θ1|m1] and E1[θ2] ≡ E1[θ2|m2], the optimal
10This criteria for selecting equilibria satisfies also the NITS condition of ?.
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actions under decentralization are
aD1 (m1,m2,θ1) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ1+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β E2[θ1]+
1− s+β
1− s+2β E1[θ2]
]
, and
aD2 (m1,m2,θ2) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ2+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β E1[θ2]+
1− s+β
1− s+2β E2[θ1]
]
.
Proposition 1 is based on Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (forthcoming).
Optimal decision making reveals that local managers cannot truthfully transmit the information ac-
quired. Let mi ≡ E j[θi|mi] be the receiver j’s expectation of θi after receiving the message mi.11
Each local manager has incentives to lie in order to improve the profits of his own division. The
intrinsic incentives to lie under decentralization are m1− θ1 = (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β θ1 ≡ ωDθ1 and under
centralization are m1− θ1 = (1−2s)β1−s+β θ1 ≡ ωCθ1. Given these incentives to lie, the only incentive
compatible communication for the sender is, as described in Crawford and Sobel (1982), a parti-
tion of the state space. Recall that we have assumed that demand’s characteristic of product j is
uniformly distributed in [−θ j,θ j]. Then, we characterize the truthfully revealing partitions and
communication equilibria.
Proposition 2. Fix two positive integers N1 and N2, there exists at least
one Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium characterized by the functions
(υ1(m1|θ1),υ2(m2|θ2),a1(m2,m1,θ1),a2(m1,m2,θ2),g1(θ2|m2),g2(θ1|m1)). The communica-
tion rule υi(mi|θi), decision rule ai(mi,m−i,θi), and beliefs gi(θ−i|m−i) satisfy:
2 .a υi(mi|θi) is uniform, with support on [di,h−1,di,h] if θi ∈ [di,h−1,di,h].
2 .b gi(θ−i|m−i) is uniform, with support on [di,h−1,di,h] if m−i ∈ [di,h−1,di,h].
2 .c The boundaries are defined by: i) di,h+1− di,h = di,h− di,h−1 + 4 (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β di,h for h =
1, ...,Ni−1 under decentralization; and ii) di,h+1−di,h = di,h−di,h−1 +4 (1−2s)β1−s+β di,h for h =
1, ...,Ni−1 under centralization.
2 .d The decision of each worker is defined by part 1.b of Proposition 1 under decentralization
and by part 1.a of Proposition 1 under centralization.
Taking the boundaries d0 =−θ and dN = θ of the space, the solution is defined by
dh = θ
xh(1+ yN)− yh(1+ xN)
xN− yN 0≤ h≤ N,
with x= (1+2ω)+
√
(1+2ω)2−1 and y= (1+2ω)−
√
(1+2ω)2−1, ω =ωD ≡ (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β
under decentralization, and ω = ωC ≡ (1−2s)β1−s+β under centralization. Note that xy = 1, x > 1 and
y < 1.
11After sending a message m1, the receiver forms a posterior of m1 about θ1. Communication is not perfect when the
posterior m1 and the real value θ1 differ.
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Proposition 2 is based on Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008), and Rantakari (forthcoming).
Proposition 2 describes the communication equilibria with N-partition of the space [−θ j,θ j]. After
communication takes place, the successful rate of communication is E[m2i ] =Viσ2j , where Vi repre-
sents the proportion of the local information variance (σ2j ≡
θ 2j
3 ) that is communicated. The rate Vi is
increasing in the number of partitions N. The equilibria with +∞-partition are the ones that achieve
the maximum expected payoffs for both managers. Onwards, we concentrate on these+∞-partitions
equilibria, which deliver the rate of transmission equal to Vj = 3+3ω3+4ω , with ω ∈ {ωC,ωD}.12
After information is acquired there are two costs in the communication and action stages. One cost
is related with how well information is used, and is characterized by Λ in equation (2.1). Under
centralization, the headquarters achieves the minimum cost, given that it maximizes total expected
profits with the information available. Under decentralization, however, each local manager has a
bias to the profit of his own division and does not internalize the externality that the decision about
product strategy has on the other division.
The second cost is associated with information transmission and is characterized by Γ(1−V ) in
equation (2.1). The factor V represents how well information is communicated between the ones
who have the information and the ones who make decisions, i.e., how accurate communication is.
The factor Γ represents how important this communication is for the expected profits, i.e., the value
of communication accuracy. Under centralization there is more accurate communication than under
decentralization because under the former the conflict between each manager and headquarters is
lower, i.e., there is less incentive to exaggerate the private information. However, the value of that
communication is also higher under centralization. The information that is not communicated under
centralization is lost, in the sense that nobody can use that information for making decisions. Under
decentralization, however, local managers use, at least, their own information for making their own
decisions.
We identify these costs for each local manager under both centralization and decentralization. The
expected profits of each division in each product are described in the following lemma. To avoid
awkward notation we focus on local manager 1.
Lemma 1. Under both structures the expected profit function for each local manager is character-
ized by
E[Π1] = K−
 Λ1+Γ11(1−V1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 1 information
+ Λ1+Γ21(1−V2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 2 information
σ2θ . (2.1)
with the following expressions for centralization VC =
3(1−s)(1+2β )
(1−2s)β+3(1−s)(1+2β ) , Λ1C =
β
1+4β , Γ11C =
1−Λ1C, and Γ12C =−Λ1C. For decentralization the values are VD = 3(1−s)(1−s+2β )(1−2s)(1−s+β )+3(1−s)(1−s+2β ) ,
12These equilibria satisfy the Non Incentives To Separate (NITS) criteria of ? when the number of partitions is infinite.
For finite partitions, it satisfies NITS if the number of partitions is odd.
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Figure 2.3: Comparing payoffs under centralization and decentralization (a) and comparing
the value generated and the value appropriated (b) by each manager .
Λ1D = β [(1−s)
2+β ]
(1−s+2β )2 , Γ11D =
β [(1−s)2+β ]
(1−s+β )2 −Λ1D, and Γ12D = β
(1−s)2
(1−s+β )2 −Λ1D.
Lemma 1 describes the situation under perfect information (the algebra for constructing these ex-
pressions are in Appendix 2.7). In brace we identify the value generated in region 1 by the infor-
mation of manager 1 and manager 2.
Summarizing the results of this section, we have characterized the value of information under both
centralization and decentralization. After information is acquired, it is transmitted and used through
local managers to decision makers. Under both centralization and decentralization, the value of in-
formation increases in incentive alignment, s. Misaligning incentives (reducing s) reduces the value
of information under both structures. This effect is higher under decentralization if s ≤ s. Hence,
the value of information is higher under centralization if incentives are sufficiently misaligned, i.e.,
s low.13 In Figure 2.3.a, we show the relation of the value generated in the communication and
action stages under centralization (continuous line) and decentralization (dashed line) as a function
of the compensation scheme s.
2.3.2 Acquiring Information
Let us assume now that information is imperfect and costly. Each manager invests an effort e in
acquiring an imperfect signal θˆ of the true value θ . The realization of the signal θˆ equals the true
value θ with probability
√
e and a random draw from the same distribution of θ with probability
1−√e. The higher the effort, the more accurate the signal. Following Rantakari (2010) we use e
as a measure of the quality of primary information which has a cost µ(t)C(e)σ2 with e ∈ [0,1] and
C(e) =−(e+ log(1− e)).
13For extension 2.4.1 it is worth noting that, under both centralization and decentralization, the value of information
is decreasing in local divisions’ integration, β . The cutoff s(β ) is increasing in β . Increasing local divisions’ integration
(increasing β ) reduces the value of information under both structures but more under decentralization.
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We first describe the objective functions with imperfect signals, and then we point out the private
incentives of managers and the headquarters to acquire information. Finally, we characterize how
information is acquired.
Acquiring information of quality ei by local manager i, with i ∈ {1,2}, with the corresponding cost
of acquiring that information means that now the expected profits of division i in equation (2.1)
becomes, (see Appendix 2.7)
E[Πi] = K−
1− ei [1−Λi−Γii(1−Vi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to i information
+ek [Λi+Γki(1−Vk)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to k information
+µC(ei)
σ2θ , i = {1,2} and k 6= i.(2.2)
Since local managers do not internalize the externality that their own information generates on
the other manager, we distinguish between the profit captured by each local manager, E[Πi], and
the profit generated by each local manager, E[pii]. Despite the fact that these values are not the
same pii Q Πi, the aggregate profit captured equals the aggregate profit generated, i.e., ∑i=1,2pii =
∑i=1,2Πi. The profit captured by a local manager is represented in equation (2.2); however, the
profit generated by a local manager is
E[pii] = K−
1− ei [1− (Λi+Λk)− (Γii+Γik)(1−Vi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψii due to information of manager i
+µC(ei)
σ2θ . (2.3)
where ψii represents the value generated by manager i with a signal of precision ei. A local manager
acquires information considering the effect that his own information has on his own payoff and not
on the value that the information generates. For this reason there is an inefficiency in information
acquisition. Given g and s the expected utility of each manager over a product is E[Ui] = (1−
s)E[Πi]+ sE[Πk] or,
E[Ui] = K+
[
−1+ eiψ˜ii+ ekψ˜ki−µC(ei)
]
σ2θ , (2.4)
where ψ˜ii represents the value appropriated by manager i with a signal of precision ei, ψ˜ki is the
externality to manager i generated by manager k who has acquired a signal of precision ek. The
expressions are defined by ψ˜ii ≡ (1− s)[1−Λi−Γii(1−Vi)]− s[Λk+Γik(1−Vi)], ψ˜ki ≡ s[1−Λk−
Γkk(1−Vk)]− (1− s)[Λi +Γki(1−Vk)], ψ˜kk ≡ (1− s)[1−Λk−Γkk(1−Vk)]− s[Λi +Γki(1−Vk)]
and ψ˜ik ≡ s[1−Λi−Γii(1−Vi)]− (1− s)[Λk +Γik(1−Vi)]. It is important to notice (Figure 2.3.b)
that the value of the information captured by a local manager, ψ˜(s,g), is decreasing in s under
both centralization and decentralization. However, the value of information generated ψ(s,g) is
increasing in s under both centralization and decentralization. Because ψi 6= ψ˜ii, the information
acquired is not optimal. The following lemma describes the effort choice
Lemma 2. Under both decentralization and centralization the effort choice is characterized as
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follows:
2.a The optimal level of effort is given by ψ = µC′(e∗).
2.b Each local manager chooses effort according to ψ˜ = µC′(eˆ).
The comparative static implies that ∂e∂µ =− C
′(e)
µC′′(e) < 0,
∂e∗
∂ s > 0 and
∂ eˆ
∂ s < 0 under both centralization
and decentralization, since ∂ψ∂ s > 0 and
∂ψ˜
∂ s < 0. For the function C(e) =−(e+ log(1−e)), eˆ= ψ˜µ+ψ˜
and e∗ = ψµ+ψ .
The proof of Lemma 2 consists in solving the first order condition of the objective function respect
to e. The objective function is defined by equation 2.3 in part 2.a of Lemma 2 and by equation 2.4 in
part 2.b of Lemma 2. The information acquired by a local manager eˆ is decreasing in his incentive
alignment s because it depends on the perceived value of that information, ψ˜ , while the optimal
amount of information is increasing in incentive alignment, s, because it depends on the real value
of information, ψ .
So far, we have described the incentives to exert effort for acquiring information, e, and how much
value that information generates, ψ(s). Under both structures, centralization and decentralization,
local managers face similar trade-offs. A manager effort increases but the value generated decreases
when local managers incentives are narrowed to their own division’s profit. Under decentralization,
however, the perceived value of information tends to be greater than under centralization.14
In this paper efforts are neither strategic complement nor strategic substitutes, since strategic effects
cancel out due to the following assumptions: 1) independence of θ j1 and θ j2 (for j ∈ {A,B}); 2)
messages m1 and m2 are unrelated in the communication game; and 3) the functional form of the
profit function.15 Relaxing these assumptions to capture the strategic interaction of the efforts
appears a promising avenue for future research.
2.3.3 Resource Allocation
Again subindex j ∈ {A,B} stands for product A and product B respectively. Local managers have
resources equal to 1 which are allocated to acquire information about different demands’ tastes. The
allocation of these resources determines the marginal cost of information, i.e., µA(tA) and µB(tB),
where tA+ tB ≤ 1. The objective function of the headquarters is ∑i=1,2 E[piiA]+E[piiB],
∑
i=1,2
{
K− [1− eiAψA+µAC(eiA)]σ2A
}
+
{
K− [1− eiBψB+µBC(eiB)]σ2B
}
. (2.5)
14ψ˜ is greater under decentralization except when β is excessively high and s excessively low. The advantage of
decentralization is that a local manager uses his own information to adapt his product to his local market. Managers
value more the information under decentralization except in some extreme circumstances where standardization is very
important and compensation schemes are narrowed to local divisions’ profits.
15Appendix 2.7 shows the form of the expected profit function under both structures.
16
Chapter 2 Organizational Design of Multi-Product Multi-Market Firms
Note that E[piiA]+E[piiB] is the value generated by local manager i within the firm. The objective
function of a local manager in division i is E[UiA]+E[UiB]
{K−σ2A[1− eiAψ˜iiA− ekAψ˜kiA+µAC(eiA)]}+{K−σ2B[1− eiBψ˜iiB− ekBψ˜kiB+µBC(eiB)]}. (2.6)
We analyze two situations. As a benchmark case we analyze the optimal resource allocation, i.e.,
how the headquarters allocates resources within each division. The headquarters chooses tAi for
local manager i maximizing the expected profit in equation (2.34) subject to optimal choice of
effort described in part 2.b of Lemma 2. In the second case, local managers allocate resources.
Each manager chooses tA and tB maximizing his expected payoff defined in equation (2.38). In the
following lemma we summarize how resource allocation is chosen.
Lemma 3. The resource allocation tA within each division is determined as follows:
3.a The headquarters chooses tA according to
− ∂µA
∂ tA
σ2A
[
C(eA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA−µAC
′(eA)]
]
=−∂µB
∂ tB
σ2B
[
C(eB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC
′(eB)]
]
. (2.7)
Replacing ψ˜ = µC′(e) we have [ψ− ψ˜] as a measure of the moral hazard problem in each
product market.
3.b A local manager chooses tA according to16
− ∂µA
∂ tA
C(eiA)σ2A = −
∂µB
∂ tB
C(eiB)σ2B. (2.8)
We assume that µ(t) is sufficiently convex for an interior solution to exist.17 A comparative static
shows that more resources are allocated to learn about a product when more information is acquired,
i.e., higher e, and when the product has higher returns to differentiation, i.e., higher σ2. In effect,
information acquisition and resource allocation are complementary. There are incentives to allocate
more resources in markets where managers acquire more information, e.g., the higher eA the higher
tA. Also more information is acquired in markets that receive more resources, the higher tA the
higher eA.
As noted in the Section 2.3.2, the effort in information acquisition of local managers is not efficient,
and thus their allocation of resources will also be distorted. Indeed, if the information is acquired
efficiently, the term ∂e∂µ [ψ−µC′(e)] disappears due to part 2.a of Lemma 2 and the resource alloca-
tion is always characterized by part 2.b of Lemma 3. The headquarters corrects this inefficiency in
information acquisition through resource allocation as described in part 3.a of Lemma 3, or through
organizational design, as is described below in the following section.
16We apply envelope theorem to get this condition.
17The convexity of resource allocation outweighs the effort convexity problem and incentive alignment convexity
problem.
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Whenever local managers allocate resources, they choose tA considering the opportunity cost of
those resources on their own expected utility. This is consistent with Geanakoplos and Milgrom
(1991) who conclude “that managers at each level optimally focus attention only on those variables
that determine the marginal productivity of resources and the marginal costs of production in the
units under their command”. As described above, the choice of tA is only affected by the returns to
differentiation σ2 and the function C(e). Hence, to reallocate resources in favor of market A, the
headquarters not only can promote a more considerable effort in market A, increasing C(eA), but
also can discourage effort in market B, reducing C(eB).
If σ2A = σ2B, there is a symmetric allocation of resources and identical effort. Note from Lemma
3.b that the allocation of resources is symmetric only if eA = eB, and from Lemma 2.a we can have
identical effort if resource allocation is symmetric.
The function C(e) =−(e+ log(1−e)) has a slope C′(e) = e1−e . For the function µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
, with
b ∈ (0,1) and µ ∈ R++, the resource allocation choice is tA = 1
1+H
1
1+b
with18
H1 ≡ C(eiB)C(eiA)
σ2B
σ2A
and H0 ≡
C(eiB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC′(eB)]
C(eiA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA−µAC′(eA)]
σ2B
σ2A
.
The term is H1 when resource allocation is decided by each local manager and H0 when re-
source allocation is chosen by the headquarters. The cost of acquiring information is µA(tA) =
µ0.5b
(
1+H
1
1+b
)b
. The following Lemma is crucial for our results.
Lemma 4. Define t∗ as the value that maximizes [−µ(t)−µ(1− t)H]. Assume µ(t,b) = µ (0.5t )b
and 0 < H ≤ 1. Given b0 ∈ [0,1], the set of all functions with b1 ∈ [b0,1] satisfies the property that
µ(t∗0 ,b0)≥ µ(t∗1 ,b1).
The proof of the Lemma 4 is in Section 2.6.1. This Lemma describes that if resource allocation is
more important, then the marginal cost of acquiring information is lower in the market with higher
variance. In other words, a higher b implies lower µA and higher µB if σ2A > σ2B. Consequently, b
represents the importance of resource allocation.
2.3.4 Optimal Structure
To find the optimal structure of the firm, we must evaluate the best response of local managers
for each possible structure and compare the total expected payoff obtained under each possible
combination of decision rights, i.e., centralization and decentralization in each product market. The
problem is as follows
max
g,s ∑i=1,2
{
K− [1− eiAψA+µAC(eiA)]σ2A
}
+
{
K− [1− eiBψB+µBC(eiB)]σ2B
}
, (2.9)
18 With the properties µ ′(t) =−bµ
(
0.5b
t1+b
)
< 0, µ ′′(t) = b(1+b)µ
(
0.5b
t2+b
)
> 0, ∂µ
′(t)
∂b < 0, and
∂µ ′′(t)
∂b > 0.
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subject to the optimal effort choice described in part 2.b of Lemma 2 and resource allocation choice
described in part 3.a of Lemma 3, in the benchmark case where the headquarters chooses t, or part
3.b in Lemma 3, when local managers choose t. For simplicity, we assume σ2B ≡ 1, such that the
ratio of market variances is equal to the variance of product A, i.e., σ
2
A
σ2B
≡ σ2A, with σ2A ≥ 1 since
θA ≥ θB.19 The first order conditions for the propositions of this section are in Appendix 2.7.
We first analyze the situation when resource allocation is not important, i.e., b→ 0, as an starting
point to understand our benchmark case, where the headquarters allocates resources, and our first
extension, where managers do. For this case, the optimal design for market A is independent of the
optimal design for market B. In the following proposition we summarize the result.
Proposition 3. Assume µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b→ 0. There exists a threshold µ˜ above which central-
ization outperforms decentralization and the choice of decision rights is independent of market of
product A and market of product B.
In Appendix 2.6.2 we develop a sketch of the formal proof in Rantakari (2010). We provide here
some useful intuition for our next results. As explained in Section 2.3.1 and represented in Figure
2.3.a, centralization performs better than decentralization when the incentives of each local manager
and the headquarters are sufficiently misaligned, i.e., s is low. The main trade off in designing the
compensation scheme, i.e., in choosing s, is clearly observed in the first order condition respect to
s,
∂e
∂ s
[ψ− ψ˜]+ e∂ψ
∂ s
= 0. (2.10)
The first term in the left hand side is negative, since ∂e∂ s is negative, and the second term is positive.
When the manager’s payoff depends more on total firm’s profit, i.e., higher s, there is an increase
in the value of the information acquired, e ∂ψ∂ s , but also an increment in the value of acquiring fur-
ther information ∂e∂ s [ψ − ψ˜], because ψ increases in s while ψ˜ decreases in s. When the cost of
information is low, there is a lot of information acquisition, and the headquarters aligns managers’
incentives with the firm’s profits to increase the value of that information. In this case, decentral-
ization performs better than centralization. When the cost of information is high, the headquarters
prioritizes information acquisition, narrowing local managers incentives to their own division profit,
and, eventually, the firm performs better under centralization.
The structure of the firm balances the moral hazard problem of suboptimal information acquisition
with the suboptimal value generated by this information in the decision making process. When
informational cost is low, the headquarters follows a strategy of product differentiation through
decentralization, but when informational cost is high, it follows a strategy of product standardization
through centralization.
19The absolute value of market variances matters if we endogenize β . For robustness, we describe the results in the
case that the headquarters also chooses β in Section 2.4.1.
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Although it is not directly stated, we can infer by Proposition 3 that when centralization performs
as well as decentralization, the compensation scheme under both structures differs, i.e., sC < sD.
Assume that the informational cost is just the threshold µ˜ , and the headquarters is indifferent to
centralizing or decentralizing decision making. This indifference between centralization and de-
centralization requires that s ≤ s.20 Figure 2.3.a (Section 2.3.1) shows that when s ≤ s the value
of information is more sensitive to s under decentralization than under centralization. Hence, at
the same informational cost, the optimal profit sharing s under centralization must be lower than
the profit sharing under decentralization, i.e., sC < sD. This result arises because, once the head-
quarters provides incentives for information acquisition, centralization handles better, at the margin,
the trade-off between acquiring and transmitting information. Then, it can foster more information
acquisition through a lower s under centralization.
Summing up the result of Proposition 3, when b→ 0, resource allocation is not important, and the
marginal cost of information is given by µ in each market. The headquarters decentralizes decision
making in both markets if µ ≤ µ˜ , and centralizes them otherwise. Let us now see how the optimal
structure changes as resource allocation becomes important.
Proposition 4. Assume µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ (0,1) and µ ∈ R++. If resources are allocated
efficiently, that is by the Headquarters, there exists a threshold in the ratio of returns to product
differentiation σ˜AB above which the optimal design requires a mix structure with centralization in
market of product B and decentralization in market of product A. Moreover, ∂ σ˜AB∂b < 0.
Proof. The headquarters chooses tA and tB according to condition (2.7) in Lemma 3. We guarantee
an interior solution in resource allocation when the function µ(t) is sufficiently convex. The allo-
cation of tA is increasing in the ratio σ2A, implying that µB(1− tA) is increasing in σ2A, and µA(tA)
is decreasing in σ2A. The resource allocation, that is tA, defines the costs’ values µA and µB, and
Proposition 3 applies in each market: if µ j > µ˜ , centralization outperforms decentralization, but if
µ j < µ˜ , decentralization outperforms centralization in market of product j. The proof of ∂ σ˜AB∂b < 0
is in appendix 4.
Proposition 4 has several implications for the optimal internal design of the firm and, consequently,
the optimal firm’s product strategy. First, the headquarters recognizes that the value of information
is higher in markets with higher returns to differentiation than in markets with lower returns to
differentiation. The reason is straightforward: the expected losses of a wrong product strategy
are higher when consumers’ tastes are more uncertain. Hence, the optimal resource allocation
concentrates more resources in markets with higher returns to differentiation. This is shown in
Lemma 3.a: the higher the ratio σ2A, the more resources the firm allocates to learn about product A
and the fewer resources the firm allocates to learn about product B demand characteristics. Thus,
20Since for s > s, not only decentralization generates more value for a given effort e, i.e., ψD > ψC, but also local
managers exert a higher effort, i.e., eD > eC since ψ˜D > ψ˜C.
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there is higher informational cost and less information acquisition in market of product B, and lower
informational cost and more information acquisition in market of product A.
Second, the headquarters recognizes that the information acquired by local managers is suboptimal
in both markets. The suboptimal level of effort, however, is more important in a market with higher
returns to differentiation. Through resource allocation, the headquarters reduces the effort cost and
encourages more learning in the market with higher returns to differentiation.
As the ratio of the returns to differentiation between markets increases, more resources are allocated
to market A and fewer to market B. The headquarters will, eventually, find it optimal to follow a
strategy of product differentiation in market A and a strategy of product standardization in market
B. To implement these strategies, the headquarters decentralizes decision making in market A,
providing a compensation scheme that aligns local managers’ incentives with the firm’s profits. In
market B, however, since the aim is to pursue standardization, it is better to centralize decision
making with a compensation scheme that narrows local managers incentives to their own divisions’
profit.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal decision making as a function of the ratio in returns (we assume σ2B = 1)
and informational cost.
Figure 2.4 shows the relation between informational cost µ and returns to differentiation for each
market when resources are allocated by the headquarters, for the particular case that µ < µ˜ . If
µ < µ˜ , the headquarters decentralizes decision rights in both markets if σ2A < σ˜2A and chooses a
mix decentralizing decisions about product A and centralizing decisions about product B otherwise.
If µ > µ˜ , however, there exists σ˘2A such that the headquarters centralizes decision rights in both
markets if σ2A > σ˘2A and chooses a mix decentralizing decisions about product A and centralizing
decisions about product B otherwise. Figure 2.5.a shows in blue the optimal compensation scheme
as a function of the returns to product differentiation for a numerical example.21
Rantakari (forthcoming) describes a positive causal relation between returns to product differentia-
21For this example β = 4, µ = 0.65, b = 0.5.
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tion (that he calls volatility) and decentralization. If decision rights are centralized in our model, an
increment in product A’s returns to differentiation can motivate the headquarters to decentralize the
decision right of product A. Rantakari (forthcoming) drives this causality through a change in the
needs for coordination β , while we drive this causality through a reallocation of resources.
There is an ongoing discussion on the literature about how exogenous is the coordination need.22
In any case, most authors agree that not all elements of the structure (e.g., contracts, decision
rights, divisional integration) can be modified with the same ease and speed. An organization
can revise the compensation scheme or its allocation of decision rights more often than its degree
of integration which may require updating the equipment, logistic, and information technologies.23
Our mechanism is more direct than Rantakari (forthcoming)’s one, and we can account for transitory
decentralization. Nevertheless, our results are robust to endogenize the needs for coordination that
we develop in an extension.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal contract when the headquarters allocates resources (blue) and when
local managers allocate resources (red).
In the following proposition we point out that our previous result is robust to the case where man-
agers can decide or affect the allocation of resources. We show that, despite the headquarters can
not control the allocation of resources, there exists a cutoff in the ratio of returns to differentiation
above which the optimal structure combines decentralization and centralization. When the head-
22Some authors argue that the headquarters is free to decide the degree of integration between the two different units
(See Rantakari (2010)). Some other authors, however, believe that the need for coordination is an exogenous constraint
given by technology, legal environment, culture, etc. (See Alonso, et al (2008) and Dessein, Garicano and Gertner
(2010)).
23Eccles and Holland (1989) describe the case of Suchard when European Union merges most western european
markets as a unique market. It took several years and lots of resources for the company to adapt the company to the
new situation. Thomas (forthcoming) also mentions how the market structure of western european markets modifies
the needs for standardization. Procter & Gamble and Unilever reorganized their production after the pass of European
Regulations in 1992. Firms have spent a lot of time and resources to launch programs to reduce the number of products
and to centralize production in fewer plants, e.g., “path to growth” (Unilever in 2000), “Unilever 2010” (Unilever in
2004) and “Organization 2005” (Procter & Gamble in 1999). The program of Unilever included “a more streamlined
brand portfolio, moving from 1600 brands in 1999 to a target number of 400 by the end of 2004”. “P&G aimed to
improve supply chain management of the proliferation of product, pricing, labeling, and packaging variations”.
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quarters has no control over resources, she modifies the strategy of the firm to capture as much
benefit as possible from resource allocation.
Proposition 5. Assume µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ (0,1) and µ ∈ R++. When local managers allocate
resources, there exists a threshold for the ratio of market returns to product differentiation σˆ2A(µ˜)
above which the optimal design requires a mixed structure with centralization in market of product
B and decentralization in market of product A. Moreover, σ˜2A ≤ σˆ2A.
Proposition 5 claims that our result even though managers control the allocation of resources. How-
ever, there are two effects that make the relation less intensive, generating a less intensive relation
between returns to differentiation and the mixed structure, i.e., σ˜2A ≤ σˆ2A. Let’s assume σ2A = σ˜2A and
µ < µ˜ , which means that decentralization is optimal if markets have similar returns to differentia-
tion, i.e., if ratio σ2A ∼ 1. Compared with Proposition 4 both effects favour decentralization in the
market with low dispersion, i.e., they favour a strategy of product differentiation in market B.
First, the headquarters would allocate more resources in the market with high returns to differen-
tiation than local managers in fact do. Local managers allocate more resources to learn about the
resources according to the condition in Lemma 3.b. The cost of acquiring information changes with
the ratio of markets’ return to product differentiation, i.e., tA and µB increase with ratio σ2A, and
µA decreases with σ2A. However, as local managers do not internalize the effect that resources can
have in reducing the inefficiency in information acquisition, they allocate more resources in markets
with low return to product differentiation. This favors decentralization in markets with low return
to product differentiation.
Second, to correct the manager’s misallocation of resources in favor of markets with high returns to
differentiation, the headquarters changes the organizational design of the firm. Lemma 3.b describes
how local managers allocate resources. The headquarters takes advantage of the complementarity
between information acquisition and resource allocation to promote not only more information
acquisition in those markets with high return to differentiation but also less information acquisition
in markets with low return to differentiation. The headquarters implements this change through
incentives alignment in markets with low return to differentiation and incentives misalignment in
markets with high return to differentiation. These changes in structure, however, may also affect
the firm’s product strategy.
These two channels increase the likelihood that the headquarters chooses decentralization in market
B, as a way to overcome the inefficiency in manager’s resource allocation. The ratio of returns σ2A
must be higher for the mixed structure of decentralization and centralization to be optimal.
Summarizing, the externalities in information sharing generate suboptimal information acquisition.
The headquarters alleviates this inefficiency allocating more resources to the markets where the
problem is more serious, i.e., the markets with high return to product differentiation. However,
when lacking control over resources, she uses the internal design of the firm, allocating decisions
rights and modifying the compensation scheme to correct the effect of resource allocation. Hence,
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resource allocation and decision rights are imperfect substitutes in the sense that controlling re-
sources leads to a mix strategy of centralization and decentralization, but lacking control derives in
a decentralized organization.
By symmetry, we can analyze the implications of Proposition 5 for the case with µ > µ˜ , in which
case the optimal organizational design when the ratio σ2A is small requires centralizing decision
making and a mix structure arises when the ratio σ2A of the returns to differentiation is high.
Figure 2.5.b shows how the optimal contract depends on the ratio of returns to product differentia-
tion in a numerical example. The aligning of incentives is higher in the market with higher returns.
There are more returns to differentiation than in the other market. The difference in alignment in-
creases with the ratio of returns to product differentiation. There is a threshold above which the
organizational design changes, centralizing decisions about the product with lower returns. This
change also affects the contract. The objectives functions depend more on the local division profits
to motivate more information acquisition in both markets, however they are more misaligned in the
centralized product.
Our results can be empirically identified in at least two ways. First, comparing multi-product multi-
market firms with single-product multi-market firms and observing that there may be differences
in their organizational design. This identification strategy is relevant since there are differences
in organizational structure of firms operating in the same market that cannot be explained either
by demand differences or by supply conditions or retailers environment. In this paper we offer a
framework for differences that are born within internal organization.
A second way to identify our result is comparing multi-product multi-market firms along time. If
there is a shock affecting the returns to product differentiation of some particular product, a firm can
modify its organizational design to increase its profits. However, it may be difficult to observe this
case because firms might modify informally their organizational design without changing formals
procedures.24
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Coordination
In the previous section we discuss that in some papers the level of coordination among divisions is
endogenous, while in some others is exogenous. Our results hold if we endogenize this choice. We
extend results of Propositions 4 and 5 for the case that the headquarters chooses β . Figure 2.6.a
shows the extension of Proposition 3, Figure 2.6.b of Proposition 4, and Figure 2.7 of Proposition
5.
24For instance, suppose a centralized organization with a formal procedure to introduce new products through the
following procedure: a country manager writes a project suggesting a product which requires Headquarters’ approval;
however, the headquarters can commit (through reputation) to relax its approval requirements over those projects related
to some particular products’ lines or segments. This is interpreted as informal decentralization. I have been informally
told by managers in international companies that this is a common proceeding.
24
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The choice of β does not modify our previous results qualitatively, even when it does quantitatively.
If the headquarters decides the optimal β for the structure of the organization, there is a negative
relation between β and σ2. There is a high risk of requiring high levels of coordination between
local managers, as long as there is high uncertainty about demand characteristics, i.e., high σ2.
For high values of σ2 the headquarters prefers to provide autonomy to local managers about what
products to be offered in their markets and to follow a strategy of product differentiation, i.e., the
higher σ2 the lower β .
Analogously, the headquarters follows a standard product strategy in those markets with low returns
to product differentiation. The effect of losing control over resources would also affect the decision
of β . For details see Appendix 2.8.2. For the function µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ (0,1), there exists a
cutoff σ˜2(µ) and increasing relations σ˜2AM(σ2B,µ), σ˜2A(σ2B,µ), σ˜2BM(σ2A,µ) and σ˜2B(σ2A,µ) such that:
a- If resources are allocated efficiently (headquarters), decision rights over market j are central-
ized if σ2j < σ˜2j (σ2− j,µ), for j ∈ {A,B}.
b- If resources are allocated by local managers, decision rights over market j are centralized if
σ2j < σ˜2jM(σ2− j,µ), for j ∈ {A,B}.
c- σ˜2A(σ2B,µ)< σ˜2AM(σ2B,µ) and σ˜2B(σ2A,µ)< σ˜2BM(σ2A,µ).
Centralization is chosen as an optimal structure if the return to product differentiation is sufficiently
low, which is more likely for higher informational cost µ . This relation is shown in Figure 2.6.a.
We remark now the effect of resource allocation on the headquarters decision over centralization
and decentralization. When resource allocation becomes important, the headquarters promotes a
lower cost in markets with high returns to differentiation. Not only the ratio of the returns to
differentiation but also the level of the returns to differentiation matter in all markets to determine
whether to centralize or decentralize decision rights.
A low β fits better in a market with high return to differentiation, which also makes decentralization
more attractive. On markets with high returns to differentiation, the cutoff ratio that makes the head-
quarters to centralize decision making in some markets increases. These thresholds are represented
by increasing relations in Figure 2.6.b. As in our baseline analysis, these thresholds are higher when
the headquarters lacks control over resources, which is shown in Figure 2.7.a. Relations are steeper
when the resource allocation is more important in determining the information cost µ , as shown in
Figure 2.7.b.
2.4.2 Delegation
We assume that the headquarters delegates resource allocation on local division managers. We
can extend our model to see that delegation may arise as the optimal’s choice of the headquarters
if there are externalities when learning about regional demands. For example, if learning about
demand’s taste of product B in region 1 can provide some additional information when learning
25
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about demand’s taste of product A in region 1, the firm can prefer to merge two subdivisions in
region 1. In this way, the firm designs the organization by regional divisions, as many international
firms do. Let us call subdivisions A1 and B1 for the rest of this section.
Assume the following technology of the signal θˆ1A: the signal equals the true value θ1A with
probability
√
e1A+αe1B and a random draw from the same distribution of θ1A with probability
1−√e1A+αe1B, with 0 < α < 1, and e ∈ [0, 11+α ].25 This technology of the signal generates an
externality in information acquisition that is described as follows:
1- If subdivisions A1 and B1 are separated, local manager in division A1 collects information
according to: ψ˜A(β ,s,g) = µAC′(eˆA).
2- If subdivisions A1 and B1 are integrated, local manager in division A1 collects information
25Introducing this change in the model does not modify the communication problem.
26
Chapter 2 Organizational Design of Multi-Product Multi-Market Firms
according to: ψ˜A(β ,s,g)+
σ2B
σ2A
αψ˜B(β ,s,g) = µAC′(eˆA).
3- If effort were contractible, the headquarters would ask the local manager to collect informa-
tion according to: ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB = µAC′(e∗A).
The net effect of this learning externality about market characteristics is intuitive. For the function
µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
, the parameter b represents the discretion of local managers to reallocate resources, the
higher the b the higher the managers’ discretion. For a given value of α , integration is profitable if
b is sufficiently low. There will be a cutoff on b such that delegation is optimal as long as b is below
that value. As α increases, learning from products A and B becomes more complementary, which
means that products are less rival. The inefficiency in resource allocation is reduced. Although
there are some new insights, the main implications of this paper over the firm’s optimal structure
remain. To see a comparison of this problem with our previous model see Appendix 2.8.2.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the internal design of a multi-product multi-division firm. We model the
economic interactions of being multi-product that arise in an organization. We focus on the effect
that the opportunity cost of resources has on decision making and compensation schemes.
Implementing a product differentiation policy on some products is more profitable than on other
products. This relative profitability generates an opportunity cost of allocating scarce resources
in each market. We show that the firm may prefer to centralize decision making in markets with
lower returns to differentiation and decentralize decision making in markets with high returns to
differentiation.
Empirically our result can be observed comparing the organizational design of multi-product multi-
market firms with single-product multi-market firms. Alternatively, it can also be observed follow-
ing dynamic organizational changes of a multi-product multi-market firm that suffers shocks which
modify the relative returns to product differentiation.
In this paper we have made a first move to extend the economic literature of organizational de-
sign into the analysis of multi-product firms. Much of this literature focuses on internal economic
problems that frequently appear in international multi-product firms. Henceforth, an analysis of the
multi-product multi-division firm is not only important but also necessary. We show that the allo-
cation of decision rights and firm’s strategy is not independent among different products. This is in
line with Roberts (2004) who points out that “The structure [of the firm] does not follow strategy
any more than strategy follows structure”.
We have focused on the impact of the opportunity cost of resources on the internal organizational
design. It is still necessary to carry out further work on analyzing other economic interactions that
multinational firms face for being multi-product, e.g., interactions that arise on the demand side.
27
Chapter 2 Organizational Design of Multi-Product Multi-Market Firms
2.6 Appendix A: Proofs
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume µ = 1, µ(t) =
(0.5
t
)b
. Looking for t∗ that maximizes
[−µ(t)−µ(1− t)H] we find that t∗ = 1
1+(H)
1
1+b
and µ(t∗) = 0.5b
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]b
. Since 0 < H ≤ 1
then t∗ ≥ 0.5.
We need to prove that µ(t∗) is decreasing in b for 0< b< 1, i.e., ∂µ(t
∗)
∂b = µ(t
∗) ∂ logµ(t
∗)
∂b < 0. Taking
logarithm and derivating respect to b we have logµ(t∗) = b log0.5+b log
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]
, and
d logµ(t∗)
db
= log0.5+ log
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]
− (H)
1
1+b[
1+(H)
1
1+b
] b
(1+b)2
log(H) . (2.11)
Note in the last term of equation 2.11 that 1−t∗≡ (H)
1
1+b[
1+(H)
1
1+b
] and that 1−t∗< 0.5. Working the last
two terms, equation 2.11 can be expressed as log0.5+ log [H2], with H2 ≡ ( 1H ) (1−t∗)b(1+b)2 +(H) 1+bt∗(1+b)2 .
I need to prove that H2 < 2.26 For the extreme case that t∗ = 0.5 and b = 1 we have that
( 1
H
) 1
8 +
(H)
3
8 ≤ 2 if 0.008 < H ≤ 1. Note that the expression H2 decreases as b decreases or t∗ increases.
For completing the proof, we check these derivatives respect to b and t∗,
∂H2
∂b
=
(
1
H
) (1−t∗)b
(1+b)2
log(
1
H
)(1− t∗) 1−b
(1+b)3
− log(H)2− t
∗+bt∗
(1+b)3
(H)
1+bt∗
(1+b)2 > 0.
Since H ≤ 1, note that log(H)< 0 and log( 1H )> 0. And the derivative respect to t∗ is,
∂H2
∂ t∗
=−
(
1
H
) (1−t∗)b
(1+b)2
log(
1
H
)
b
(1+b)2
+ log(H)
b
(1+b)2
(H)
1+bt∗
(1+b)2 < 0.
Finally, we check that the derivative ∂µ(t
∗)
∂H =
b
1+b 0.5
b
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]b−1
(H)
−b
1+b > 0 which implies
that if H decreases, then the cost µ(t∗) decreases and the cost µ(1− t∗) increases. The proof is
complete.
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Sketch of the proof. (Based on Proposition 5 of Rantakari (2010)) Consider the optimal structure
design for market A. We proceed in two steps: first determining the contract s under decentral-
ization and under centralization, and second, comparing which structure generates higher profits.
The first order condition respect to s shows a balance between less information which has more
value and more information which has less value: eA
∂ψA
∂ sA +
∂eA
∂ sA [ψA− ψ˜A] = 0. Since local managers
26Recall that log0.5+ log2 = log1 = 0.
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appropriate the amount ψ˜ of the value generated, ψ , they acquire a suboptimal amount of infor-
mation, e. However, this inefficiency can be partially corrected with the compensation scheme. A
comparative static shows that incentives are narrowed to local manager’s payoff when information
is more expensive, i.e., ∂ s∂µ < 0. To have a good balance between the amount of information ac-
quired and the value generated with this information, e and ψ respectively, the headquarters fosters
information acquisition when it is expensive, even when this reduces the value generated by the
information acquireds.
Evaluated in the optimal compensation scheme, decentralization outperforms centralization if the
surplus value is greater, i.e., if eAψA−µAC(eA) is higher under decentralization than under central-
ization. Recalling that: 1) e decreases and ψ increases when s increases; 2) s decreases when µ
increases; 3) for high values of s, ψ and ψ˜ are higher under decentralization, and for low values of
s, ψ is higher under centralization but ψ˜ is higher under decentralization; and finally 4) the infor-
mation acquired increases with the value appropriated by local managers, i.e., the higher the ψ˜ the
higher the e.
Low µ generates high e, which allows the firm to increase s and to decentralize. In words, low cost
of information generates high amount of information, allowing the firm to increase the degree of
incentives alignment and to decentralize decision rights. This result follows directly from section
2.3.1 (based on Alonso et al, 2008) and from section 2.3.2.
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For the last part of Proposition 4, we prove that the cutoff σ˜AB decreases with b. For a given
σAB, the higher the b the lower the µA and the higher the µB. Recall that t∗ and µB depend on H and
b and from Lemma 4 we have
∂µB(1− t∗)
∂b
= µB(1− t∗)∂ ln[µB(1− t
∗)]
∂b
> 0. (2.12)
A higher b implies a higher µB. At σ˜AB the headquarters is indifferent between centralizing and
decentralizing decision rights about product characteristics in market B. If b increases, µB increases
and now the headquarters strictly prefers to centralize decision rights in market of product B. The
cutoff σ˜AB decreases when b increases.
2.6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When local managers allocate resources, headquarters internalizes an additional effect of
modifying the contract. Increasing sA not only reduces the amount of effort eA but also reduces
the amount of resources that a local managers allocate to acquire information about product A,
which indirectly also reduces the effort eA. Moreover, a reduction in tA fosters more information
acquisition about product B.
If the headquarters allocates resources, t∗A, the optimal sA is defined by
∂ψA
∂ sA eA+
∂eA
∂ sA (ψA− ψ˜A) = 0.
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However, if local managers allocate resources the first order condition becomes:
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A) = − ∂ tA∂ sA
σ2B
σ2A
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
,
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B) = − ∂ tA∂ sB
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
.
With ∂ tA∂ sA < 0 and
∂ tA
∂ sB > 0, and calling ϕ ≡
σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA [ψA− ψ˜A] +
∂eB
∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]. These expressions
separate the indirect effect of sA on tA from the direct effect of sA on eA (similarly for sB). In
Section 2.7.7.1 we describe that each manager reaction to an increase in σ2A are
∂eA
∂σ2A
> 0, ∂eB∂σ2A
< 0
and ∂ tA∂σ2A
> 0. As σ2A increases, more resources are allocated to product A; the HQ increases sA to
increase ψA and it reduces sB to increase ψ˜B fostering higher effort in market B, i.e., higher eB.
Eventually, the headquarters chooses to centralize decision making in product B and decentralize
decision making in product A.
However, comparing with the situation where headquarters allocates resources, the indirect effects
make the cutoff σˆAB to be higher than σ˜AB. To show that σ˜AB < σˆAB we identify the two indirect
effects that foster the headquarters to decentralize product B when σAB is around σ˜AB. Let us assume
that σAB = σ˜AB. If this is the case and local managers allocate resources, the optimal organizational
design, for the case where µ < µ˜ , requires to decentralize decision making in both products.
First, since local managers ignore the inefficiency in exerting effort, represented by [ψ − ψ˜], they
allocate more resources to market B than the headquarters would, i.e., tˆA < t∗A. Given tˆA < t
∗
A, we
have that µA(tˆA) > µA(t∗A) and µB(1− tˆA) < µB(1− t∗A). Formally, in section 2.3.3 we show that
the term H differs depending on whether headquarters or local managers allocate resources, being
higher in the latter case. This difference in H comes from the fact that local managers ignore the
inefficiency [ψ− ψ˜], which affects directly the cost µB.
∂µB(1− t∗)
∂H
=
∂
∂H
[
µ0.5b
(
1+H
−1
1+b
)b]
< 0.
There is lower effort cost µB, when managers allocate resources. If information is cheaper in market
B, the headquarters increases sB in market B to increase the value generated by this information,
which, at the same time, favors decentralization of decisions rights in market B.
Second, the headquarters recognizes the inefficient allocation of resources of local manager, and
changes the organizational design to correct it. With this purpose, the headquarters increases sB
which also favors decentralization of decision rights in market B.
Both effects favor to decentralize market of product B. At σAB = σ˜AB the headquarters strictly
prefers to decentralize decision rights in market B. Then, it requires a higher value of σAB to
centralize decisions rights in the market of product B.
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2.7 Appendix B: Solving the Problem
2.7.1 Close Forms
In this appendix we construct the close form solutions of the expressions of ψ and ψ˜ under central-
ization and decentralization that are the following:
ψc =
(3(1− s))(1+2β )2
(1+4β )(β (1−2s)+(3(1− s))(2β +1)) ,
ψd =−(1− s)5s
3(1−2β )+ s2(5β +14(β 2−1))+ s(16β +2β 2+13)− (4+6β 3+11β +12β 2)
((1− s)+2β )(1− s+β )((1− s+β )(1−2s)+3(1− s)(1− s+2β )) ,
ψ˜c = (3(1− s)) (1+2β )((1− s)+β (3−4s)
((1+4β )(β (1−2s)+(3(1− s))(2β +1)) , and
ψ˜d = (1− s) 9β
2+11β +13s2β +4−13s+14s2−5s3−12sβ (2+β )
((1− s)+2β )((1− s+β )(1−2s)+3(1− s)(1− s+2β ))) .
And its derivatives under centralization are:
∂ψc
∂ s
=
3β (2β +1)2
(1+4β )(8β (1− s)−β +3(1− s))2 ≥ 0,
∂ψ˜c
∂ s
=
3(2β +1)(3(1− s)2+β 2+2(1− s)β (10(1− s)−1)+8β 2(1− s)(4(1− s)−1))
(1+4β )2(8β (1− s)−β +3(1− s))2 < 0.(2.13)
And under decentralization are:
∂ψd
∂ s
=
β 2((1− s)3H1+β (1− s)2H2+β 2(1− s)H3+β 3H4+12β 4)
((1− s)+2β )2(1− s+β )2((1− s+β )(1−2s)+3(1− s)(1− s+2β ))2 ≥ 0, (2.14)
with H1 ≡ 160(1− s)3− 120(1− s)2 + 27(1− s)− 2, H2 ≡ 680(1− s)3− 516(1− s)2 + 1266(1−
s)+ 10, H3 ≡ 956(1− s)3− 744(1− s)2 + 204(1− s)− 16 and H4 ≡ 448(1− s)3− 360(1− s)2 +
102(1− s)−8.
∂ψ˜d
∂ s
=
5(1− s)5(5(1− s)−2)+6β (1− s)4(30(1− s)−11)+(1− s)4+6β 2(1− s)3(69(1− s)−20)
((1− s)+2β )2(5(1− s)2− (1− s)+8β (1− s)−β )2 +
6(1− s)3β +4β 3(1− s)2(104(1− s)−23)+9(1− s)2β 2+8(1− s)β 3+6β 4(32(1− s)2−8(1− s)+1)
((1− s)+2β )2(5(1− s)2− (1− s)+8β (1− s)−β )2 < 0.
2.7.2 Decision Making: Using Information
In this section we build the expression in equation (2.1) for Centralization and Decentralization be-
fore communication outcome is introduced. To have the same terms we must replace the expression
E[m2] = [1− (1−V )]E[θ 2].
We build the indirect function for E[Π|m] given the equilibrium beliefs for m ≡ E[θ |m] and
E[θ 2|m]≡ m2. Remember that Π1A = K(β )− (a1A−θ1A)2−β (a1A−a2A)2.
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Given the optimal policy for decision making and the information transmission process, the objec-
tive function of each division can be expressed as a function of σ21 , σ22 , E[θ 21 |m] and E[θ 22 |m]. We
show how to arrive to the optimal expressions.
2.7.2.1 Centralization
The optimal decision making under centralization are:
aC1 (m1,m2) =
1+2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 2β1+4β E[θ2|m2], and
aC2 (m1,m2) =
2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 1+2β1+4β E[θ2|m2].
Replacing them in the expected profit of division 1 we get the following terms:
(aC1 −θ1)2 =
(
E[θ1|m1]−θ1+ 2β (E[θ2|m2]−E[θ1|m1])1+4β
)2
,
= (m1−θ1)2+ 4β
2 (m2−m1)2
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
,
=
(
m21−2m1θ1+θ 21
)
+
4β 2
(
m22+m
2
1−2m2m1
)
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
.(2.15)
(aC1 −aC2 )2 =
(
E[θ1|m1,m2]−E[θ2|m1,m2]
1+4β
)2
=
m21−2m1m2+m22
(1+4β )2
. (2.16)
Taking expectations we get that
E[(aC1 −θ1)2] =
(
E[θ 21 ]−E[m21]
)
+
4β 2
(
E[m22]+E[m
2
1]
)
(1+4β )2
, (2.17)
E[(aC1 −aC2 )2] =
E[m21]+E[m
2
2]
(1+4β )2
. (2.18)
Now, lets build the expected profits E[Π] which add both terms weighted by 1 and β re-
spectively. Notice that taking ex-ante expectation the following terms are null: E[m1m2] = 0,
E[(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)] = 0. Also note that E[m1θ1] = E[m21]
E[Π1] =
(
K(β )−
[
E[θ 21 ]−
1+3β
(1+4β )
E[m21]+
β
(1+4β )
E[m22]
])
. (2.19)
REMARK: Since E[m1] = 0 and E[θ1] = 0, then E[m21] = V E[θ 21 ] = E[θ 21 ]− (1−V )E[θ 21 ] The
division payoff is E[U1] = (1− s)Π1+ sΠ2.
32
Chapter 2 Organizational Design of Multi-Product Multi-Market Firms
2.7.2.2 Decentralization
The optimal decision making under decentralization are:
aD1 (m1,m2,θ1) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ1+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β m1+
1− s+β
1− s+2β m2
]
, and
aD2 (m1,m2,θ2) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ2+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β m2+
1− s+β
1− s+2β m1
]
.
Replacing it in the expected profit of division 1 we get the following terms:
(aD1 −θ1)2 =
(
− β
(1− s+β )θ1+
β
(1− s+β )m1+
β
1− s+2β (m2−m1)
)2
,
=
β 2
(1− s+β )2 (m1−θ1)
2+
β 2
(1− s+2β )2 (m2−m1)
2+
2β 2(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)
(1− s+β )(1− s+2β ) ,
=
β 2
(
m21−2m1θ1+θ 21
)
(1− s+β )2 +
β 2
(
m22+m
2
1−2m2m1
)
(1− s+2β )2 +
2β 2(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)
(1− s+β )(1− s+2β ) .(2 20)
(aD1 −aD2 )2 =
(
(1− s)(θ1−θ2)
(1− s+β ) +
β
(1− s+β )
(1− s)(m2−m1)
1− s+2β
)2
,
=
(1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 (θ
2
1 +θ
2
2 −2θ1θ2)+
β 2
(1− s+β )2
(1− s)2(m22+m21−2m1m2)
(1− s+2β )2 ,
+
2β
(1− s+β )2
(1− s)2
1− s+2β (m2θ1+m1θ2−m2θ2−m1θ1). (2.21)
Now, lets build the expected profits E[Π] which add both terms weighted by 1 and β respectively.
Notice that taking ex-ante expectation the following terms are null: E[m1m2] = 0,E[m1θ2] = 0,
E[m2θ1] = 0,E[θ1θ2] = 0, E[(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)] = 0. Also note that E[m1θ1] = E[m21] By parts27
E[(aD1 −θ1)2] =
β 2E[θ 21 ]
(1− s+β )2 +
(1− s+β )2− (1− s+2β )2
(1− s+β )2(1− s+2β )2 β
2E[m21]+
β 2
(1− s+2β )2 E[m
2
2],
=
β 2E[θ 21 ]
(1− s+β )2 −
2(1− s)+3β
(1− s+β )2(1− s+2β )2β
3E[m21]+
β 2
(1− s+2β )2 E[m
2
2].
E[(aD1 −aD2 )2] =
(1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 (E[θ
2
1 ]+E[θ
2
2 ])−
[2(1− s)+3β ]
(1− s+β )2
β (1− s)2
(1− s+2β )2 (E[m
2
2]+E[m
2
1]).
The expected profits E[Π1] are
(
K(β )−
[
β (1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 E[θ
2
2 ]+β
β +(1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 E[θ
2
1 ]−β 2
[2(1− s)+3β ]
(1− s+β )2
β +(1− s)2
(1− s+2β )2 E[m
2
1]+
(
β
β +(1− s)2
(1− s+2β )2 −
β (1− s)2
(1− s+β )2
)
E[m22]
])
.(2.22)
27In the profit function we have E[(aD1 − θ1)2] + βE[(aD1 − aD2 )2]. Note that (1−s+β )
2−(1−s+2β )2
(1−s+β )2(1−s+2β )2 =
−β 2(1−s)+3β
(1−s+β )2(1−s+2β )2 .
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Since E[θ ] = 0, E[θ 2] =V (θ) = θ
2
3 = σ
2.
2.7.3 Strategic Communication: Transmission
2.7.3.1 Building E[m2] for any Finite Partition.
I must find the payoff for any finite partition. The general formula for a N j partition is:28
E[m2] =
1
2θ ∑j∈N j
∫ d j
d j−1
(
d j +d j−1
2
)2
dθ . (2.23)
By uniform distribution we get that
∫ d j
d j−1
(
d j+d j−1
2
)2
dθ = (d j−d j−1)
(
d j+d j−1
2
)2
.
From Proposition 2 we have d j,i+1− d j,i = d j,i− d j,i−1 + 4bd j,i with b ≡ (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β under de-
centralization and b ≡ (1−2s)β1−s+β under centralization. Also di = θ x
i(1+yN)−yi(1+xN)
xN−yN 0 ≤ i ≤ N with
x = (1+2b)+
√
(1+2b)2−1 and y = (1+2b)−
√
(1+2b)2−1. Property xy = 1 and x > 1 ap-
plies to both cases and are used all along the algebra. Replacing it in the expression above we have
(Equation 27 in Alonso, Dessein and Matouscheck 2008).
E[m2] =
θ 2
3
[
(x3N j −1)(x−1)2
(xN j −1)3(x2+ x+1) −
(xN j +1)2(x+1)(1+ y)
xN j(xN j − yN j)2
]
,
=
θ 2
3
[
(x3N j −1)(x−1)2
(xN j −1)3(x2+ x+1) −
xN j(x+1)2
x(xN j −1)2
]
. (2.24)
For the case with infinite partitions we have
lim
N j→+∞
E[m2] =
θ 2
4
(x+1)2
(x2+ x+1)
= θ 2
1+b
3+4b
=Vσ2 = [1− (1−V )]σ2. (2.25)
If the sender is truly believed, he will report exaggerating the signal. For example, if s = 0, a
manager has incentives to misreport θR−θ = β1+β θ under centralization and θR−θ = 1+ββ θ under
decentralization. For this case, his report is: θR ≡ (1+4β )(1+2β )
(1+2β )2+β θ =
1+2β
1+β θ under centralization and
θR ≡ 1+2ββ θ under decentralization.
2.7.4 Imperfect Signals
Given the information acquired, specified by the effort e, each manager have a posterior about the
true value. That is, given the realization of the signal θˆ (that coincide with the true value of θ with
probability
√
e), the manager’s posterior is θ˜ = E[θ |θˆ ] =√eθˆ .29 This posterior is the best guess
28Note that m2 =
(
d j+d j−1
2
)2
is the expected value given a particular signal. Then, E[m2] is the ex-ante expected value
in the expression.
29Note that we care about the mean of the posterior and not the posterior distribution. The posterior mean distribution
is uniform in [−√eθ ,√eθ ].
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that a manager has over the true value θ , and he prefers to design a product that is closest to this
estimation of consumers’ tastes.
With the posterior, the headquarters has also inferences after she receives managers’ reports that are
E[θ˜ 21 |m] and E[θ˜ 22 |m] The optimal decision making under centralization are:
aC1 (m1,m2) =
1+2β
1+4β
E[θ˜1|m1]+ 2β1+4β E[θ˜2|m2], and
aC2 (m1,m2) =
2β
1+4β
E[θ˜1|m1]+ 1+2β1+4β E[θ˜2|m2].
Then, replacing it in the expected profit of manager in country 1 we get the following terms:
(aC1 −θ1)2 =
(
E[θ˜1|m1]−θ1+
2β
(
E[θ˜2|m2]−E[θ˜1|m1]
)
1+4β
)2
,
= (m1−θ1)2+ 4β
2 (m2−m1)2
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
,
= (m1−θ1)2+
4β 2
(
m22+m
2
1−2m2m1
)
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
. (2.26)
(aC1 −aC2 )2 =
(
E[θ˜1|m1,m2]−E[θ˜2|m1,m2]
1+4β
)2
=
m21−2m1m2+m22
(1+4β )2
. (2.27)
Notice that taking ex-ante expectation the following terms are null E[m1m2] = 0,
E[(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)] = 0. Also note that E[m1θ1] = E[m21]. Also, note that m2 = E[θ˜1]2 = e1θˆ 21
and then E[m21] = e1E[θˆ 21 ] = e1V1
θ 21
3 . Taking expectations
E[(aC1 −θ1)2] = E[(m1−θ1)2]+
4β 2
(
E[m22]+E[m
2
1]
)
(1+4β )2
, (2.28)
E[(aC1 −aC2 )2] =
E[m21]+E[m
2
2]
(1+4β )2
. (2.29)
Building the expected profits E[Π] which add both terms weighted by 1 and β respectively.
E[Π1] =
(
K(β )−E[(m1−θ1)2]+ β
(1+4β )
(E[m21]+E[m
2
2])
)
. (2.30)
where the term E[(m1−θ1)2] is the difference between the real realization of θ and what the HQ
believes of θ˜ after receiving the report. Note that the message of the posterior is equivalent as a
message of the signal, then m =
√
eE[θˆ |m].
E[(m−θ)2] = E[(m−√eθˆ +√eθˆ −θ)2],
= E[
(√
eE[θˆ |m]−√eθˆ)2]+E[(√eθˆ −θ)2].
with the first term being the communication accuracy of the signal, i.e.,E[
(√
eE[θˆ |m]−√eθˆ)2] =
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eV E[θ 2]. The second term is the loss due to the lack of precision in the signal, i.e., E[
(√
eθˆ −θ)2] =
(1− e)E[θ 2].30 Recall that V is the proportion of the variance communicated, i.e., how ac-
curate the communication is. We prove now that the omitted term is equal to zero, i.e.,
E[
(
m−√eθˆ)(√eθˆ −θ)] = 0.
Proof.
E[
(
m−√eθˆ)(√eθˆ −θ)] = E[m(√eθˆ −θ)]−E[√eθˆ (√eθˆ −θ)],
= E[m
(√
eθˆ −θ)]−E[√eθˆ (√eθˆ −θ)].
The first term is not problematic E[m
(√
eθˆ −θ)] = 0, but the second term deserves a little more
of attention to notice that E[
√
eθˆ
(√
eθˆ −θ)] = E[eθˆ 2]− E[√eθˆθ ] = 0. I prove that E[eθˆ 2] =
eE[θ 2] = E[
√
eθˆθ ]:
E[
√
eθˆθ ] = E[
√
e
√
eθθ +(1−√e)√exθ ] = E[eθ 2+(1−√e)√exθ ] =,
eE[θ 2]+ (1−√e)√e E[xθ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 independent
= eE[θ 2]. (2.31)
Now, we show the other part.
E[eθˆ 2] = E[
√
eeθ 2+(1−√e)ex2] =√eeE[θ 2]+ (1−√e)eE[x2] = eE[θ 2]. (2.32)
The proof is complete.
REMARK: Since E[m1] = 0 and E[θ1] = 0, then E[m21] = e1E[θˆ 21 ] = e1V1
θ 21
3
E[Π1] =
(
K(β )− θ
2
3
[
1−
(
1−V1 1+3β
(1+4β )
)
e1+ e2V2
β
(1+4β )
])
.
And the division payoff is E[U1] = (1− s)Π1+ sΠ2. Adding up for both divisions
E[Π1]+E[Π2] =
(
2K(β )− θ
2
3
[
1−
(
1−V1 1+2β
(1+4β )
)
e1−
(
1−V2 1+2β
(1+4β )
)
e2
])
,
=
(
2K(β )− θ
2
3
[1− e1ψ1− e2ψ2]
)
.
A similarly analysis accounts for the case under decentralization. For further details you can see
Proposition 5 in Rantakari (2010).
30 E[
(√
eθˆ −θ)2] = E[eθˆ2]+E[θ2]−2E[√eθˆθ ] = (1−e)E[θ2], which equation (2.31) proves that E[eθˆ2] = eE[θ2]
and E[
√
eθˆθ ] = eE[θ2].
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2.7.5 Indirect Profit Function before Communication and Decisions
Value created and value captured:
ψ1(s) = 1−φ11(s)−φ12(s),
ψ˜11(s) = (1− s)(1−φ11(s))− sφ12(s),
ψ˜11(s) = (1− s)ψ1(s)+(1−2s)φ12(s).
It is worth noting that from communication and decision making both φ11(s) and φ12(s) are de-
creasing in s. Under centralization the reason is that communication is becoming more precise.
Under decentralization both decisions are less biased and communication is more precise. The ex-
ternality φ12(s) is almost always greater under decentralization.31 This externality reflects the high
responsiveness to local conditions (to increase revenues) which also reduces the coordination what
is translated into higher production costs.
The expected profits for a particular product in division 1 are,
E[Π1] = K(β )−
1− e1 [1−Λ1−Γ11(1−V1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 1 information
+e2 [Λ1+Γ21(1−V2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 2 information
+µC(e1)
σ2θ . (2.33)
Expected value generated by division 1:
E[pi1A]+E[pi1B] = KA−σ2A + e1Aψ1Aσ2A−µA(t1A)C(e1A)σ2A,
+ KB−σ2B + e1Bψ1Bσ2B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B)σ2B.
Expected value appropriated by local manager in division 1:
K−σ2A + e1Aψ˜11Aσ2A + e2Aψ˜21Aσ2A−µA(t1A)C(e1A)σ2A,
K−σ2B + e1Bψ˜11Bσ2B + e2Bψ˜21Bσ2B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B)σ2B.
2.7.6 Headquarters Allocates Resources
2.7.6.1 Assumption
Sufficient Assumption for ΠtAtA ≤ 0 (and when managers allocate t) is:
A1- µ(t)µ ′′(t)C(e)C′′(e)>C′(e)2µ ′(t)2 for all t and e.
This assumption holds for functions µ(t) = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ [0,1] and µ ∈R+, and C(e) =−(e+
log(1− e)).
31Only if s→ 0 and β →+∞ the externality is a little greater under centralization.
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2.7.6.2 Managers’ Choices
Each manager solves:
max
e1A,e1B
2K−σ2A−σ2B +(e1Aψ˜11A+ e2Aψ˜21A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A,
+(e1Bψ˜11B+ e2Bψ˜21B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B))σ2B.
The values of eA and eB are determined by ψ˜σ2−µ(t)C′(e)σ2 = 0. The comparative static are: i-
∂e
∂ s =
∂ψ˜
∂ s
1
µC′′(e) < 0; ii-
∂e
∂ t =− µ
′(t)C′(e)
µ(t)C′′(e) > 0;
∂e
∂σ2 = 0; and
∂eA
∂ sB = 0. Also
∂ 2e
∂ s∂ t
=−∂ψ˜
∂ s
1
[µC′′(e)]2
µ ′(t)
C′′(e)
[C′′(e)2−C′(e)C′′′(e)]> 0 if e > 0.5,
∂ 2e
∂ t2
=−
C′(e)C′′(e)[µ(t)µ ′′(t)−µ ′(t)2]−µ ′(t)2 C′(e)C′′(e) [C′′(e)2−C′′′(e)C′(e)]
[µC′′(e)]2
< 0,
∂ 2e
∂ s2
=
[
∂ 2ψ˜
∂ s2
−
(
∂ψ˜
∂ s
)2 C′′′(e)
µC′′(e)2
]
1
µC′′(e)
≷ 0.
Where ∂
2e
∂ s2 ≤ 0 for µ sufficiently small. We can define tB = 1−tA and we have ∂eB∂ tA =
µ ′(1−tA)C′(eB)
µ(1−tA)C′′(eB) <
0.
2.7.6.3 Headquarters’ Design
The HQ solves:
max
sA,sB,tA
E[pi1A]+E[pi1B] = K−σ2A +(e1Aψ1A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A,
+K−σ2B +(e1Bψ1B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B))σ2B. (2.34)
The first order conditions are,
σ2A
[
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A)
]
= 0,
σ2B
[
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B)
]
= 0,
−µ ′(tA)C(eA)σ2A +
∂eA
∂ tA
(ψA− ψ˜A)σ2A +µ ′(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B +
∂eB
∂ tA
(ψB− ψ˜B)σ2B = 0.
The second order conditions are

ΠsAsA 0
∂ψA
∂ sA
∂eA
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eA
∂ sA∂ tA
(ψA− ψ˜A)
0 ΠsBsB
∂ψB
∂ sB
∂eB
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eB
∂ sB∂ tA
(ψB− ψ˜B)
σ2A [
∂ψA
∂ sA
∂eA
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eA
∂ sA∂ tA
(ψA− ψ˜A)] σ2B [ ∂ψB∂ sB
∂eB
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eB
∂ sB∂ tA
(ψB− ψ˜B)] ΠtAtA

 dsAdsB
dtA
 .
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Where ΠtAtA ≡ σ2A
[
−µ ′′ACA−µ ′AC1A ∂eA∂ tA +
∂ 2eA
∂ t2A
(ψA− ψ˜A)
]
+σ2B
[
−µ ′′BCB+µ ′BC1B ∂eB∂ tA +
∂ 2eB
∂ t2A
(ψB−
ψ˜B)
]
.32 We can split ΠtAtA into two parts ΠtAtA ≡ ΠAtAtA +ΠBtAtA . Also ΠsAsA ≡ ∂
2ψA
∂ s2A
eA +
∂ψA
∂ sA
∂eA
∂ sA +
∂ 2eA
∂ s2A
(ψA− ψ˜A)+ ∂eA∂ sA
∂ (ψA−ψ˜A)
∂ sA (≤ 0 in our relevant domain). The determinant is defined by |J| ≡
ΠsAsA [ΠsBsBΠtAtA−Π2sBtB ]−ΠsBsBΠ2sAtA or
|J| ≡ΠsAsA [ΠsBsBΠBtAtA−Π2sBtB ]+ΠsBsB [ΠsAsAΠAtAtA−Π2sAtA ]< 0

0
0
µ ′A(tA)C(eA)− ∂eA∂ tA (ψA− ψ˜A)
(dσ2A)=

0
0
−ΠtAσ2A
(dσ2A) .
Then, we have ΠsAsA ≤ 0, ΠsBsB ≤ 0, ΠtAtA ≤ 0 but ΠsAtA ≥ 0, −ΠtAσ2A ≤ 0 and ΠsBtA ≤ 0. I took
common factor σ2Aσ2B, then:
∂ sA
∂σ2A
=
−ΠtAσ2A [−ΠsAtAΠsBsB ]
|J| > 0, (2.35)
∂ tA
∂σ2A
=
−ΠtAσ2A [ΠsAsAΠsBsB ]
|J| > 0, (2.36)
∂ sB
∂σ2A
=−
−ΠtAσ2A [ΠsBtAΠsAsA ]
|J| < 0. (2.37)
Finally, the headquarters chooses to centralize or decentralize decision rights in each market consid-
ering the one that generates higher value, i.e., higher [ψAeA− µAC(eA)]σ2A +[ψBeB− µBC(eB)]σ2B.
If µ is sufficiently low and σ2A ∼ σ2B, the headquarters decentralizes decision rights about both prod-
ucts. If σ2A increases, sA and tA increase and sB decreases, making more likely that the firm prefers
to centralize decision rights of product B (see equations (2.35), (2.36), and (2.37)). There is a cutoff
σ˜2A above which the headquarters decentralizes decision making about product A and centralizes
decision making about product B.
2.7.7 Managers Allocate Resources
2.7.7.1 Managers’ Choices
Each manager solves:
max
e1A,e1B,t1A
2K−σ2A−σ2B +(e1Aψ˜11A+ e2Aψ˜21A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A,
+(e1Bψ˜11B+ e2Bψ˜21B−µB(1− t1A)C(eiB))σ2B.
32Note that, replacing the expression of ∂eA∂ tA , each term in brackets can be re-expressed as
[
− 1µACA11 (µAµ ′′ACACA11−
µ ′2A C
2
1A)+
∂ 2eA
∂ t2A
(ψA− ψ˜A)
]
< 0 guaranteeing that ΠtAtA ≤ 0.
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The first order conditions are
ψ˜Aσ2A−µA(tA)C′Aσ2A = 0,
ψ˜Bσ2B−µB(1− tA)C′Bσ2B = 0,
−µ ′A(tA)C(eA)σ2A +µ ′B(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B = 0.
Differentiating the first order conditions we have,
−µA(tA)C′′Aσ2A 0 −µ ′A(tA)C′Aσ2A
0 −µB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2B µ ′B(1− tA)C′Bσ2B
−µ ′A(tA)C′Aσ2A µ ′B(1− tA)C1(eB)σ2B −(µ ′′A(tA)C(eA)σ2A +µ ′′B(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B)


deA
deB
dtA
 .

0 − ∂ψ˜A∂ sA σ2A 0 0
0 0 0 − ∂ψ˜B∂ sB σ2B
µ ′A(tA)C(eA) 0 µ ′B(tB)C(eB) 0


dσ2A
dsA
dσ2B
dsB
 .
where
|J|=−µA(tA)C′′Aσ2A
[
µB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2B
(
µ ′′A(tA)C(eA)σ
2
A +µ
′′
B(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B
)
− [µ ′B(1− tA)C′Bσ2B]2
]
+µ ′A(tA)C
′
Aσ
2
A
[
µ ′A(tA)C
′
Aσ
2
AµB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2B
]
Assumption A1, i.e., µ(t)µ ′′(t)C(e)C′′(e)>C′(e)2µ ′(t)2 for all t and e, is a sufficient condition for
|J|< 0. The comparatives static respect to sA are
∂eA
∂ sA
=
∂ψ˜A
∂ sA
σ2B
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′Bµ ′′AC(eA)σ2A
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
< 0.
∂eB
∂ sA
=−∂ψ˜A
∂ sA
µ ′A(tA)C′Aµ ′B(1− tA)C′Bσ2A
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
> 0.
∂ tA
∂ sA
=−∂ψ˜A
∂ sA
µ ′A(tA)C′AµB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2A
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
< 0.
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The comparatives static respect to σ2A are
∂eA
∂σ2A
=
µ ′A(tA)2C(eA)C′AµB(1− tA)C′′B
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
> 0.
∂eB
∂σ2A
=− µ
′
A(tA)C(eA)µA(tA)C′′Aµ ′B(1− tA)C1(eB)
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
< 0.
∂ tA
∂σ2A
=− µ
′
A(tA)C(eA)µA(tA)C′′AµB(1− tA)C′′B
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
> 0.
2.7.7.2 Headquarters’ Design
the HQ’s problem is maxsA,sB E[pi1A]+E[pi1B]
max
sA,sB
K−σ2A +(e1Aψ1A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A +K−σ2B +(e1BψB−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B))σ2B. (2.38)
the first order conditions are
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A)+ σ
2
B
σ2A
∂eB
∂ sA
(ψB− ψ˜B) = 0,
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B)+ σ
2
A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ sB
(ψA− ψ˜A) = 0.
Notice that these first order conditions capture the effects of sA on ψA and on eA like when the
headquarters allocate resources. However, it also captures the indirect effects of sA on eA and eB
through a change in tA. This indirect effects are of second order magnitude and do not modify the
main trade-off when choosing the organizational design.
The headquarters chooses to centralize or decentralize decision rights considering the sum of
[ψAeA−µAC(eA)]σ2A +[ψBeB−µBC(eB)]σ2B. If µ is sufficiently low and σ2A ∼ σ2B, the headquarters
decentralizes decision rights about both products. Since both products are similar in terms of returns
to differentiation the headquarters follows a strategy of product differentiation in both products. If
σ2A increases, sA and tA increase and sB decreases, making more likely that the firm prefers to cen-
tralize decision rights of product B. There is a cutoff σˆ2A above which the headquarters decentralizes
decision making about product A and centralizes decision making about product B.
Note that the change in the organizational design that yields decentralization in product A and
centralization in product B has an discrete jump in the optimal shares. The jump in s arises because
the headquarters centralizes product B which non-locally reduces sB; this also modifies ψB− ψ˜B
and, consequently, provides incentives to reduce sA and to increase sB.
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2.7.7.3 Redefining Effects
Given an efficient allocation of resources, t∗A, the optimal s is defined by σ2A[
∂ψA
∂ sA eA +
∂eA
∂ sA (ψA−
ψ˜A)] = 0. However, if local managers allocate resources the first order condition becomes:
σ2A[
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A)]+ ∂ tA∂ sA
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψAσ2A− ψ˜Aσ2A]+
∂ tA
∂ sA
∂eB
∂ tA
[ψBσ2B− ψ˜Bσ2B],
+
∂ tA
∂ sA
[−µ ′A(tA)CA(eA)σ2A +µ ′B(1− tA)CB(eB)σ2B] = 0.
with ∂ tA∂ sA < 0 and
∂ tA
∂ sB > 0 leading to
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A) = − ∂ tA∂ sA
σ2B
σ2A
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
,
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B) = − ∂ tA∂ sB
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
.
calling ϕ ≡ σ2Aσ2B
∂eA
∂ tA [ψA− ψ˜A] +
∂eB
∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]. It is easier to separate the indirect effect of sA and
sB on tA from the direct effect of sA on eA and sB on eB. This alternative expression is used in the
following section.
2.8 Appendix C: Extension
2.8.1 Extension in Section 2.4.1: Coordination
The first order conditions of the Headquarters problem are
− ∂µA
∂ tA
σ2A
[
C(eA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA−µAC
′(eA)]
]
=−∂µB
∂ tB
σ2B
[
C(eB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC
′(eB)]
]
, (2.39)
σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)]
]
= 0, (2.40)
σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)]
]
= 0. (2.41)
K′(βA)−σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂βA
+
∂eA
∂βA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)
]
= 0, (2.42)
K′(βB)−σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂βB
+
∂eB
∂βB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)
]
= 0. (2.43)
First, we could replace the optimal effort choice µAC′(eA) = ψ˜ into all first order conditions. Once
tA is chosen, the decisions of (s,β ,g) are described by Rantakari (2010). Given the convexity of
µ(t), the decision of tA depends directly on who makes effort choice. In either case there exists
increasing relations σ˜2B(σ2A) and σ˜2A(σ2B) such that product A is centralized if σ2A < σ˜2A(σ2B) and
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decentralized if σ2A ≥ σ˜2A(σ2B), and product B is centralized if σ2B < σ˜2B(σ2A) and decentralized if
σ2B ≥ σ˜2B(σ2A).
If local division managers control resources, the first order conditions are
σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sA
ϕ, (2.44)
σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sB
ϕ. (2.45)
K′(βA)−σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂βA
+
∂eA
∂βA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)
]
= − ∂ tA
∂βA
ϕ, (2.46)
K′(βB)−σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂βB
+
∂eB
∂βB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)
]
= − ∂ tA
∂βB
ϕ, (2.47)
with
ϕ ≡ σ2A
∂µA
∂ tA
∂eA
∂µA
[
ψA−µAC′(eA)
]−σ2B ∂µB∂ tB ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC′(eB)] . (2.48)
We can replace the optimal allocation of time chosen by managers into ϕ . There exists increasing
relations σ˜2BM(σ2A) and σ˜2AM(σ2B) such that decision making about product A is centralized if σ2A <
σ˜2AM(σ2B) and decentralized if σ2A ≥ σ˜2AM(σ2B), and decision making about product B is centralized
if σ2B < σ˜2BM(σ2A) and decentralized if σ2B ≥ σ˜2BM(σ2A).
When σ2A > σ2B then ϕ > 0, and thus the firm prefers to allocate more resources in product A than
implemented by local managers, i.e., tA < t∗A. The right hand side of equations (2.44) and (2.46) are
positive and the right hand side of equations (2.45) and (2.47) are negative. The headquarters aligns
incentive, s, and integrate divisions, β , to affect the resource allocation choice of local managers.
When σ2A > σ2B, the headquarters reduces incentive alignment of product A, i.e., ∇sA, increases
incentive alignment of product B, i.e., ∆sB, reduces integration of product A, i.e ∇βA, and increases
integration of product B, i.e., ∆βB. In other words, local managers put too much resources in
product B, because they underestimate the opportunity cost of resources. The headquarters finds less
important to provide incentives for information acquisition in product B and then decentralization
appears more profitable.
2.8.2 Extension in Section 2.4.2: Delegation
The headquarters objective function is:
E[piiA]+E[piiB] =
{
KA− [1− (eA+αeB)ψA+µAC(eiA)]σ2A
}
+
{
KB− [1− (eB+αeA)ψB+µBC(eiB)]σ2B
}
.
When the headquarters control resources, the first order conditions are
− ∂µA
∂ tA
σ2A
[
C(eA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA +
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)]
]
=−∂µB
∂ tB
σ2B
[
C(eB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB +
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)]
]
.(2.49)
43
Chapter 2 Organizational Design of Multi-Product Multi-Market Firms
σ2A
[
(eA+αeB)
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)]
]
= 0, (2.50)
σ2B
[
(eB+αeA)
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB+
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)]
]
= 0. (2.51)
Once tA is chosen, the effort exerted by local managers is given by ψ˜A = µAC′(eˆA). Note that the
inefficiency in effort choice is given by ψA− ψ˜A+ σ
2
B
σ2A
αψB.
If local division managers control resources, the first order conditions are
σ2A
[
(eA+αeB)
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sA
ϕ, (2.52)
σ2B
[
(eB+αeA)
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB+
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sB
ϕ. (2.53)
with
ϕ ≡ σ2A
∂µA
∂ tA
∂eA
∂µA
[
ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)
]
−σ2B
∂µB
∂ tB
∂eB
∂µB
[
ψB+
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)
]
.(2.54)
However, the effort choice is now given by ψ˜A+
σ2B
σ2A
αψ˜B = µAC′(eˆA), and the inefficiency in effort
choice is given by ψA− ψ˜A+ σ
2
B
σ2A
α(ψB− ψ˜B). The headquarters faces a trade-off between allocating
resources efficiently and internalizing the learning externality. If the firm is organized by regional
divisions and resource allocation is delegated to local managers, there is an inefficiency in resource
allocation but local managers internalize that learning about one product has a positive externality
in learning about the other product.
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Product Reliability, Consumers’
Complaints and Market Performance:
The case of Consumers’ Associations.
3.1 Introduction
In their dealings with retailers and suppliers, regulations and warranties ensure that consumers can
seek a repair, a replacement or a refund if the good they have purchased is faulty. The evidence,
however, indicates that few consumers pursue any form of compensation (Best and Andreasen,
1977; Huppertz, 2007), suggesting that, for most consumers, claiming costs are high (see Hup-
pertz (2007), which is based on Hirschmann (1970)) and providing a rationale for the role that
consumers’ associations play in helping consumers channel their complaints. In this paper, we
analyze the monopolist’s pricing and product reliability problem when consumers are entitled to
product replacement and we assess the implications of a decrease in consumers’ claiming costs due
to, for instance, the appearance of consumers’ associations. Our results suggest that consumers’
associations could, instead, lower product reliability.
Our results hinge on how the firm deals with the replacement decision of consumers. In its choice
of failure rate, the firm internalizes three effects. On the one hand, the failure rate affects directly
the cost of production, through the manufacturing cost, and indirectly, through the number of units
it must produce to replace the claimed faulty ones (including the associated indirect cost per re-
placement). On the other hand, the failure rate affects the expected utility of consumers because it
modifies the probability of consuming a non-faulty good either when buying or when receiving a
replacement of a faulty unit. When choosing the failure rate, the firm’s trade-off among these three
effects depends on the consumers’ claiming cost. A decrease in the claiming cost implies more
units being replaced and thus a higher cost of production, and a higher expected utility both from
complaint and consumption, which implies a higher demand. Alone, the manufacturing cost of the
replacement units would make the firm increase the level of its product reliability, but the presence
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of the expected utility effect may yield opposite results.
To study the effect of a reduction in the consumers’ claiming cost on the firm’s decisions, we con-
struct a model with a monopolist choosing the price and reliability of the product it manufactures.
The product’s reliability is defined by the probability that the product is defective. Replacing a
faulty product, and providing a more reliable one are costly actions for the firm. Consumers derive
a high utility from consumption when the good does not break down, and a low utility otherwise. If
the good is faulty, consumers choose whether to seek a replacement, incurring a claiming cost. Con-
sumers differ in their cost to file a complaint. Within this set-up, we propose a comparative static
analysis to understand the impact of the consumers’ associations (as a way to reduce the claiming
costs) on market performance. We show that the monopolist can optimally respond to a decrease in
transaction costs by decreasing the product’s reliability.
In our environment, there is sorting of consumers: those with low claiming costs are the ones with
high willingness to pay and the ones who are prompt to complain if the product fails. Those with
high claiming costs are the ones with low willingness to pay and the ones who do not complain
when receiving a defected unit. The firm will follow either a high-pricing strategy, allowing only
consumers with high willingness to pay to purchase the product, or a low-pricing strategy, allowing
all consumers to buy the product. The dispersion of the consumers’ willingness to pay is negatively
related with the consumers’ claiming cost, and, in line with Johnson and Myatt (2006), in this set-
ting “firm’s profits are a U-shaped function of dispersion [of consumers’ willingness to pay]. High
dispersion is complemented by niche production [and high price] and low dispersion is comple-
mented by mass-market supply [and low price].” (brackets added)
On the one hand, low consumers’ claiming cost is associated with high dispersion of consumers’
willingness to pay, high price, and low demand. Firm’s profit and product’s failure rate are decreas-
ing functions of consumers’ claiming cost. The claiming cost is an unavoidable transaction cost
affecting all consumers. When it is low, a marginal increment in transaction cost generates a reduc-
tion in consumers’ willingness to pay which is compensated by an increase in product’s reliability.
Both effects reduce firm’s profit. On the other hand, high consumers’ claiming cost is associated
with low dispersion of consumers’ willingness to pay, low price, and high demand. Firm’s profit
and product’s failure rate are increasing functions of consumers’ claiming cost. When it is high, a
marginal increment in claiming cost generates a reduction in consumers’ willingness to complain,
reducing the firm’s liability cost and thus its unit cost. That is, a higher consumers’ claiming cost
reduces the number of complaints and the unit cost, making the failure rate to go up.
The result that product’s reliability may decrease when consumers’ claiming cost decreases arises
when the firm changes its strategy as an optimal response for a discrete reduction in consumers’
claiming cost. This result is more likely when the firm’s cost of receiving complaints is sufficiently
low: the lower the firm’s cost of receiving complaints, the lower the liability cost associated to
replacements and the higher the weight the firm puts on consumer’s willingness to pay.
One way to reduce consumers’ claiming cost is with the entry of consumer protection agencies,
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e.g., consumers’ associations. In the 1960s, consumers’ associations (hereafter, CAs) became more
common.1 Since then, CAs have been bridging between consumers, firms, and law makers: they
have demanded to pass laws that add rights to consumers, they have provided more reliable infor-
mation to consumers, and they have represented the consumers’ interests by direct action. With the
appearance of internet, some independent websites started to provide devices to help consumers to
voice their complaints and to help to mediate between consumers and firms.2 Consumers partici-
pate in the CAs as a substitute or a complement to costly direct legal actions. Some governmental
agencies, like the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the US car market,
also play the role of protecting consumers’ rights: they collect information about automobiles (cars,
trucks, motorbikes, etc) and force companies to issue recalls to repair, replace, or repurchase the
defective automobiles.
In the US car market, the NHTSA is the governmental agency that rules and controls safety stan-
dards. In 1995, the NHTSA introduced on-line complaints, lowering significantly consumers’
claiming costs. Data from the NHTSA shows that the number of car complaints and the num-
ber of recalls issued have substantially increased since 1995. Firms could have adjusted product
reliability after 1995 as a response to this change. However, internet filings were permitted for cars
manufactured both before and after 1995. This allows us to interpret the difference in the number
of recalls for cars manufactured before and after 1995 as a change in product’s reliability. The
evidence appears consistent with a reduction in the firm’s choice of reliability.
Although the CAs have become increasingly common, the theoretical and empirical literatures have
not analyzed their effects on market performance. Few exceptions are Inderst and Ottaviani (2009),
showing that the imposition of minimum post-sale return policies on sellers improves welfare and
consumers’ surplus when the proportion of credulous buyers is high, and Xinyu (Forthcoming
JLEO), showing that when firm’s product liability is duty to recall there is a higher rate of con-
sumers’ response to recall but the firm has fewer incentives to make these recalls voluntarily. Simon
(1981) studies the impact of costly litigation and imperfect information about product quality and
the outcome of a lawsuit on the existence of negligent firms. In her environment, a reduction in
consumers’ litigation cost fosters firms to increase product reliability. She models imperfect infor-
mation about product quality in consumer side, while we introduce asymmetric information about
consumer’s valuation or consumer’s claiming cost in the firm side. She also ignores the possibility
of not buying, banning the demand effect.
Our paper also relates to other strands of literature. First, to the vast literature on product liability.
Murthy and Djamaludin (2002) and Huang, Liu, and Murthy (2007) analyze how warranties may
1The first two organizations to focus on consumers’ rights were the National Consumer League founded in 1899 and
the Consumer Union founded in 1936. It was not until the 60s, however, that consumers’ associations became popular
and common in a number of countries.
2For instance, the website getsatisfaction.com is used by more than 40.000 firms to handle complaints and medi-
ate between consumers and firm. Other websites are fearlessrevolution.com in US, miqueja.es, quejasonline.com and
reclamacionesconsumidor.com in Spain.
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affect the firm’s choice of product reliability and demand.3 Oi (1973) analyzes how a change in
product’s liability from consumer to producer can affect quality negatively. Daughety and Rein-
ganum (2008) work on the relation between signaling price and information disclosure when prod-
uct’s safety is private information. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) study the relation between
R&D phase and product’s safety when price may work as a signal of product’s safety. Daughety
and Reinganum (2005) analyze the relation between safety, R&D and confidential settlements. My
contribution is to endogenize the number of claimants among buyers as a function of price. The
relationship between price and claimants is translated to the firm’s expected marginal cost and to
the optimal choice of product’s reliability.
Second, our paper also relates to the literature on consumers’ complaint behavior (CCB), which
focuses on the consumers’ reaction to dissatisfaction (Chebat, Davidow, and Codjovi, 2005; Owens
and Hausknecht, 1999). In our paper, we focus on complaints filed against the firm or third parties
(CAs). We do assume that the firm undergoes an additional transaction cost when the consumer
files a complaint and the information becomes public. We contribute to this literature showing that
the number of complaints is endogenously determined and that the product’s reliability can either
increase or decrease when reducing the consumers’ claiming cost.4
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model and explains the firm’s strate-
gies. Section 4.3 states the equilibrium and the main proposition. Section 3.4 illustrates the main
results with a numerical example. Section 3.5 provides evidence about the effect of reducing claim-
ing cost in the US car market. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider the problem of a monopolist choosing its product’s price p and failure rate x ∈ [0,1] to
maximize its profit, while anticipating that consumers may request a replacement if the product they
have purchased is faulty. The firm grants all replacement requests (there is binding legislation) by
exchanging faulty products for new ones. Consumers are heterogeneous in their cost of requesting
a replacement, which may lead to some consumers scrapping faulty products. Obviously, a replace-
ment itself may fail as well and the consumer may again request a replacement, which will, again,
be granted.5
3Spence (1977) analyzes the effect of consumers’ misperceptions on product quality and characterizes the conditions
under which a warranty can work as a signal of product quality. He suggests different types of interventions to solve the
subprovision of quality. However, he ignores any type of consumers’ claiming cost.
4There are other ways to affect the consumers’ claiming cost, such as Class Action Lawsuits (Hensler, 2001; Klement
and Neeman, 2004) and Small Courts (Best and Andreasen, 1977). Also, there are other mechanisms to motivate a pro-
vision of reliability. Klein and Leffler (1981) study the choice of product reliability by the firm in a dynamic framework.
Repeated purchases, reputation, and brand name may ensure the provision of high quality goods by the firm. Finally,
Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) describe how merchants create guild to improve the terms of trade, such as the level
of product quality/reliability. We work on a static model with perfect information where reputation does not guarantee
the provision of product reliability.
5Our model resemblesBar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cun˜at (2010). In their paper, a marketing strategy transmits, prior to
purchasing, information to the consumer about how suitable the product is, informing him whether the match is good or
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3.2.1 Consumers and Demand
Consumers are indexed by i and are heterogeneous in their cost of requesting a replacement,
ki ∈ R+. We assume k is exponentially distributed, with cumulative distribution G(k,λ ).6 Con-
sumers derive utility v ≥ 0 from consuming one unit of a non-faulty good. If the good is faulty
or the consumer chooses not to purchase it, the consumer derives a utility of 0.7 Each consumer i
makes two sequential decisions, whether to purchase one unit of the product and whether to pursue
a replacement if the product breaks down. The consumer pursues a replacement if v(1−x)−ki ≥ 0.
Notice that the consumer’s replacement decision is the same independent of whether the product
being replaced is the original product or a replacement. This implies that the expected utility con-
sumer i derives from replacing faulty products is given by
x
max{v(1− x)− ki,0}
1− x . (3.1)
Then, given (3.1), the consumer purchases one unit of the product if
EUi(p,x) = v(1− x)− p+ xmax{v(1− x)− ki,0}1− x ≥ 0. (3.2)
Figure 3.1.a depicts the maximum willingness to pay of each consumer type ki given a failure rate
x. It shows that those consumers who purchase the good and then request replacements are those
with lowest k, while those with highest k prefer to purchase the good and will not replace it if it
is faulty. The characterization of the actual consumption choice depends on p. If p is high (e.g.,
equal to pH in the figure), all consumers who purchase replace the product if it is faulty, with their
willingness to pay only depending on x by the expected replacement cost. Instead, if p is low (e.g.,
pL), some consumers purchase and replace while others purchase and scrap.
We next obtain the demand function. We aggregate the consumers’ choices for all k, but separate
them into two groups, depending on whether they will request a replacement if the good results
to be faulty. Those consumers with ki ≤ v(1− x) anticipate replacing a product if it is faulty.
We label them claimants. Among these consumers, those with ki ≤ (v− p)(1− x)/x purchase
the product. Instead, the consumers with ki ≥ v(1− x) anticipate not replacing a faulty product.
We label these non-claimants. All consumers who are non-claimants make the same purchasing
decision. If v(1−x)≥ p, all non-claimants purchase the product, while otherwise, all non-claimants
do not. (Notice that the difference in thresholds v(1− x) and (v− p)(1− x)/x can be rewritten
as (1− x)(p− v(1− x))/x, which implies that the demand cut-offs are solely determined by the
comparison of p and v(1− x).) That is, the demand function of claimants, QC, and non-claimants,
bad. The consumer learns the result of the match after purchasing. Here the consumer anticipates that the product can
work (good) or fail (bad) and the buyer chooses to request a replacement or not after buying.
6We can generalize our results for any family of continuous and differential distributions with increasing reverse
hazard rate that can be ranked according to the reverse hazard rate criteria.
7Our results also hold if, instead, v∼U [0,1] and k ∈ R+. The proofs are available upon request.
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QNC, is given, respectively, by
QC =
{
G( (v−p)(1−x)x ,λ ) if p > v(1− x), and
G(v(1− x),λ ) if p≤ v(1− x).
QNC =
{
0 if p > v(1− x), and
1−G(v(1− x),λ ) if p≤ v(1− x).
Exponential distributions are ordered by λ . A distribution with a higher λ is first order stochasti-
cally dominated by another distribution with a lower λ . If λ is higher, the exponential distribution
moves to the left and consumers have lower claiming costs. Also, an exponential distribution with a
higher λ is dominated in terms of reverse hazard rate by another exponential distribution with lower
λ . This property guarantees that the firm charges a higher price to a population of consumers with
lower claiming costs. We next turn to the problem of the firm.
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Figure 3.1: Willingness to pay (a) and demand and substitution effects (b).
3.2.2 Monopolist’s Problem
We let c(x) denote the marginal cost of production, which is constant for a given x. We assume
c(x) > 0, c′(x) < 0 and c′′(x) > 0. We also assume that xc(x) is weakly increasing in x. This
assumption implies that xc(x)/(1−x), i.e., the expected cost of manufacturing replacement units is
increasing in the failure rate.8 When serving replacement requests, the firm also incurs a per-unit
replacement cost cr ≥ 0.9 This implies that the cost of selling one unit of the good to a claimant
consumer is c(x)+ x(c(x)+ cr)/(1− x), while selling the same unit to a non-claimant is only c(x).
To ensure that a solution to the firm’s maximization problem exists, we assume there exists a cr > 0
such that, for some x ∈ [0,1], v(1− x)− c(x)− x c(x)+cr1−x > 0. This assumption says that the firm
can make positive profits if it sells to all consumers, including those with lowest willingness-to-pay
8The family of functions c(x) = βxα , with α ∈ [0,1] and β ∈ R+, satisfies this assumption.
9The parameter cr may account for a variety of costs, from administrative/shipping and handling costs to reputational
losses.
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v(1− x).
Then, given the demand function in (3.3), the monopolist’s maximization problem is given by
Π(p,x) =

[
p− c(x)− x c(x)+cr1−x
][
1− e−λ (v−p)(1−x)x
]
if p > v(1− x), and
p− c(x)− x c(x)+cr1−x
[
1− e−λv(1−x)
]
if p≤ v(1− x).
We say that the firm follows a high-pricing strategy if p and x are such that p > v(1−x); otherwise,
we say that the firm follows a low-pricing strategy. Notice that p = v(1− x) dominates all other p
and x that constitute a low-pricing strategy as the objective function depends positively on p.
The firm faces a trade-off in its choice of price and failure rate. When following a low-pricing
strategy the marginal consumer is a non-claimant whose willingness to pay is low and depends only
on the probability of buying a non-defected unit; reducing the failure rate increases considerably
his willingness to pay. This effect defines the demand effect on non-claimants in Figure 3.1.b. The
marginal cost of selling this unit, however, is only its production cost, which increases as failure rate
decreases. In contrast, when following a high-pricing strategy the marginal consumer is a claimant
whose willingness to pay is high and depends both on the failure rate and on his own claiming
cost. Reducing the failure rate increases his willingness to pay but this increment decreases as
his claiming cost decreases. This effect defines the demand effect on claimants in Figure 3.1.b.
The marginal cost of selling this unit incorporates a production cost and a replacement cost and it
increases as the failure rate decreases.10
3.3 Equilibrium
We next find the monopolist’s optimal strategy for a given distribution of consumers’ claiming cost
and then analyze the effect of a reduction in the consumers’ claiming cost, i.e., the effect of an
increase in λ .
The firm’s optimal choice of p and x depends crucially on the parameter λ . The intuition is as
follows. If λ is such that consumers have low claiming costs, they are more likely to complain
when receiving a defected unit and there is high dispersion in the consumers’ willingness pay. If
this is the case, the firm does not find rewardable to reduce the price to v(1− x) so as to increase
demand and it follows a high-pricing strategy. If, instead, consumers have high claiming costs,
there is low dispersion in consumers’ willingness pay, and the firm finds rewardable to reduce the
price to v(1− x) to increase demand and thus follows a low-pricing strategy. The next proposition
characterizes the cut-off in the expected consumers’ claiming cost above which the firm chooses to
follow a low-pricing strategy.
10The unit cost that incorporates the production and replacement costs has a U-shaped function of product’s failure
rate, i.e., c(x) + x(c(x) + cr)/(1− x) has a U-shaped function of x. When following a high-pricing strategy the firm
always chooses a failure rate in the decreasing part.
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Proposition 6. There exists a cut-off in the parameter values characterizing the consumers’ claim-
ing cost distribution, λˆ , such that the firm follows a low-pricing strategy if the consumers’ claiming
costs are sufficiently high (λ < λˆ ) and follows a high-pricing strategy otherwise. The firm’s profit
function has a U-shaped relation with λ , with a minimum value at the cutoff λˆ .
The demands of claimants and non-claimants are the only terms in the firm’s profit function that de-
pend on the distribution of the consumers’ claiming cost. If the firm follows a high-pricing strategy,
only claimants purchase the product and the demand increases when the distribution of consumers’
claiming cost is moved to the left, i.e., when λ increases. For this reason, when following a high-
pricing strategy, firm’s profits are increasing in λ . If, instead, the firm follows a low-pricing strategy,
both claimants and non-claimants purchase the product and increments in the consumers’ claiming
cost do not affect the number of units sold. At most, a claimant may become non-claimant (only
the substitution effect in Figure 3.1.b). In this case, when following a low-pricing strategy, the firm
saves part of the liability cost and the firm’s profit decreases in λ . Under certain conditions, there
is a cut-off where the firm’s profits coincide with both strategies.
Proposition 6 provides a rationale for the firm’s optimal strategy when subject to product replace-
ment. If the firm follows a low-pricing strategy, its profit increases when consumers have higher
claiming costs. If it were possible for the firm to affect consumers’ claiming costs, the firm would
have clear incentives to provide a tiresome procedure for requiring its customer service to discour-
age consumers from complaining. If, instead, the firm follows a high-pricing strategy, we observe
the opposite result. The firm’s profit decreases with the consumers’ claiming cost and the firm
would provide devices to aid consumers complain.
We argue in the Introduction that the empirical evidence shows that many buyers do not request
a replacement despite having received a defective product. In our environment, this evidence is
consistent with the firm following a low-pricing strategy so that non-claimants also purchase the
product. In Proposition 7, we show that, if the firm’s cost of receiving complaints is not too high,
the firm may reduce its product’s reliability when the consumers’ claiming cost is reduced.
Proposition 7. If the firm’s liability cost of receiving complaints is not too high, there exists a
reduction in the consumers’ claiming cost to which the firm responds by reducing the level of its
product’s reliability.
The intuition behind the formal proof is as follows. If consumers’ claiming costs are infinitely high
(λ is low), there are only non-claimants. If this is the case, the firm follows a low-pricing strategy
and the product’s reliability is determined by −c′(x) = v. The failure rate monotonically decreases
with consumers’ claiming cost. On the other hand, if the consumers’ claiming cost is zero (λ →+∞
), there are only claimants. If this is case, the firm follows a high-pricing strategy and the product’s
reliability is determined by−c′(x) = (c(xa)+cr)/(1−xa). The failure rate monotonically increases
with consumers’ claiming cost. The change in the strategy from low-pricing to high-pricing at the
cut-off λˆ implies that the failure rate has a U-shaped function of consumers’ claiming cost. If
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c(xa)+cr
1−xa < v, for any λ , there exists a λ
′ < λ such that x(λ ′)> x(λ ), which means that there exists
a reduction in consumers’ claiming costs, represented by moving the distribution from λ to λ ′, for
which the firm reduces product’s reliability.
To understand this result, we consider first a marginal reduction in the consumers’ claiming cost.
Under a high-pricing strategy, the consumers claiming cost represents a transaction cost. A marginal
reduction in consumers’ claiming cost generates a reduction in transaction cost. The firm increases
the price and reduces the product’s reliability, making both demand and profits increase. Under a
low-pricing strategy, a marginal reduction in the consumers’ claiming cost generates an increment
in complaints and in the firm’s costs. The firm increases product reliability and price and the mark-
up and profit decrease.
However, for a discrete reduction in consumers’ claiming cost, we have a new insight. For a high
pricing strategy, there is nothing new. For a low-pricing strategy, a discrete reduction in consumers’
claiming cost leads to a change in the firm’s strategy, from low to high-pricing. This non-local
increment in price generates a reduction in demand, a change in product reliability, and a change in
profits. For a large enough discrete reduction in consumers’ claiming costs, the firm’s profit increase
and the product reliability decreases. The reason is that once consumers have an inexpensive way
of guaranteeing a well-functioning product, either because the good does not fail or because it is
replaced at a low cost, reliability loses its value for consumers.
Proposition 7 states a clear result: a discrete reduction in consumers’ claiming cost might gener-
ate a reduction in product’s reliability and an increase in firm’s profit. The policy implication of
Proposition 7 is that any policy that helps consumers to file complaints pursues to increase product
reliability but it could get exactly the opposite effect.
This result, that product reliability can decrease when there is a reduction in consumers’ claiming
cost, is more likely when the firm has a low cost of receiving complaints. Under a high-pricing
strategy, the replacement effect is what motivates the firm to increase product reliability. While
the demand effect is only determined by consumers’ willingness to pay, the replacement effect is
determined by the firm’s cost of facing complaints. When the firm has a low liability cost, it has
more incentives to reduce reliability if consumer’ claiming cost decreases.
3.4 Example
In this section we run a numerical example assuming that v = 1 and that the unit production cost
function is c(x) = βx , with β = 0.01.
11 In Figures 3.2.a, 3.2.b and 3.2.c we plot product’s failure
rate, price, and firm’s profit, as a function of consumers’ claiming cost for different values of cr,
i.e., the black line for cr = 1 and the red dashed-line for cr = 1.5. First, note that the optimal price
decreases when the expected consumers’ claiming cost increases (Figure 3.2.b). Moreover, both
firm’s profit and product’s failure rate are U-shaped functions of expected consumers’ claiming cost
11 The cost function c(x) = βx satisfies technical specifications according to Huang, Liu, and Murthy (2007).
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(Figures 3.2.a and 3.2.c). The lowest level of both functions coincides with the threshold above
which the firm follows a low-pricing strategy.
From this example we can quantify our effect. Assume that firm’s liability cost is 1, i.e., cr = 1, and
that on average the consumers’ claiming cost is 60% of their valuation of a non-defected product.
If this is the case, any reduction of more than 75% on consumers’ claiming cost will generate an
increment in product’s failure rate. For instance, a reduction of 80% of consumers claiming cost
generates an increment in product’s failure rate of around 3%. This increment in failure rate jumps
to 5.2% for a reduction of 83% of consumers’ claiming cost.
This example highlights that the introduction of consumer associations, or any device that helps
consumers voice their complaints, leads to either a reduction or an increase in the failure rate.12
This change in failure rate depends on the magnitude of consumers’ claiming cost reduction and on
the level of firm’s liability cost.
(a) Product failure rate (b) Price (c) Profit
Figure 3.2: Failure rate, price and profit as a function of consumers’ claiming cost.
3.5 The Effect of Claiming Cost Reductions in the US Car Market
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is a US governmental agency that
has the authority to issue vehicle safety standards and to require manufacturers to recall vehicles that
have safety-related defects or do not meet Federal safety standards.13 Consumers use the NHTSA
service as an additional device to voice their complaints. When a car company does not attend
their complaints, consumers can either privately sue the firm, file a complaint with a consumers’
association, file a complaint with the NHTSA, or do nothing.
In 1995, the NHTSA introduced two important modifications to its filing process, which signifi-
cantly decreased the consumers’ claiming costs: it released an electronic mailing address to which
consumers could mail complaints and it launched a website application that allowed consumers to
12As pointed out in the introduction, consumers’ associations have been working for consumers’ sake in different
dimensions. One of them is to decrease consumers’ claiming cost helping them to exercise their rights. In our setup a
CA affects consumers in two different ways: i) by moving consumers’ claiming cost distribution downward, and ii) by
providing a “legal” help when a problem arises (which is equivalent to provide a lower claiming cost). In this paper, these
two effects are not distinguished.
13See Rupp and Taylor (2002) for a detailed explanation of a recall process.
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file their complaints on-line.14 Since then, the number of complaints and the number of recalls have
increased, and the correlation between them is positive.
Figure 3.3 plots the number of recalls and complaints per car model-year accumulated since the
year the car was manufactured until 2008.15 For instance, cars produced in 1994 suffered 50 recalls
and cars produced in 1995 suffered 78 recalls until 2008. Notice that the on-line devices had been
available since 1995 for those consumers who had bought a car before and for those who bought
it after 1995. The figure shows that the accumulated number of recalls for cars produced after
1995 is substantially higher than for those cars produced before 1995. The increment in recalls
for cars produced after 1995 may be consistent with the following effects: car companies have
decreased cars’ reliability, consumers’ complaints help disclose more information, car companies
have introduced new car models (i.e., new car segments like Minivan), the NHTSA has tightened
its controls and/or standards, or, more likely, a combination of all of the above. The informational
and reliability change effects are more likely to dominate because we have not found evidence of a
change in the NHTSA’s regulations and, although we do not have data on the number of models in
the market, it is quite unlikely that it changes discontinuously in a particular year.
We provide evidence consistent with the existence of informational and reliability change effects.
A clear way to see if there is a reliability effect is to compare the number of recalls for cars sold im-
mediately before and after 1995. Notice that the reduction of consumers’ claiming cost is available
for consumers who bought a car either in 1994 or 1995. The data, however, show that the number
of recalls were much more higher in 1995 with respect to 1994. If cars’ reliability is the same along
the whole period, we must observe, ceteris paribus, the same number of recalls for cars produced in
1994 and 1995. This fact is consistent with our predictions that a reduction in consumers’ claiming
cost can motivate the firm to decrease the reliability of the product manufactured.
To reinforce our analysis, in Table 3.1 we report the number of recalls for car models-year aggre-
gated in periods of 6 years and its distribution over time. Cars produced between 1995 and 2000
suffered 429 recalls; half of them took place in the same year that these new cars were launched.16
Given that the car’s life expectancy is around 10 years, we expect that cars produced before 1982
received no effect of the introduction of on-line devices, while cars produced between 1983 and
1994 received only an informational effect. For this reason, cars produced between 1989-1994 are
a control group that captures only the informational effect. Cars produced in 1995 or after have
received an informational and reliability change effect.
14These on-line devices were available since the end of 1994.
152008 is the last year of data available. The data correspond to the six largest US automobile manufacturers: Ford,
General Motors, Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan and Honda. Since 1970, these companies have accounted for around 90%
of US car market. However, this aggregated share has been slightly reduced since mid 2000. The NHTSA provides
data of complaints as from 1984 but it was not until 1995 that consumers’ complaints became sizable. The evolution of
complaints and complaints/sales have the same pattern. For robustness, we should control recalls by the number of car
models. However, we do not have this data yet.
16Since the average car life expectancy is 10 years, the serie is truncated for car models in the subperiod 1995-2000.
The number of recalls is higher in spite of this truncation. However, this does not constitute a problem because the
introduction of internet devices has helped disclose information earlier.
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Table 3.1: Number of recalls per model and its distribution over time.
time elapsed since model launched
cars produced in recalls same year 1-5 years 6-10 years rest
1977-1982 248 73.39% 22.58% 3.63% 0.40 %
1983-1988 234 52.14% 39.32% 8.12% 0.43 %
1989-1994 252 44.05% 40.87% 12.70% 2.38 %
1995-2000 429 50.12% 44.76% 5.13% -
We first provide evidence of our claim that consumers’ complaints help to disclose more informa-
tion. Consistent with our statements, for cars produced in the period 1977-1982, around 4% of
recalls took place six years after new cars were launched or later (See column 5 and 6 in Table 3.1).
This proportion raises to 8.5% and 15% for cars produced in 1983-1988 and 1989-1994, respec-
tively. Note that the accumulated number of recalls of cars produced after 1983 may have captured
an informational effect when the NHTSA introduced the on-line devices to complain. The differ-
ence in the proportion of recalls that took place six years after manufacture or later for subperiods
1977-1982 and 1989-1994 is statistically significant at standard levels, showing that the on-line de-
vices helped to disclose some additional information.17 This new information allowed many recalls
that would have not been done otherwise.
We now provide evidence of the reliability change effect. Aggregating in subperiods and comparing
the trend in recalls for cars produced before (between 1989-1994) and after (1995-2000), the incre-
ment in the number of recalls after the NHTSA introduced on-line applications to file consumers
complaints is statistically significant.18 This evidence is consistent with our theoretical results.
Concluding, we observe that there is clear evidence of the effect of the NHTSA’s website application
and e-mail on complaints and recalls. These inexpensive devices to voice consumers’ complaints
generate an increment in recalls. We claim that these increments are due to more information
disclosure and to a reduction in cars’ reliability. The increment in the number of recalls per year-
model after 1995 conciliates our theoretical results.19
17The statistic comparing the proportion in the period 1983-1988 (which captures only partially the information effect)
with 1977-1982 is |t| = 2.05 and comparing the period 1989-1994 with 19877-1982 is |t| = 5.11. If we consider only
recalls initiated in the first 5 years since launched, the increment in recalls from 1989-1994 to 1995-2000 is from 214 to
409 recalls, almost 100%.
18The statistic of testing that the means of recalls are the same for subperiods 1989-1994 and 1995-2001 is |t| = 4.7,
rejecting the hypothesis that they are equal (a one tail test is also rejected). Assuming that there is only an informational
effect for cars produced in the subperiod 1989-1994, and a combination of informational and reliability change effects in
the subperiod 1995-2001, the test is consistent with the existence of a reliability change effect.
19We are aware of the limitations of the data. We have made some controls by unit sold and the results remain the same.
However, we could not get any control by number of models sold by each company. As mentioned above, even when
the new models may account for part of the change in complaints and recalls, it is unlikely that there is a discontinuous
change in the number of models. Finally, we must be cautious when interpreting the data with our theoretical findings
since our model lacks the strategic interaction among firms that is present in the U.S. car market.
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Figure 3.3: Number of recalls and complaints accumulated until 2008 in the U.S. car Market
per model-year.
3.6 Conclusion
Consumers’ associations goals are, among others, to help consumers voice their complaints and en-
force the provision of reliable products. In this paper, we show that these goals may not be aligned:
the firm may decide to produce a less reliable product if more consumers request a replacement of
a defected product.
The evidence from U.S. car market shows that after a reduction in claiming costs in 1995, the
number of complaints and recalls has clearly increased. Complaints were permitted for the cars
manufactured before that year, but the number of recalls increased much more for cars produced
after 1995. The evidence appears inconsistent with the firms’ choice of reliability increasing or be-
ing constant, even when controlling for the effect of more information disclosure. All this evidence
goes in the direction of our results.
The main contribution in terms of policy implication of this paper is to warn consumers’ associ-
ations that reliability is an endogenous decision. Product reliability depends on both consumers’
claiming costs and firm’s replacement costs. An increase in consumers’ complaints may be fol-
lowed by a reduction in product’s reliability, which in turn generates additional complaints. Then,
observing a sharp increment in complaints is not necessarily a good market signal. This paper also
points out that the expected number of complaints is endogenously determined by the price and
product reliability.
57
Chapter 3 Product Reliability, Consumers’ Complaints and Market Performance
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Change of Variable for High-pricing Strategy
To find the solution when p > v(1− x) we make a simple transformation: define k = (v−p)(1−x)x
implying that p = v− xk1−x . Since p ∈ [0,v] ⊂ R+ and x ∈ (0,1], then k ∈ R+. The problem is
re-expressed as
max
k,x
Π(k,x) =
[
v− xk
1− x − c(x)− x
c(x)+ cr
1− x
][
1− e−λk
]
. (3.3)
This expression allows us to find, first, the optimal choice of x as a function of k, and second, the
value of k that maximizes firm’s profit. For any k there exists xk(k) = argmin
[
c(x)+x(cr+k)
1−x
]
with
x′k(k)< 0, i.e., if k increases xk decreases. The minimum of
c(x)+x(cr+k)
1−x is increasing in k. The value
of k is defined by the first order condition of equation (3.3),
1− x
x
[
v− c(x)− xc(x)+ cr + k
1− x
]
=
[
1− e−λk
]
λe−λk
. (3.4)
The left hand side is decreasing in k if c(x) is sufficiently convex.20 The right hand side is increasing
in k. The value of k is uniquely defined. Finally, the second order condition respect to k is
Πkk =− 2x1− xλe
−λk−λ 2e−λk
[
v− c(x)− xc(x)+ cr + k
1− x
]
< 0. (3.5)
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The exponential distribution has the following properties: if λ → +∞, G(k,λ ) is degener-
ated in k = 0, and, if λ → 0, the cumulative is G(k,λ )∼ 0 for any k <+∞ (consumers have a k too
high and never complain).
For any 0< λ <+∞, the profit function is discontinuous at p= v(1−x). However, we can consider
the expressions under a low-pricing strategy and under a high-pricing strategy separately. By the
envelope theorem Π(p = v(1− x),λ ) is decreasing in λ and Π(p > v(1− x),λ ) is increasing in λ .
For details of the high-pricing strategy see Appendix 3.7.1.
Note that if λ → 0 there is only non-claimants and Π(p= v(1−x))> 0=Π(p > v(1−x)). If λ →
+∞ there is only claimants and 0 <Π(p = v(1− x))<Π(p = v− ε), for some ε ≥ 0. Assumption
A1 guarantee an equilibrium with positive profits that is characterized by at least one these two
strategies for any λ . The existence of the cutoff λˆ such thatΠ(p= v(1−x), λˆ ) =Π(p> v(1−x), λˆ )
20Recall that x′(k) < 0, which depends on c′′(x). The condition for the left hand side to be decreasing in k is that
v−c(x)−x c(x)+cr+k1−x
x2(1−x)c′′(x) −1 < 0. It is sufficient that the slope x′(k) =− 1(1−x)c′′(x) not to be so steep, i.e., c′′(x) sufficiently high.
Note that the mark-up can not be too high in this equilibrium, given that if v is high, the firm would prefer to expand
demand choosing a price p = v(1− x).
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is guaranteed.
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Recall that higher λ implies lower consumers claiming cost.
Proof. We show that x is a decreasing function of λ when the firm follows a low-pricing strategy,
i.e., p= v(1−x), and x is an increasing function of λ when the firm follows a high-pricing strategy,
i.e., p > v(1−x). Finally, we guarantee conditions such that x(λ → 0) under a low-pricing strategy
is lower than x(λ → +∞) under a high-pricing strategy, such that there exists an increment in λ
(i.e., a reduction in consumers claiming cost) that generates an increase in the failure rate.
Since the objective function is submodular in x and λ when the firm follows a low-pricing strategy,
the failure rate is decreasing in λ .21 When the firm follows a high-pricing strategy, we state the
monotonicity x respect to λ from the first order condition respect to k in equation (3.4) and from the
monotonicity of x′(k)< 0. The right hand side in equation (3.4) increases in λ since the derivative of
the reverse hazard rate respect to λ is positive, i.e.,− ekλλ 2
(
1− e−kλ − kλ)> 0, since 1−e−kλ−kλ <
0. Any increment in λ generates a reduction in k and thus an increase in x. There is a monotonic
relationship between λ and x, i.e., the higher the λ the higher the x.
In the limit, if λ →+∞, consumers have zero claiming cost: the firm chooses k→ 0 and p = v− ε
for some ε ≥ 0; and the failure rate is determined by −c′(xa) = c(xa)+cr1−xa . On the other hand, if
λ → 0, most consumers have extremely high claiming cost: the firm chooses p = (1− x)v and
the failure rate is determined by −c′(xb) = v. xa ≤ xb if and only if c(xa)+cr1−xa ≥ v. Note that, since
c′(x) < 0 and c′′(x) > 0, the expression c(x)+cr1−x has a global minimum at xa for a given cr. This
minimum c(xa(cr))+cr1−xa(cr) is increasing in cr and xa is decreasing in cr. Since v is constant and
c(xa(cr))+cr
1−xa(cr)
is increasing in cr, there exists cˆr(v) ∈R+ such that c(xa)+cˆr(v)1−xa = v for which xa = xb. Then, xa < xb
if and only if cr > cˆr. The threshold cˆr(v) is increasing in v.
Concluding, the product’s failure rate has a U-shaped relation with λ , with a jump in the minimum
x at λˆ . There exists a cutoff λˆ such that the firm follows a low-pricing strategy if λ < λˆ . Finally,
it is guaranteed for cr < cˆr(v) that there exists a reduction in consumers claiming cost, i.e., ∆λ > 0,
such that product reliability decreases, i.e., ∆x∆λ > 0. The proof is complete.
21Assumption that xc(x) is non-decreasing in x is sufficient condition. The cross derivative is ∂
2Π
∂x∂λ =
−veλv(1−x)[λvx(c(x)+ cr)+(c(x)+ cr)+ c′(x)x]≤ 0, which is guaranteed if (c(x)+ cr)+ c′(x)x > 0.
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Chapter 4
Hotelling Competition for a Consumer
with Unknown Taste
(joint work with Daniel Garcı´a-Gonza´lez)
4.1 Introduction
Preferences for most products are in constant change, so that they are difficult to predict for firms.
Moreover, consumers may also be uncertain over which products they prefer from an ex-ante point
of view, i.e., before observing or tasting the products. In spite of having vertical advantages, like
in brands positioning, product quality and/or in cost of production, firms might have little market
success when having a bad foresight of consumer’s taste. For instance, Honda’s market losses in
late 80s in Japan are attributed to a bad response to a shift in demand’s preferences. A dynamic
and changing clothing markets is another good example of these situations.1 In this paper, we study
how the presence of ex-ante firms’ heterogeneity and the acquisition of informative signals affect
the degree of horizontal differentiation, profits and consumer surplus when firms are uncertain about
consumer’s taste.
We analyze a Hotelling’s duopoly game of location-then-price-competition choice with quadratic
transportation cost and an ex-ante advantaged firm, under the assumption that firms are uncertain
about consumer’s taste.2 We show that both factors –firm advantage and informative signals- can
foster competition increasing consumer surplus in spite of decreasing profits and welfare.
In the benchmark model, there is one consumer with unitary demand and imperfect information
about her most preferred variety. Her willingness to pay for a product decreases with the dis-
tance between product’s variety and her most preferred one, with quadratic transportation costs.
In the supply side, two firms simultaneously and costlessly choose a product location/variety. Af-
1For the evidence of Honda see Brickley, J., Smith, C., Zimmerman, J.(2001) and for a description of the apparel
market see Uzzi (1997).
2The firm advantage is common knowledge and may stem from costs reduction or better quality.
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ter consumer’s preference and products’ varieties are disclosed, Bertrand competition with perfect
information defines the equilibrium price and the allocation.
As in the traditional Hotelling model, anticipating a fierce Bertrand competition in prices, firms
choose to differentiate their products ex-ante. Given the timing of the model, strategic interaction
moves upstream to the location stage. We analyze whether firms can coordinate their strategies in
the location stage in order to soften competition and to make higher expected profits. Uncertainty
about consumer’s taste fosters differentiation. We find two types of equilibria. Some equilibria are
characterized by a split of the market, so that each firm sells customers located in a given subset
with probability one, and does not try to sell to customers located outside. The remaining equilibria
exhibit more competition, since at least one firm will try to sell to any particular customer.
An equilibrium with a market partition has higher expected price, profits, welfare and lower ex-
pected consumer surplus when compared with an equilibrium without market partition. We call the
former an equilibrium with low competition and the latter an equilibrium high competition. In each
equilibrium (of any type) one of the firms is leading the market if it sells with higher probability
and makes higher expected profit than the other firm. We analyze how equilibria are affected when
we add to the benchmark model two factors: the presence of firms’ heterogeneity, interpreted as
different unit cost (low or high cost) or brand positioning, and the provision of informative signals.
We additionally distinguish between private and public signals.
In the expanded model, when its cost advantage is sufficiently high, a firm is leading the market
in any of the equilibria described above. Having a high advantage in cost makes the firm more
aggressive and it cannot commit to accommodate. Additionally, if a firm can acquire a costly
private signal about consumer’s taste, it uses the information choosing a location that is likely to
match consumer’s preference. If information is sufficiently cheap and a firm has a cost advantage,
there only exists equilibria with high competition. An equilibrium with low competition cannot
be sustained because a firm with cost advantage cannot commit to restrict his product variety to a
subset of preferences. Its informative signal and its cost advantage increase the opportunity cost of
coordination; and the likelihood that both firms locate close to each other (thereby competing more
fiercely) increases.
If a signal is public, that is, if the realization of a signal is common knowledge, equilibria with
low competition can be sustained for any range of parameters. While the firm with cost advantage
has incentive to locate its product following the realization of the public signal, the firm with cost
disadvantage has incentive to locate its product with the opposite variety. Both firms get higher
expected profits coordinating.
With this framework we seek to understand the functioning of markets where uncertainty may be
important, like the high competitive environment of New York apparel industry described by Uzzi
(1997) where heterogeneous firms acquire private information about uncertain preferences. Fi-
nally, our model can be mapped into a procurement second-price auction in which the consumer
values pairs of price and positioning and chooses the one that yields higher ex-post surplus. In
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procurements, the consumer, e.g., the state, may have to decide whether to allow for private mar-
ket inquiries, or whether to make private or public announcements about her preference. Against
common wisdom, increasing transparency through public announcements may reduce its consumer
surplus.
The implications of our model for procurements and market design are the following. First, making
public announcements can foster firms’ coordination which softens competition.3 Second, allow-
ing for private inquiries about market conditions can foster competition even when it can favor a
particular supplier that already has a cost advantage. Finally, the existence of ex-ante asymmetries
among firms reduces the set of parameters for which low competition equilibria may be sustained,
and thus, may increase consumer’s surplus.
4.1.1 Literature
This paper relates to the literature on product differentiation with asymmetric information. Several
papers study the relation of product differentiation and asymmetric information on the demand
side. Shaked and Sutton (1982) analyze entry and vertical differentiation, Bester (1998) investigates
how product differentiation (both vertical and horizontal) of experienced goods is used to attract
uninformed consumers, and Schultz (2004) analyzes the impact of transparency on competition.
However, our paper relates closely to the literature that focus on uncertainty on the supply side.
This approach is analyzed in Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) assuming fixed firms’ locations and
provision of informative signals to the uninformed buyer about her own preference. We study the
endogenous location decision of firms that can obtained additional information about consumer’s
preference. Casado-Izaga (2000), Meagher and Zauner (2004) and Meagher and Zauner (2005)
study location-then-price competition in a symmetric firms’ environment with heterogeneous con-
sumers. Out paper differs from theirs in that we study heterogeneous firms and we allow these firms
to acquire informative signals.
Our approach allows us also to make predictions for procurement auctions. In this literature, Ganuza
(2004) analyzes the provision of public signals by the seller in a single unit private value auction.
However, he characterizes the setup with fix locations where the seller chooses the amount of public
information. Our approach focuses on buyer’s side, i.e., procurement or reverse auctions, and the
buyer can provide either private or public signals to the sellers whose locations are endogenously
determined.
4.2 Benchmark Model
On the demand side there is one consumer that maximizes her utility by buying one unit of an
indivisible product. A product is defined by a unit price pi (∈ R+) and a variety θi (∈ [0,1]). The
3General guidelines would direct suppliers in the right direction, discharging all characteristics that are, for sure, not
desirable. However, specific guidelines listing which specifications are desirable can soften competition.
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consumer has imperfect information about her most preferred variety θ which takes a value from
{0, 12 ,1}. A priori, each value realizes with the same probability. The consumer derives utility
v of buying one unit of her most preferred variety θ , and her willingness to pay for a product i
decreases as its variety θi differs from her bliss point θ . We assume quadratic transportation costs.
The net utility of buying a product with variety θi at price pi is U(θi, pi) = v− (θ −θi)2− pi. The
reservation utility is zero.
On the supply side there are two firms with constant unit cost. Each firm is risk neutral and maxi-
mizes expected profits choosing a variety θi and a price pi for his product. Defining product variety
is costless and allows for product differentiation. For some exogenous reason (technological, le-
gal or market advantage) firm 1 has an advantage. This advantage is common knowledge, and we
model it through the assumption that firm 1 has zero unit cost and firm 2 has a constant unit cost c
in [0,c].4 Assumption 1 guarantees that the consumer always buys one unit of a product.
Assumption 1: v > 1+ c.
After firms simultaneously choose their products’ varieties, all information about products’ varieties
(θ1,θ2) and consumer’s tastes θ is disclosed and firms simultaneously choose their prices a` la
Bertrand.5 The consumer buys one unit of a product to the firm from which she derives higher
surplus. In case that she derives the same surplus in both products, the consumer buys from the
firm that yields positive profits. In case that both firms get zero equilibrium profits she picks one
randomly.
The timing of the model is as follows: first, the consumer’s taste θ realizes but it is not observed.
Second, each firm chooses the characteristics of his product θi (∈ [0,1]) to offer in the market.
Third, after observing each other firm’s product (θ1,θ2) and the consumer’s preferences θ , firms
simultaneously choose their prices.6 Finally, the consumer buys one unit of the product from the
firm she derives higher surplus and payoffs are delivered.7
4Note that this specification of firms’ differences can also be interpreted as vertical differentiation through consumer’s
idiosyncratic preferences, that is the consumer valuation vi differs for different brand i. Actually, for any combination
of (vi,ci) there is an equivalent vertical differentiation either on preferences vi or on unit costs ci. For the case where
c1 = c2 and v1 > v2, Assumption 1 becomes v2 > 1.
5In the Hotelling model firms simultaneously choose a location and, observing locations, firms simultaneously choose
their prices, and finally the consumer’s preference realizes (or there are heterogeneous consumers). In this paper, like in
Meagher and Zauner (2004), firms simultaneously choose locations, and, observing consumer’s preference and products’
locations, firms simultaneously choose their prices. This assumption makes our paper comparable with studies of pro-
curement auctions in markets with uncertain consumer’s preferences. We assume that a firm can rapidly adjust his price
up or down, and we rely on Bertrand competition as a shortcut for quick market learning about consumer’s preference
and other products’ locations. Finally, notice that Assumption 1 with Bertrand competition guarantee that the market is
fully covered.
6Alternatively, we can model this step with a reverse auction or procurement.
7Other papers in the literature model allow firms to choose their prices without observing consumer’s preference.
We have developed in Appendix 4.8 an alternative model where firms simultaneously choose location and price, and we
characterize the unique equilibrium of the game. We compare our results with this benchmark.
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4.3 Equilibrium
We look for a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. A strategy for a firm is defined by a variety for
his product, θi, and a price, pi(θ1,θ2,θ) for each realization of products varieties and consumer
taste.
In the last step, firms face price competition a` la Bertrand with perfect information. Let’s define the
difference in firms’ production cost ∆c ≡ c2− c1 = c and the difference in consumer’s willingness
to pay between products ∆v ≡ [v− (θ − θ2)2]− [v− (θ − θ1)2]. The consumer buys one unit of
product i if i = argmax j{U j}.8 The following Lemma says that at most one firm makes positive
profits ex-post; namely the firm with better market advantage, weighting cost and willingness to
pay.
Lemma 5. Given c, θ1, θ2 and θ , price competition a` la Bertrand leads, in equilibrium, to the
following results: If c < ∆v, prices are p1 = 0 and p2 = ∆v, and profits are Π1 = 0 and Π2 =
∆v−c> 0. If c>∆v, prices are p2 = c and p1 = c−∆v, and profits areΠ2 = 0 andΠ1 = c−∆v> 0.
If c = ∆v, prices are p2 = c and p1 = 0 and profits are Π2 = 0 and Π1 = 0.
The proof of Lemma 5 follows the Bertrand’s argument of undercutting prices with differentiated
products until one firm has no incentives to reduce his own price because in doing so the firm
will get losses. Lemma 5 says that if c ≤ ∆v, the price is restricted for product 1 which equals its
marginal costs, i.e., p1 = 0. Firm 2 sells to a positive margin with price p2 = ∆v (≥ c). However,
if c ≥ ∆v, the price is restricted for product 2 which equals its marginal costs, i.e., p2 = c. Firm 1
sells and has positive profits with price p1 = c−∆v (≥ 0).
In the previous stage, anticipating the price competition each firm forms beliefs about the strategy
of the other firm, and chooses his variety θi maximizing expected profits. For instance, firm 1 solves
max
θ1
E[Π1] = max
θ1
E[Π1|c≥ ∆v]Pr(c≥ ∆v). (4.1)
Conditional on selling, each firm’s profit increases in the distance between products’ varieties. Firm
1 has a cost advantage that provides some positive profits in case that both firms choose a similar
variety. Anticipating the Bertrand price competition, firms have incentives to soften ex-post com-
petition through product differentiation. This effect represents the strategic effect in Hotelling’s
model.
It is worth noting that, in equilibrium, each firm i chooses the expected consumer’s best variety
conditional on selling when those varieties realize, i.e., Ei[θ | i sells]. Ei[θ | i sells] is a fix point in
the following sense: choosing θ1 = E1[θ | i sells] firm 1 sells the product in some states of the world
[of consumer’s tastes and the other firm’s strategy], and the expected consumer’s ideal variety in
8It is worth noting that firms differences in cost c1 < c2 are equivalent to vertical differences in consumer’s prefer-
ences, i.e., v1 > v2.
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those states where firm 1 sells is equal to θ1. A firm may use a mixed strategy randomizing among
different varieties, with each variety satisfying θi = Ei[θ | i sells]. For details see Appendix 4.7.1.
There are multiple equilibria in this model that we classify in two types, according to the degree
of competition: low vs high competition. If consumer’s taste space can be divided in two disjoint
subsets such that one firm sells with probability one in all values of one subset and does not sell
otherwise and viceversa, we say that there is an equilibrium with low competition. The remaining
equilibria exhibit more competition, since at least one firm will try to sell to any particular customer,
and we say that these equilibria are characterized by high competition. For example, if firm 1
chooses a variety θ1 = 14 and firm 2 chooses a variety θ2 = 1, firm 1 sells and makes positive profits
with probability one if consumer’s taste is θ = 0 or θ = 12 ; firm 2 sells and gets positive profits with
probability one if consumer’s taste is θ = 1. Notice that the expected consumer’s taste when firm
1 sells is E1[θ | 1 sells] = (
1
3∗0+ 13∗ 12 )
1
3+
1
3
= 14 which is firm 1’s variety. This is true also for firm 2, i.e.,
E2[θ | 2 sells] = 1. The strategic effect of separating products to increase prices is maximal and the
demand effect of competing for consumers’ types is represented by the dispute for selling to the
consumer when θ = 12 . In our example, this dispute is resolved in favor of firm 1 with θ1 =
1
4 .
In an equilibrium with high competition, one firm locates at 12 , e.g., θ1 =
1
2 and the other firm
randomizes in the corners, e.g., σ2 = (σ2(0),σ2(1)) = (0.5,0.5)). The demand effect is stronger
for both firms and the strategic effect generates a randomization between equilibria.
Let’s define σi as a mixed strategy of firm i and σi(x) the probability that firm i chooses a variety
equals to x. In the following proposition we describe the equilibria if c = 0, although the result
extends for an open interval of costs. (Proof in Appendix 4.7.2)
Proposition 8. If c = 0, the duopoly location-then-price game under consumer’s taste un-
certainty has the following equilibria in products varieties,
8.a Equilibria with low competition are characterized by the following product varieties: {(θ1 =
1
4 ,θ2 = 1),(θ1 =
3
4 ,θ2 = 0),(θ1 = 0,θ2 =
3
4),(θ1 = 1,θ2 =
1
4)}.
8.b Equilibria with high competition are characterized by the following product varieties: {(θ1 =
1
2 ,σ2 = (σ2(0),σ2(1)) = (0.5,0.5));(σ1 = (σ1(0),σ1(1)) = (0.5,0.5),θ2 =
1
2)}.
Equilibria with low competition share a pattern. In all of them, one firm is in one corner, e.g.,
θ2 = 1, selling only when consumer’s taste falls on that corner, and the other firm is in the middle
of the other corner and 12 , e.g., θ1 =
1
4 , selling when consumer’s taste falls in that corner or in
1
2 .
Equilibria with high competition offer a different pattern. One firm is in the middle 12 and the other
firm is randomizing with probability 12 between the extremes. The firm that randomizes only sells
if his choice coincides with consumer’s taste realization, otherwise the other firm sells the product.
Equilibria with low competition show the maximum strategic effect of Hotelling’s model, while the
equilibria with high competition shows a mix of demand effect and strategic effect. Consequently,
it is not surprising that the expected price is higher, firms’ expected profits are higher and expected
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consumer’s surplus is lower in equilibria with low competition than in equilibria with high compe-
tition. Since firms divide the market ex-ante, the price competition is not tough enough to reduce
prices.
In all equilibria, however, there is one firm that is better positioned. This positioning is related
to which firm sells more often and makes higher expected profits. We say that a firm is leading
the market if it is following the strategy that allow him to sell with higher probability. Otherwise
we say that a firm is accommodating in the market. A firm makes higher expected profits when
leading a market than when accommodating, even when comparing across equilibria of different
types. That is, a firm gets higher expected profits when leading the market in an equilibrium with
high competition than when accommodating the market in an equilibrium with low competition.
If firm 1’s cost advantage c is low, any equilibrium can be sustained. However, if c is higher,
the equilibrium set shrinks in favor of firm 1, since now firm 1 is leader in all equilibria. This is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. If c > 116 , there is no equilibrium with low competition where firm 1 is accommo-
dating, i.e., neither θ1 = 0 nor θ1 = 1 pure strategies can be hold as an equilibrium. If c > 18 there
is no equilibrium with high competition where firm 1 is accommodating, i.e., there is no equilibrium
where firm 1 plays a mixed strategy randomizing in {0,1} and firm 2 chooses a variety θ2 = 12 .
The proof is quite simple and derives from the following reasoning: If c> 116 the equilibrium θ1 = 0
and θ2 = 34 can not be sustained, since firm 1 has incentives to deviate to θ1 =
1
4 . Similarly, if c >
1
8
the equilibrium where firm 2 variety is θ2 = 12 and firm 1 randomizes in {0,1} can not be hold,
since firm 1 has incentives to move to θ1 = 12 .
9
It is not surprising that with high cost advantage, firm 1 guarantees higher expected profits. The firm
becomes more aggressive and cannot commit to accommodate in an equilibrium since its expected
profits from deviating are high. In all equilibria firm 1 is leading the market, and firm 2 follows an
accommodating strategy having positive profits only when matches consumer taste in one corner.
However, there are still equilibria with low and high competition. In the following Section we allow
firms to acquire a costly and private signal about consumer’s taste before choosing their varieties,
and we see how the access to private information changes the equilibrium set.
4.4 Information Acquisition
Suppose now that, before choosing its own variety, each firm simultaneously acquires a costly
private signal s about the consumer’s optimal variety θ . A signal of precision q ∈ [13 ,1] costs k(q),
with k′(q) > 0, k′′(q) > 0, limq→ 13 k
′(q) = 0 and limq→1 k′(q) = +∞. The precision defines the
probability with which the signal reveals the state of the world θ and with probability 1− q the
9We restrict to the set c < 14 . If c≥ 14 firm 1 sells with probability one if θ1 = 12 yielding only trivial equilibria.
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signal is a random draw from the complement set of the same distribution of θ .10 Firms’ signals
are independently distributed.
In this case, the timing of the model is as follows: first, the consumer’s taste θ realizes but it is
not observed. Second, each firm independently and simultaneously decides the precision (quality)
qi of his private signal si at cost k(qi) to be acquired. Third, without knowing the precision of the
signal of the other firm, each firm chooses the characteristics of the product to offer in the market θi
(∈ [0,1]). Forth, observing all products varieties (θ1,θ2) and the consumer’s preferences θ , firms
simultaneously choose their prices. Finally, the consumer buys one unit of the product from the
firm she derives higher utility and payoffs are delivered.
A strategy for a firm is defined by information acquisition, qi, and a product variety for each real-
ization of his signal, i.e., θi(si), and a price for each combination on consumer’s taste and products’
varieties, pi(θ1,θ2,θ). Each firm forms beliefs about the quality of the signal and the product’s
variety (conditional on signal’s realization) of the other firm (qˆ j,θ j(s j, qˆ j)). Conditioning on those
beliefs, a firm maximizes expected profits by choosing the precision of its own signal qi, and then,
its own product’s variety θi(si,qi, qˆ j,θ j(s j, qˆ j)) for each realization of the signal.
Acquiring private information does not modify the condition derived above regarding the location
of a firm given its expected demand. Indeed, the firm will choose the product variety that equals
the expected consumer’s taste conditional on the signal and the fact that the firm is actually selling,
i.e., θi = Ei[θ | i sells]. Despite the introduction of informative signals, there are equilibria with low
and high competition. However, each firm uses now the information available to improve expected
product’s fit with consumer taste and thus his expected profits. Strategies vary only slightly when
receiving a signal si with precision qi. For instance, one equilibrium with low competition led by
firm 1 has the following strategies on varieties:
θ2 = 1, and θ1(s1) =

1−q1
2(2q1+1−q1) if s1 = 0,
q1
2q1+1−q1 if s1 =
1
2 ,
1
4 if s1 = 1.
(4.2)
Since firm 2 only sells when θ = 1, there is no benefit of acquiring information, and q∗2 =
1
3 (uninfor-
mative signal) and θ2 = E2[θ | 2 sells] = 1. Firm 1, however, has an incentive to acquire information
to match consumer taste either when θ = 0 or when θ = 12 . With this information, firm 1 modifies
θ1(s1 = 0) and θ1(s1 = 12) as described in Equation (4.2). On the other hand, one equilibrium with
10That is, if θ = 0, the signal is 0 with probability q and, is 0.5 or 1 with probability 1−q2 . We use a simplified version
of a technology where the signal is the true value with probability qˆ and a random draw from the original distribution
with probability 1− qˆ. This simplification implies that we have q≥ 13 , where a signal with q = 13 is uninformative.
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high competition led by firm 1 has the following strategies on varieties:
σ2(s2) =

σ2(0) = 1 if s2 = 0,
(σ2(0),σ2(1)) = (0.5,0.5) if s2 = 12 ,
σ2(1) = 1 if s2 = 1.
and
θ1(s1) =

(1−q1)(1+ 32 (1−q2))
4q1+(1−q1)(2+ 32 (1−q2))
if s1 = 0,
1
2 if s1 =
1
2 ,
4q1+(1−q1)
4q1+(1−q1)(2+ 32 (1−q2))
if s1 = 1.
In this equilibrium both firms have incentives to acquire information. When the cost advantage is
high, firm 1 sells if consumer’s taste is θ = 12 or if the signal realization is correct (s1 = θ ), or
both. On the contrary, firm 2 sells only if consumer taste is in one extreme, firm 2 variety is in that
extreme, and the signal of firm 1 is incorrect.11 Notice that firm 2 chooses a variety, say θ2 = 0,
when receiving a correct signal or when firm 2 randomly peaks that variety if the signal delivers
s2 = 12 . In order to sell, firm 2 must choose a variety of the product as far as possible of the variety
of the product of firm 1, and this is more likely to happen when firm 1 receives a wrong signal and
firm 2 receives the right signal about consumer’s taste.
The use of information differs in equilibria with low and high competition. In the former, only firm
1 acquires information to improve the match of his product with consumer’s taste in all states that
firm 1 sells. However, with high competition, firms acquire information to steal demand from the
other firm. They want to match consumer taste in the corners (i.e., {θ = 0,θ = 1}). Firm 2 sells
only if firm 1 receives a wrong signal.
When information is cheap, competition becomes fierce since equilibria with low competition can
not be sustained. Assume that firm 2 locates its product in one corner, say θ2 = 1, and firm 1
receives a realization of the signal indicating that the consumer taste is in the corner where firm 2
is located, i.e., s1 = 1. Firm 1 has two options: to choose a product far from the corner, and sell if
the signal is incorrect, or to choose a product where firm 2 is located making some positive profits
with probability one (is the signal is correct or not). If information is cheap and the signal indicates
that it is quite likely that the consumer’s taste is located where firm 2 is, the latter option is more
profitable. Firm 1 can not commit not to compete.
Defining qLC1 the optimal amount of information that firm 1 would acquire in an equilibrium with
low competition. The following Proposition summarizes our result (proof in Appendix 4.7.3).
Proposition 10. If qLC1 > 1− 169 c and c is sufficiently high, there is no equilibrium with low compe-
tition.
Thus, only high competitive equilibria survive. In these equilibria the expected price paid by the
11If acquiring an informative signal is too expensive, the equilibrium is similar to the one described in Section 4.3:
firm 2 sells if the signal in the corner is correct with probability one. If this is the case, strategy of firm 1 varies a little.
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consumer is lower, in spite of the possibility of having a bad match between products’ varieties and
consumer’s taste.
This result provides a rationale for the buyer to provide cheap private signals to the supply side.
This result applies to procurements where the states builds some public goods (like a bridge, road,
highway, dam, etc.). The recommendation is the following: allow suppliers to make their own
private inquiries to capture as much information as possible. In this way, an equilibrium with high
competition is guaranteed.
4.5 Public Information
We have shown that providing cheap private information when one firm has a cost advantage may
generate that only equilibria with high competition can be sustained. Since the firm with cost
advantage (firm 1) cannot commit to keep in their own region the equilibrium with low competition
can not survive.
There is however some important insight. Suppose that firm 1 acquires information and designs his
product using the information like in the equilibrium with high competition. If the signal realization
is either s1 = 0 or s1 = 1 and it is publicly observed, firm 2 will anticipate firm 1 behavior and
will design a product with opposite characteristic of signal realization. Actually, firm 2 has less
incentives to acquire information, since, in this case, firm 2 maximizes both the probability to sell
and the expected profits conditioning on selling. Disclosing information allows firms to coordinate
and reduce competition.
Without commitment, disclosing truthfully the realization of the signal can be difficult. Neverthe-
less, a public signal would perfectly coordinate firms’ strategies, reducing competition when an
extreme taste is delivered. This coordination partially reduces market competition and increases
expected prices. When the signal delivers either s = 0 or s = 1, there exists two disjoint subsets
such that one firm sells with probability one for all values of one subset and with probability zero
in the other subset. When the signal delivers θ = 12 there is high competition.
If public information is sufficiently good, i.e., if qp is high, equilibria with low competition can not
survive. If public information is good, one equilibrium with coordination has the following firms’
strategies in choosing varieties:
σ2(sp) =

σ2(1) = 1 if sp = 0,
(σ2(0),σs(1)) = (0.5,0.5) if sp = 12 ,
σ2(0) = 1 if sp = 1.
and θ1(s1) =

(1−qp)
2(1+qp)
if sp = 0,
1
2 if sp =
1
2 ,
(1+3qp)
2(1+qp)
if sp = 1.
Firms coordinate their strategies in the extremes when the signal indicates that and, in turn, com-
petition is relaxed. Firms get higher expected profits with public signals than with private signals.
The consumer pays a higher expected price with public signals than with public signals. This result
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is summarized in the following proposition.12
Proposition 11. If information about consumer’s taste is sufficiently good, expected profits and
expected price are bigger with public information but the expected price is also bigger, and thus
expected consumer surplus is bigger with private information.
Proposition 11 says that when information is sufficiently good, firms appropriate more of the surplus
generated with a public signal. Coordinating their actions with a public signal, firms relax compe-
tition that allow them to get a higher price when selling. Concluding, if the consumer has some
information about her own preferences it is better to allow private inquiries instead of revealing the
information directly to the market in a way to avoid coordination.
If the State needs to buy a product, Proposition 11 recommends first to hide any private information
and, second, to foster private inquiries. If possible, in a procurement the State must transmit some
information to each bidder privately. However, it must avoid public announcements that allow for
coordination. With private information, not only the state increases her expected surplus but also
pays a lower expected price.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the role of firms heterogeneity and information in competitive environments
whenever there is uncertainty about consumer’s taste. We have shown that the degree of competition
depends positively on firms heterogeneity and the precision of private signals. We have also shown
that public information may foster firms coordination which in turn relaxes market competition.
Our environment can be used for analyzing dynamic and changing markets, like the clothing market,
as wells as second-price auctions in procurement of goods that may be difficult to define ex-ante.
Allowing for firms heterogeneity and private inquiries can foster competition which reduces the
expected price and increases the expected consumer surplus.
12Two independent signal reveals more information than one public signal, which may yield that welfare is higher
with private signals. If there is only one signal, a public signal generates greater welfare but still lower consumer surplus
than a one private signal (for instance, to the more efficient firm). This private signal ensure an equilibrium with high
competition. A public signal foster coordination, which is good to guarantee a good match between consumer’s taste
and, at least, one product in the market. This improvement can be made at a cost of reducing competition. The consumer
pays a higher expected price with public signals that might outweigh the increment in expected utility due to a good fit
between product variety and consumer taste.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Fixed Point Strategy
Suppose that in equilibrium a firm, e.g., firm 1, sells in some (finite) events x with probability f (x).
In those events, the profit of firm 1 is c+(θ −θ2)2− (θ −θ1)2. Firm 1’s expected profit is
∑
x
[c+(θ −θ2)2− (θ −θ1)2] f (x). (4.3)
In equilibrium a change θ1 have two effects: it modifies the conditional expected profit c+(θ −
θ2)2− (θ − θ1)2, and affects the number of events where the firm sells a product. However, if a
marginal increment in θ1 increases the number of events where the firm sells, the firm makes zero
expected profits in those events. Notice that the firm sells in an event if c+(θ−θ2)2−(θ−θ1)2≥ 0
on that event, which is exactly the expected profits when selling. For this reason, in equilibrium we
expect that the first order condition characterize the optimal θ1.13
2∑
x
[−θ +θ1] f (x) = 0, −→ θ1 = E1[θ | 1 sells] = ∑x θ f (x)∑x f (x)
. (4.4)
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 8
Let’s start with equilibria in pure strategies. Given the rule of Ei[θ | i sells] a firm sells in one, two
or three states. If one firm sells in three state it requires that both firms are located at 12 , but the other
has incentives to move to one corner. If one firm sells in two states his choice must be 14 (or
3
4 ), and
the best response of the other firm is 1 (or 0). Finally, if both sells when preferences are at 12 , their
Ei[θ | i sells] is 16 or 56 but cannot be an equilibrium because only firm 1 sells with these strategies.
(given his cost advantage)
Let’s analyze those equilibria where one firm plays a pure strategy, say firm 1, and the other firm
may randomize between products varieties, say firm 2. However, each variety that is played with
positive probability must satisfy Ei[θ | i sells] to be part of a maximum and there should not be
another point where the firm gets higher expected profit.
Assume that firm 1 plays a pure strategy θ1 in [0,0.5). Firm 2 can sell with positive probability to
the left or to the right of θ1. Lets analyze first the interval in the right and focus on [0.5,1], since
the rest (θ1,0.5) is dominated. Firm 2 will sell only if θ = 0.5 or θ = 1. For some strategies, firm
2 only sells if θ = 1, in which case firm’s 2 best response is θ2 = 1. For some other strategies,
firm 2 sells a unit of the product if the state is θ = 0.5 or θ = 1, and the highest expected profit is
achieved at θ2 = 34 . Second, In the interval in the left, firm 2 sells only when θ = 0 and θ2 = 0. So
any randomization must be done in {0, 34} or {0,1}. The best response of firm 1 to these strategies
13The second effect enter into the first order condition as ∑y[c+(θ − θ2)2− (θ − θ1)2] ∂ f (y)∂θ1 , but either [c+(θ −
θ2)2− (θ −θ1)2] or ∂ f (y)∂θ1 is zero.
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is θ1 = 0.5. And finally, the best response of firm 2 to firm 1 strategy θ1 = 0.5 is θ2 = 0, θ2 = 1 or
any randomization to between them (since firm 2 yields the same expected profit in both θ2 = 0 and
θ2 = 1).
4.7.3 Proof Proposition 10
No equilibrium with low competition exists if q1 > 1− 169 c. We prove Proposition 10 showing
that, if q1 > 1− 169 c, no equilibrium with low competition can exists since firm 1 has incentives to
deviate. In the equilibrium with low competition firm 2 plays θ2 = 1 and firm 1 uses the signal,
playing θ1(s1 = 1) = 14 since this is the expected value of θ conditioning on selling.
However, suppose that firm 1 deviates and sell for all values of θ given the realization of the signal
of precision q1 is s1 = 1. If this is the case, the variety of firm 1 must be E1[θ | 1 sells] = 1+3q14 since
firm 1 always sells. So we need to check that consumer will choose to buy product 1 in all states
and that firm 1 gets higher profits deviating to this state.
It is straightforward to see that a consumer with θ = 0 or θ = 12 buys product 1. However, a
consumer with θ = 1 buys product 1 only if c > ∆v that we can express as
c >
[(
1− 1+3q1
4
)2]
. (4.5)
This condition requires that q1 > 1− 43
√
c for the consumer to prefer product 1 instead of product
2. Firm 1, instead, prefers to play θ1(s1 = 1) = 1+3q14 instead of θ1(s1 = 1) =
1
4 only if his expected
profits are greater in the former than in the latter that we can express as
q1
[
c−
(
1− 1+3q1
4
)2]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+1−
(
1+3q1
4
)2]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+
1
4
−
(
1
2
− 1+3q1
4
)2]
,
>
1−q1
2
[
c+1−
(
1
4
)2]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+
1
4
−
(
1
4
)2]
.
This condition is satisfied if q1 > 1− 169 c. Given that c < 916 , any q1 that satisfies q1 > 1− 169 c,
also satisfies q1 > 1− 43
√
c, and we claim that if q1 > 1− 169 c, firm 1 has incentives to deviate from
the equilibrium with low competition. This reveals that firm 1 would be better if he can tie his
hands when acquiring information. Given that information is not verifiable, we have that only an
equilibrium with high competition survives.
4.7.4 Proof Proposition 11
4.7.4.1 Consumer surplus.
We show that CS(public)−CS(private)< 0.
CS(public) = v− 53
1−qp
8 − 23 qp(c+1)− 13(c+ 14), and CS(private) = v− 23 cq−q 12(1−q)− c3− 112−
(1−q)2
2 (c+ 1)− (1−q)(1+3q)12 54 . And the difference is negative for q > 0.5 (if the signal is relatively
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good), since
CS(public)−CS(private) =−c(q− 1
2
)+
19
48
− 3
4
q− 39
48
q2 < 0.
4.7.4.2 Expected price.
We show that EP(public)−EP(private)> 0.
EP(public) = 12 +qc+
q
4 , and EP(private) =−qc3 + 5c6 + 724 + 5q12 −q2(1524 − c2). And the difference
is positive for q > 0.5 (if the signal is relatively good), since
EP(public)−EP(private) = 5−4q
24
+q2(
15
24
− c
2
)+
c(8q−5)
6
> 0.
4.7.4.3 Welfare: two private signals versus one public signal.
Comparing the case of two private Welfare with public signal is:
Wpublic = v− 13
{1−q
8
+(1−q)(1
2
)2
}
− 1
3
(1−q)c.
Welfare with private signal and high competition is:
Wprivate = v− 23
[
3(1−q)2
8
[
1
4
+1
]
− 1−q
12
− (1−q)C¸(1+3q)
6
c.
Calling q1 = q+ x, where x stands for the difference in signals’ precision, and ignoring the first
order effect we get:
Wpublic−Wprivate = 15q
2−20q+5
48
− c
2
(1−q)+ 5+8c
16
x2+
5q−13
24
− 2
3
cx.
4.7.4.4 One public signal versus one private signal
There is a threshold in q above which the consumer surplus is higher and welfare is lower with
private signal than with public signal. We omit the second order effects since they are very small.
Welfare with public signal is:
Wpublic = v− 13
{1−q
8
+(1−q)(1
2
)2
}
− 1
3
(1−q)c.
Welfare with private signal and high competition is:
Wprivate = v− 23
[
1−q1
4
[
1
4
+1
]
− 1−q1
3
(
1
2
)2− (1−q)
3
c.
The difference in welfare is Wpublic−Wprivate = 1−q12 > 0.
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The consumer surplus with public information is
CSpublic = v− 724 −
11
24
q− 2
3
qc− c
3
.
Consumer surplus with private signal and high competition is:
CSprivate = v− 1124 +
1
24
q− 1
3
qc− 2c
3
.
The difference in consumer surplus is CSpublic−CSprivate = 13 [(c+ 12)(1−q)−q]< 0, for q > 0.5
(since c < 0.25).
The expected price with public information is
EPpublic =
1
2
+qc+
q
4
.
The expected price with private signal and high competition is:
EPprivate =
1
3
+
1
3
q+
1
3
qc+
2c
3
.
The difference in consumer surplus is EPpublic−EPprivate = 1−q12 [1− 8c(1− q)] > 0, for q > 0.5
(since c < 0.25).
4.7.5 Expected Profits, Utility and Prices with No Information Acquisition
In each type of equilibrium the expected profits are:
1- Low competition led by firm 1 (θ1 = 14 ,θ2 = 1): Π1 =
1
3
[
1+ 18 +2c
]
and Π2 = 13
[ 9
16 − c
]
.
Expected Utility (before price) is EU = v− 23 116 , expected price is E p = 23 c+ 13(1+ 1116), and
expected consumer surplus is CS = v− 23 c− 13 2916 .
2- Low competition led by firm 2 (θ1 = 0,θ2 = 34 ): Π1 =
1
3
[ 9
16 + c
]
and Π2 = 13
[
1+ 18 − c
]
.
Expected Utility (before price) is EU = v− 13 116 , expected price is E p = 13 c+ 13(1+ 1116) and
expected consumer surplus is CS = v− 13 c− 13 2916 .
3- High competition led by firm 1 (θ1 = 12 ,(σ2(0),σ2(1)) = (0.5,0.5)): Π1 =
1
3 [1+2c] and
Π2 = 13
[1
4 − c
]
. Expected Utility (before price) is EU = v− 13 14 , expected price is E p =
2
3 c+
1
3
5
4 and expected consumer surplus is CS = v− 23 c− 13 32 .
4- High competition led by firm 2 ((σ1(0),σ1(1)) = (0.5,0.5),θ2 = 12 ): Π1 =
1
3
[1
4 + c
]
and
Π2 = 13 [1−2c]. Expected Utility (before price) is EU = v− 13 14 , expected price is E p =
1
3 c+
1
3
5
4 and expected consumer surplus is CS = v− 13 c− 13 32 .
The difference in expected price from low competitive equilibrium led by firm 2 and high competi-
tive equilibrium led by firm 1 is: ∆E p = 13
( 7
16 − c
)
.
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UPPER BOUND FOR c: If firm 1 is leading an equilibrium with high competition, it may have
incentives to deviate to θ1 = 35 if c >
4
25 . Firm 2 is randomizing in {0,1}, then with θ1 = 35 firm 1
sells if θ = 1 with probability one and if θ = 0 with probability 12 . However, if c≤ 15 the expected
profit firm 1 gets when θ1 = 12 is higher than when θ1 =
3
5 . So c < 0.2.
4.7.6 Expected Profits and Prices with Information Acquisition
4.7.6.1 Equilibrium with low competition
If firm 1 does acquire a signal with q1 not so high, there is one equilibrium where: i- firm 2 chooses
one corner, for instance θ2 = 1, acquiring no information; and ii) firm 1 chooses to offer a product
in [0,0.5] depending on the realization of the signal, i.e θ1(s1). For the case θ2 = 1, firm’s 1 strategy
is defined by:
θ2 = 1, and θ1(s1) =

1−q1
2(2q1+1−q1) if s1 = 0,
q1
2q1+1−q1 if s1 =
1
2 ,
1
4 if s1 = 1.
Let’s calculate the expected profits of firm 2 recalling that θ1(0) = 12 −θ1(12).14
Π2 =
1
3
[
−c+q1(34)
2+
1−q1
2
(1−θ1(0))2+ 1−q12 (
1
2
+θ1(0))2
]
. (4.6)
Profits for firm 1 is15
Π1 =
1
3
(c+1)− 1
3
{
q1θ1(0)2+
1−q1
2
θ1(
1
2
)2+
1−q1
2
(
1
2
)2
}
,
+
1
3
(c+
1
4
)− 1
3
{
q1(
1
2
−θ1(12))
2+
1−q1
2
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2+ 1−q12 (
1
2
)2
}
.
knowing that θ1(0) = 12 −θ1(12),
∂Π1
∂q1
=−2
3
[
θ1(0)2
]
+
1
3
[
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2+(12)
2
]
.
14
Π2 =
1
3
0+
1
3
0+
1
3
{
q1
[
(
3
4
)2− c
]
+
1−q1
2
[
(1−θ1(0))2− c
]
+
1−q1
2
[
(1−θ1(12 ))
2− c
]}
.
15
Π1 =
1
3
{
q1
[
c+1−θ1(0)2
]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+1−θ1(12 )
2
]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+1− (1
2
)2
]}
,
+
1
3
{
q1
[
c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(12 ))
2
]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(0))2
]
+
1−q1
2
[
c+
1
4
− (1
2
)2
]}
+
1
3
0.
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For q1 not so high, it is true that 23θ1(0)
2 < 13(
1
2−θ1(0))2, implying that ∂Π1∂q1 ≥ 112 . Since
∂θ1(0)
∂q1 < 0
we can show that ∂
2Π1
∂q21
> 0. We require the cost function to be sufficiently convex such that we find
a maximum with the first order condition.
In an equilibrium with low competition led by firm 1 the expected price is:16
EPLC =
1
3
5
4
+
2
3
{
c−q1θ1(0)2− 1−q12 [
1
16
+(
1
2
−θ1(0))2]
}
+
1
3
{
q1
9
16
+
1−q1
2
[(1−θ1(0))2+(1−θ1(12))
2]
}
.
The consumer gets the following expected gross utility (before price):17
EU = v− 2
3
[
q1θ1(0)2+
1−q1
2
[θ1(
1
2
)2+
1
16
]
]
Expected Consumer Surplus under low competition is:
v− 1
3
5
4
− 2
3
c− 1
3
9
16
q1− 23
1−q1
2
[(1−θ1(0))2+(12 −θ1(
1
2
))2]
4.7.6.2 Equilibrium with high competition
In this case firm 1 acquires a signal with q1 and firm 2 acquires a signal with q2. The equilibrium is
characterized by: i- firm 2 chooses one corner, following the signal realization when possible; and
ii) firm 1 chooses to offer a product in [0,1] depending on the realization of the signal, i.e θ1(s1).
Firms’ strategies are defined by:
σ2(s2) =

0 if s2 = 0,
(σ2(0),σ2(1)) = (0.5,0.5) if s2 = 12 ,
1 if s2 = 1.
, and θ1(s1) =

(1−q1)(1+ 32 (1−q2))
4q1+(1−q1)(2+ 32 (1−q2))
if s1 = 0,
1
2 if s1 =
1
2 ,
4q1+(1−q1)
4q1+(1−q1)(2+ 32 (1−q2))
if s1 = 1.
16
EPLC =+
1
3
{
q1[c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(12 ))
2]+
1−q1
2
[c+
1
4
− 1
16
]+
1−q1
2
[c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(0))2]
}
,
+
1
3
{
q1[c+1−θ1(0)2]+ 1−q12 [c+1−
1
16
]+
1−q1
2
[c+1−θ1(12 )
2]
}
,+
1
3
{
q1[(
3
4
)2]+
1−q1
2
[(1−θ1(0))2]+ 1−q12 [(1−θ1(
1
2
))2]
}
.
17
EU = v− 1
3
[
q1θ1(0)2 +
1−q1
2
θ1(
1
2
)2 +
1−q1
2
(
1
4
)2
]
− 1
3
[
q1(
1
2
−θ1(12 ))
2 +
1−q1
2
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2 + 1−q12 (
1
4
)2
]
− 1
3
0.
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Recalling that θ1(1) = 1−θ1(0), the expected profits of firm 2 are,18
Π2 =
1−q1
3
1+3q2
4
[θ1(1)2+
1
4
−2c].
Firm’s 1 profit function is19
∂Π1
∂q1
=
2
3
[
c
2
1
8
−θ1(0)2− 38(1−q2)[c− (1−θ1(0))
2]
]
+
1
3
(
1
2
−θ1(0)
)2
.
For calculating ∂
2Π1
∂q1∂q2 notice that θ1(0) also depends on q2
In an equilibrium with high competition led by firm 1 the expected price is:20
EPHC =
2
3
{
q1[c−θ1(0)2]+q1 3(1−q2)4 +
1−q1
2
3q2−1
2
][θ1(
1
2
)2+θ1(1)2]+2
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
[c+1]
}
,
+
1
3
{
[c+
1
4
]−21−q1
2
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2
}
.
18
Π2 =
1
3
{
q2
1−q1
2
[θ1(1)2− c]+ 12
1−q2
2
1−q1
2
[θ1(1)2− c]+ 1−q12
1+3q2
4
[
1
4
− c]
}
+
1
3
0,
+
1
3
{
q2
1−q1
2
[(1−θ1(0))2− c]+ 12
1−q2
2
1−q1
2
[(1−θ1(0))2− c]+ 1−q12
1+3q2
4
[
1
4
− c]
}
.
19
Π1 =
1
3
{
q1
[
c−θ1(0)2 + 34 (1−q2)
]
+
1−q1
2
[
c− 1
4
+
3
4
(1−q2)
]
+
1−q1
2
3
4
(1−q2)
[
c+1−θ1(1)2
]}
,
1
3
{
q1
[
c− (1−θ1(1))2 + 34 (1−q2)
]
+
1−q1
2
[
c− 1
4
+
3
4
(1−q2)
]
+
1−q1
2
3
4
(1−q2)
[
c+1− (1−θ1(0))2
]}
,
+
1
3
{
c+
1
4
− (1−q1)
2
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2− (1−q1)2 (θ1(1)−
1
2
)2
}
.
20
EPHC =
1
3
{
q1[q2 +
1−q2
4
][c−θ1(0)2]+q1 3(1−q2)4 [c+1−θ1(0)
2]+
1−q1
2
[q2 +
1−q2
4
][θ1(
1
2
)2],
+
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
[c+1−θ1(12 )
2]+
1−q1
2
[q2 +
1−q2
4
][θ1(1)2]+
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
[c+1−θ1(1)2]
}
,
+
1
3
{
q1[c+
1
4
]+
1−q1
2
[c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(0))2]+ 1−q12 [c+
1
4
− (θ1(1)− 12 )
2]
}
,
+
1
3
{
q1[q2 +
1−q2
4
][c− (1−θ1(1))2]+q1 3(1−q2)4 [c+1− (1−θ1(1))
2]+
1−q1
2
[q2 +
1−q2
4
][(1−θ1(12 ))
2],
+
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
[c+1− (1−θ1(12 ))
2]+
1−q1
2
[q2 +
1−q2
4
][(1−θ1(0))2]+ 1−q12
3(1−q2)
4
[c+1− (1−θ1(0))2]
}
.
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The consumer gets the following expected gross utility (before price)21
EU = v− 2
3
[
q1θ1(0)2+
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
[
1
4
+(1−θ1(0))2
]
− 2
3
1−q1
2
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2.
Expected Consumer Surplus under under high competition is:
v− 2
3
cq1− 23q1
3
4
(1−q2)− 13(c+
1
4
)− 2
3
3(1−q1)1−q24 (c+1)−
2
3
1−q1
2
1+3q2
4
[
1
4
+(1−θ1(0))2].
for the extreme case that there is perfect information about the taste, the expected net utility under
low competition is v− 13(1+ 14)− 23 c− 13 916 while for high competition is v− 13(c+ 14)− 23 c and the
difference (low- high) is−13(1−c)− 13 916 which accounts only for the absence of competition, since
perfect information generates a perfect match between at least one product and consumer’s taste.
Notice that the difference is lower when the cost advantage is higher. However, this cost advantage
could be necessary for having an equilibrium with high competition.
4.7.7 Firm’s incentives to Play Pure Strategies
Notice these strategies.
σ2(s2) =

0 if s2 = 0,
(σ2(0),σ2(1)) = (0.5,0.5) if s2 = 12 ,
1 if s2 = 1.
, and θ1(s1) =

(1−q1)(1+ 32 (1−q2))
4q1+(1−q1)(2+ 32 (1−q2))
if s1 = 0,
1
2 if s1 =
1
2 ,
4q1+(1−q1)
4q1+(1−q1)(2+ 32 (1−q2))
if s1 = 1.
Could firm 1 do better when the signal is s1 = 12 by randomizing between the left and the right of
1
2 .
If this is case, by the rule of E1[θ |sell], firm 1 randomizes between:
θ a1 (s1 =
1
2
) =
q1+ 34(1−q1)(1−q2)
1+q1+ 34(1−q1)(1−q2)
, and θ b1 (s1 =
1
2
) =
1
1+q1+ 34(1−q1)(1−q2)
.(4.7)
With θ a1 < 0.5 < θ
b
1 . However, if θ = 0 the consumer prefers θ
a
1 to θ2 = 0 only if the value of q1
satisfies q1 < 11− 34 (1−q2)
[
√
c
1−√c − 34(1−q2)].
4.7.8 Expected Prices with Public Signals
Let’s assume that there is a public signal s that is the true value θ with probability q and a random
draw from the complementary set. If the signal precision q is not so high, there are equilibria with
21
EU = v− 1
3
[
q1θ1(0)2 +
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
(
1
2
)2 +
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
θ1(1)2
]
− 1
3
[
q10+2
1−q1
2
(
1
2
−θ1(0))2
]
,
−1
3
[
q1(1−θ1(1))2 + 1−q12
3(1−q2)
4
(
1
2
)2 +
1−q1
2
3(1−q2)
4
(1−θ1(0))2
]
.
78
Chapter 4 Hotelling Competition for a Consumer with Unknown Taste
low competition. However, if the q is high enough, the only equilibria that survives is the one where
firms choose the following varieties.
σ2(sp) =

1 if sp = 0,
(σ2(0),σs(1)) = (0.5,0.5) if sp = 12 ,
0 if sp = 1.
and θ1(s1) =

(1−qp)
2(1+qp)
if sp = 0,
1
2 if sp =
1
2 ,
(1+3qp)
2(1+qp)
if sp = 1.
the expected price paid by the consumer is:22
EPpublic =
2
3
{
qp[c+1]−qp[θ1(0)2]+ 1−qp2
1
2
+
1−qp
2
[θ1(1)2− c]
}
,
+
1
3
{
qp(c+
1
4
)+
1−qp
2
[c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(0))2]+ 1−qp2 [c+
1
4
− (θ1(1)− 12)
2]
}
.
Expected utility before price is:
EU = v− 1
3
{
2qpθ1(0)2+
1−qp
2
1
4
+(1−qp)(12 −θ1(0))
2
}
the difference between utility and price are:
v− 5
3
1−qp
8
− 2
3
qp(c+1)− 13(c+
1
4
)
Notice that if q is high, the difference in expected utility is higher under any type of competition
with private information than with public information.
4.8 Appendix B: Bayesian Pricing Game
Setup: One consumer with taste θ (∈ {0;0.5;1}) must buy one unit of a product. The prior
is that each value of θ ∈ {0;0.5;1} realizes with the same probability. The utility that the
consumer with taste θ derives of buying a product with location θi (∈ [0,1]) at price pi (∈ R+) is
U(pi,θi) = v− (θ −θi)2− pi. We assume v∼+∞, i.e., the buyer always buys a unit of the product.
The prior is that θ ∈ {0;0.5;1} with the same probability. Two homogeneous firms with zero unit
cost simultaneously choose a location and a price. After observing both products locations and
prices the consumer chooses from which firm she buys one unit of a product. The timing is that,
first, firms choose (θi, pi) simultaneously without knowing the consumer’s location θ , and second,
22
EPpublic =
1
3
{
qp[c+1−θ1(0)2]+
1−qp
2
[
1
2
(
1
4
− c)+ 1
2
(c+1− 1
4
)]+
1−qp
2
[θ1(1)2− c]
}
,
+
1
3
{
qp(c+
1
4
)+
1−qp
2
[c+
1
4
− (1
2
−θ1(0))2]+
1−qp
2
[c+
1
4
− (θ1(1)− 12 )
2]
}
,
+
1
3
{
qp[c+1− (1−θ1(1))2]+
1−qp
2
[
1
2
(
1
4
− c)+ 1
2
(1+ c− 1
4
)]+
1−qp
2
[(1−θ1(0))2− c]
}
.
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the consumer chooses from which firm to buy one unit of a product maximizing her utility. In case
of being indifferent between both products, the consumer randomly peaks one firm.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique equilibrium θi = 12 ∀i, pi ∼ F(p), F(p) = 1− 1p for p ∈ [1,+∞).
First we prove the following lemma
Lemma 6. In equilibrium, the density function of the mixed strategy f (p) is decreasing function of
p.
Proof. Recall that maxpΠ = maxp 13 p∑k[1−Fk(p)]. Suppose that f (p) is increasing. The first
order condition is
∑
k
[1−Fk(p)]− p∑
k
fk(p) = 0.
Since the function f (p) represent a mixed strategy, it must satisfy the first order condition for all p
in the domain. In particular for p and p+ ε: ∑k[1−Fk(p+ ε)] = (p+ ε)∑k fk(p+ ε). Subtracting
the first order conditions for p and p+ ε we have
∑
k
[Fk(p)−Fk(p+ ε)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 since F ′(p)>0
= p[∑
k
fk(p+ ε)− fk(p)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 since by assumption f ′(p)>0
+ε∑
k
fk(p+ ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
but this is a contradiction. Then f (p) is decreasing.
Proof. θi = 12 ∀i is an equilibrium. Let D(p|12) be the expected demand given the other firm is
located at 12 . Given this, F(p) is uniquely identified at F(p) = 1− 1p . Note that: Π= p[1−F(p)] =
p[1− (1− 1p)] = 1, and that E[p1|p1 ≤ p2] = 2.
Lemma 7. There exists no other equilibrium.
We prove this by showing that if θi < 12 (W.L.O.G.), the best response of the other player is to choose
θˆ = BR j(θi) ∈ (θi, 12). The Best Response mapping has a unique F(p) at 12 . The firm chooses θˆ .
The demand
D(p|θˆ) = 1
3
[
F(p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)+F(p+(θ1−
1
2
)2− (θˆ − 1
2
)2)+F(p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2)
]
.
We first prove that (2.a) θi ≤ θˆ : by contradiction. Suppose θi > θˆ and choosing the value of θˆ to
maximize the expected demand:
−2θˆ f (p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)−2(θˆ −
1
2
) f (p+(θ1− 12)
2− (θˆ − 1
2
)2)−2(θˆ −1) f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2) = 0.
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And we obtain a value of θˆ equal to,
1
2
< θˆ =
1
2 f (p+(θ1− 12)2− (θˆ − 12)2)+ f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2)
f (p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)+ f (p+(θ1− 12)2− (θˆ − 12)2)+ f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2)
.
Since f (p) is decreasing, implies that f (p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)< f (p+(θ1−1)2−(θˆ−1)2) (recall that that
θˆ < θ1), but 12 < θˆ generates a contradiction, and θ1 < θˆ .
Second we prove that (2.b) θi < θˆ . Suppose that θi = θˆ
−2θˆ f (p)−2(θˆ − 1
2
) f (p)−2(θˆ −1) f (p) = 0.
which implies that θˆ = 12 , but we have assumed that θi <
1
2 , then θˆ = θi yields a contradiction.
Third we prove that (2.c) θˆ ≤ 12 . For any θi < 0.5 the first order condition respect to θˆ is also lower
than 12 . Recall that we have proved that θˆ > θi. In the first order condition respect to θˆ note that
f (p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)> f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2)
−2θˆ f (p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)−2(θˆ −
1
2
) f (p+(θ1− 12)
2− (θˆ − 1
2
)2)−2(θˆ −1) f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2) = 0.
now
1
2
> θˆ =
1
2 f (p+(θ1− 12)2− (θˆ − 12)2)+ f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2)
f (p+θ 21 − θˆ 2)+ f (p+(θ1− 12)2− (θˆ − 12)2)+ f (p+(θ1−1)2− (θˆ −1)2)
.
Notice that we have proved that θˆ ∈ (θi, 12). The proof is complete.
Finally, note that when both firms locates in the same point, e.g., θi = 12 , given the mixed strategy
F(p) of the other firm, the first order condition respect to p is
[1−F(p)]− p f (p) = 0, → −1
p
=
∂ log[1−F(p)]
∂ p
.
And we conclude that F(p) = 1− 1p .
4.8.1 Comparison
In this setup firms locate at 0.5 and charge high expected prices. A simple comparison with our
benchmark model yields an straithforward conclusion. Our setup drives lower expected prices and
lower losses due to location. In our setup the expected price paid by the buyer is 916 and the welfare
loss due to location is 116
2
3 . In the alternative model presented in this appendix, the expected price
is 2 and the loss due to location is 14
2
3 .
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